#11685: Generate a security patch for GDM Authentication Bypasses
-------------------------+-----------------------
 Reporter:  renodr       |      Owner:  blfs-book
     Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
 Priority:  high         |  Milestone:  8.4
Component:  BOOK         |    Version:  SVN
 Severity:  normal       |   Keywords:
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 Another private report from an Arch Linux developer who prefers to remain
 anonymous.

 There are two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in GDM that were
 discovered last week. This ticket is being defined to track them.

 Vulnerability 1:
 [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1672825]
 [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdm/issues/460]
 [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdm/merge_requests/58]

 {{{
 In some cases with timed login enabled, GDM will unlock a session for a
 different user than typed their password

 Burghard Britzke reported to [email protected] that he has found a bug in
 GDM's timed login implementation.

 Under the right circumstances, after the timed login timeout expires, a
 running session may get misassociated with the timed login user instead of
 the user that started the session. Further attempts to log in as the timed
 login user will instead unlock the misassociated user session.

 This only affects X.org since, we kill the login screen on wayland after
 login.

 Steps to reproduce:

     create two users bubi(1000) and user gast(1001)
     edit the [daemon] section of /etc/gdm/custom.conf to enable timed
 login for the gast user

 [daemon]
 TimedLoginEnable=true
 TimedLogin=gast
 TimedLoginDelay=10

     restart
     login as user bubi(1000)
     lock the screen
     select Login as different user below the password field
     select gast from the user list and enter the password for the gast
 user
     notice that the bubi user is unlocked instead of the gast user

 }}}

 Vulnerability 2:

 {{{
 Partial screen lock bypass via keybindings?

 I noticed that on a locked Gnome screen, when you right-click on the
 password text field, certain keyboard shortcuts are re-enabled.

 Example1: right-click, the small menu (copy/paste/...) appears, then press
 Super+F10. You can now see the front window menu, and eg you can close the
 window, or change its parameters, etc.

 Example2: right-click, press Alt+Screenshot, and a screenshot of the
 window is taken and saved in the user's Pictures/ directory. It means that
 someone can fill the disk with images.

 Example3: press Alt+Super+S, and sometimes, Orca starts spelling you the
 content of the window (which is supposed to be secret since the screen is
 locked). It does not always do, not sure why. Note also that by then
 enabling the virtual keyboard (by clicking on it in the accessibility
 button that appeared on the upper-right corner of the screen), you can
 then open (in the session, but not in gdm) the accessibility menu.

 All of that doesn't look really intentional to me.
 }}}
 [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell/issues/851]

 These vulnerabilities have been assigned IDs CVE-2019-3820 and
 CVE-2019-3825 by Red Hat Product Security.

--
Ticket URL: <http://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/ticket/11685>
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