#8813: openssl-1.0.2k
-------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  renodr       |      Owner:  blfs-book@…
     Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
 Priority:  high         |  Milestone:  8.0
Component:  BOOK         |    Version:  SVN
 Severity:  normal       |   Keywords:
-------------------------+-------------------------
 New security release


 {{{
 OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Jan 2017]
 ========================================

 Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731)
 =========================================================

 Severity: Moderate

 If an SSL/TLS server or client is running on a 32-bit host, and a specific
 cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that server or
 client
 to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.

 For OpenSSL 1.1.0, the crash can be triggered when using
 CHACHA20/POLY1305;
 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d

 For Openssl 1.0.2, the crash can be triggered when using RC4-MD5; users
 who have
 not disabled that algorithm should update to 1.0.2k

 This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 13th November 2016 by Robert Święcki
 of
 Google. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development
 team.

 Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730)
 ===========================================================

 Severity: Moderate

 If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key
 exchange
 then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL
 pointer
 leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service
 attack.

 OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d

 This issue does not affect OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

 Note that this issue was fixed prior to it being recognised as a security
 concern. This means the git commit with the fix does not contain the CVE
 identifier. The relevant fix commit can be identified by commit hash
 efbe126e3.

 This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 14th January 2017 by Guido Vranken.
 The
 fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

 BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732)
 ==================================================================

 Severity: Moderate

 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
 procedure. No
 EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and
 DSA
 as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
 believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although
 very
 difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
 about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
 required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
 accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
 additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
 private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
 key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
 default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is
 very
 similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.

 OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0d
 OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2k

 This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 15th January 2017 by the OSS-Fuzz
 project.
 The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL development team.

 Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
 =======================================================================

 Severity: Low

 This issue was previously fixed in 1.1.0c and covered in security advisory
 https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20161110.txt

 OpenSSL 1.0.2k users should upgrade to 1.0.2k
 }}}

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