When you talk about minority chain we should take in consideration that this might change over time. So todays winning chain might be the loser of tomorrow and so on. Might be pretty messy with re-orgs and double spends... Also I would not count with what some people expect that the minority chain will quickly die (or get killed). The ETH devs made that mistake and underestimated ETC a lot. Mining resources and price are highly dynamic factors making predictions much harder. Not to talk about the emotional and political factors... Also a PoW change is a very likely element in such a scenario...
Am Mittwoch, 22. März 2017 11:18:23 UTC-5 schrieb Andreas Schildbach: > > Maybe the recommendation should be: if you want to follow a minority > chain, use the Peer API to connect to a trusted peer under your control. > You can then run your desired full node implemention on the trusted peer > and bitcoinj will follow. If the network between bitcoinj and the > trusted peer is not to be trusted, use a VPN to secure that connection > (the Bitcoin protocol itself lacks authentication). > > That would be far more reliable than a version string whitelist. In > fact, frontending bitcoinj with bitcoind has always been a > recommendation for centralized/web services, so if they followed that > recommendation they should not have to change anything. > > > On 03/22/2017 03:34 PM, Tobias B. wrote: > > Still maybe it adding an API call to go into "whitelist mode" and then > > add certain node ips would be a compromise. Software building on > > bitcoinj could then offer the user to go into this mode and add certain > > ips there. > > > > On Wednesday, March 22, 2017 at 3:25:15 PM UTC+1, Tobias B. wrote: > > > > A whitelist of nodes for me sounds highly conflicting with the > > decentralized nature of bitcoin. Also what if nodes switch their > > software? Not that unlikely in case they notice that their minority > > chain is dying. > > > > On Wednesday, March 22, 2017 at 1:28:09 PM UTC+1, Jameson Lopp > wrote: > > > > > > > > On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 1:55 AM, Manfred Karrer > > <manfred...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > A Bitcoin core node will not mine a transaction originated > > in a >1 MB block (not sure if it would relay it). BitcoinJ > > has no validation of that consensus rule, so it would accept > > a tx from a BTU block. I think with a whitelist to connect > > to BTC core nodes only (or better run your local node) you > > should be safe against receiving txs from a BTU block (> > > 1MB or built on top of a >1MB block). If BTC core does not > > check if a tx has inputs from a >1 MB block for replaying > > then we need to take extra care of 0 confirmation txs. > > Does anyone here know if that is the case? > > > > > > If your software ignores all unconfirmed transactions then I > > could see a slightly stronger argument for going the whitelist > > route. My point was that unconfirmed transactions will get > > relayed around the network by nodes on both chain forks. > > > > > > Yes I agree on the protocol level it will be hard as the > > nodes can easily lie. > > > > Sure wallet providers should not have to deal with it. But I > > don't see much alternative. As pure wallet it might be > > easier to tell the people just dont use yoru wallet for a > > few days/week. But for Bitsquare as an exchange that is not > > really an option, trading should not get stopped (and in > > case of Bitsquare cannot really). > > > > Maybe 2015 people have not been so nervous about it because > > it was before ETH demonstrated the risk and damage of a > HF... > > > > Am Dienstag, 21. März 2017 21:42:07 UTC-5 schrieb Jameson > Lopp: > > > > I don't think replay protection can be added at the > > network level. Peers could lie about their software > > version and/or switch it, plus it's highly likely that a > > chain split won't result in a clean network partition. > > Transactions will get relayed around the network > > comprised of nodes on both chains and you can expect > > that Core nodes would still relay transactions to you > > that were originally broadcast by Unlimited nodes and > > vice versa. > > > > At a more philosophical level, I'm not so sure that the > > onus is on every wallet provider to implement protection > > against contentious hard forks. You could have made > > similar arguments that BitcoinJ should have added replay > > protection when support for 8MB blocks was nearing 50% > > hashrate back in 2015. > > > > On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Manfred Karrer > > <manfred...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Btw. of course the whitelist can be set by the user > > himself, so if he runs a full node he can use that. > > But knowing that the majority of users are not > > running their own full node we need alternative > > solutions as well. > > > > > > Am Dienstag, 21. März 2017 19:23:56 UTC-5 schrieb > > Manfred Karrer: > > > > Andreas, how are you planning to protect users > > of the Android wallet agains replay attacks? > > How does a user know if she/he can send his > > wallet coins to a peer who accepts only BTC or > > BTU (e.g. exchange)? Otherwise he might end up > > pretty frustrated to see outgoing transactions > > at this wallet but not confirmation of receipt > > at the receiver. > > > > You cannot assume that all your users are > > blindly following the longest PoW chain as the > > only valid BTC chain and ignore the replay > > attack risks. > > There might be even legal issues connected to it > > (see ETH HF and losses from replay attacks), > > probably less for a wallet provider than for a > > centralized exchange holding customers funds. > > But I am not sure if that would not fall back to > > others as well (due diligence), at least people > > could try to sue... > > > > One of the easiest solution I see is to deploy a > > whitelist of Bitcoin Core nodes and use those > > for the P2P network connections. > > You can give the user the choice to select > > between whitelist Bitcoin Core nodes (if he > > wants BTC), whitelist BU nodes (i he wants BTU) > > or public network (if he thinks all plays out by > > itself and is aware of the included risk/mess). > > Of course a whitelist is not great as well but > > that would solve the problem that we cannot know > > in advance the data which helps us to > > distinguish between the chains (like blockID or > > certain transactions). That whitelist only need > > to be used as long the HF is messy, once things > > have settled it can be removed or replaced by > > other distinguishing data sources like blockIds. > > > > If BTU implements a clean mechanism to make it > > easy to distinguish that would be the best > > solution of course but I am not aware of any > > concrete plans for such. > > > > > > Am Mittwoch, 15. März 2017 06:08:55 UTC-5 > > schrieb Andreas Schildbach: > > > > As long as a fork does not change the proof > > of work rules, bitcoinj > > makes no assumptions about forks. It will > > always select the chain with > > the most work. > > > > What do you mean by "requesting an UTXO" and > > what do you want to achieve > > by that? > > > > > > On 03/14/2017 06:07 PM, Manfred Karrer > wrote: > > > If there would happen really a BU fork SPV > > wallets could get a > > > connection to a majority of BU nodes and > > so a different view to the network. > > > Any plans or ideas how to deal with that? > > > > > > One idea would be to use a UTXO which is > > known to exist on only 1 chain > > > request that and use that as a check to > > see which chain the node is > > > operated on. > > > If it is not the chain the wallet supports > > the node gets disconnected. > > > > > > Br, > > > Manfred > > > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are > > subscribed to the Google > > > Groups "bitcoinj" group. > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop > > receiving emails from it, send > > > an email to bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com > > > <mailto:bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com>. > > > For more options, visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/optout > > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed > > to the Google Groups "bitcoinj" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving > > emails from it, send an email to > > bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/optout > > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the > > Google Groups "bitcoinj" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails > > from it, send an email to bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "bitcoinj" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > > an email to bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com <javascript:> > > <mailto:bitcoinj+u...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>>. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "bitcoinj" group. 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