I've poked around here, and I'm not sure it's possible to wire this up to a base::Feature. Headless runs some code before instantiating context, including parsing a remote debugging IP address from the command line. This results in calling the IPv4 parser before content, and thus the global feature list, is loaded, which results in the feature code CHECKing. Even if we figured out a way to work around this, I'm concerned that other code not exercised by the trybots may be doing the same thing, which could result in a lot of unexpected surprises.
I guess we could add a command line switch to bypass the check, though that's more difficult to use than a base::Feature, and can't be set server-side. Open to other ideas. On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 10:16 AM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: > On second thought, doesn't seem to be any benefit to a partial rollout on > prerelease channels, so probably just land it with an enabled by default > base::Feature. > > On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 7:57 AM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: > >> I'm planning to ship it behind a feature (enabled by default, after >> experimenting on pre-release channels) to allow emergency disabling. >> >> On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 12:53 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> OK, I'm convinced that these are not "real" hosts, and that breaking >>> them will not result in actual user-visible breakage. Would it be possible >>> to ship this with a server-side flag that'd enable us to quickly revert in >>> case we're wrong? >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:09 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: >>> >>>> So given information on this thread, I think the ways these can succeed >>>> are possibly: >>>> 1) Entries in the HOSTS file. >>>> 2) Intermediary DNS servers or MitMs typo squatting, or actively >>>> attacking the user. >>>> 3) Local DNS servers providing additional DNS results. >>>> 4) Suffix search (which would trigger on, e.g., "1533.67.89" but not >>>> "67.89.1533") >>>> 5) mDNS >>>> 6) Local tools injecting DNS lookup results. >>>> >>>> Unfortunately, we don't have a good way to gather hard data on which >>>> are more common. Given that there are potential security implications >>>> here, I'm reluctant to wait for another round of data gathering, though we >>>> could probably distinguish cases 4) and 5) from the others, and 1) as well, >>>> at least on some platforms. Also not sure how useful just knowing about >>>> those cases would be. >>>> On Thursday, August 19, 2021 at 11:54:29 AM UTC-4 Harald Alvestrand >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks - I misremembered which end of the class B network got jammed >>>>> together. 67.89.31533 is indeed the one that is "legal" syntax, and so of >>>>> course 67.89.1 is too. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 3:20 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Note that 127.0.1 is mapped to 127.0.0.1 by GURL, following the URL >>>>>> spec, so that would generally not make it to the DNS resolver (unless >>>>>> something tried to resolve it directly). Per the URL spec, "31533.67.89" >>>>>> would not be normalized by GURL, but "67.89.31533" would be converted to >>>>>> 67.89.123.45. My instrumentation was at the DNS layer, so "127.0.1" and >>>>>> "67.89.31533" would not show up as problematic hostnames in my metrics, >>>>>> though "31533.67.89" would. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 9:10 AM Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting property of all-numeric hostnames is that they *may* >>>>>>> be legitimate IPv4 addresses using highly archaic IP address formats - >>>>>>> we're so used to the 123.45.67.89 syntax that we forget that 31533.67.89 >>>>>>> once was regarded as a legitimate way to encode the same address (class >>>>>>> B >>>>>>> notation). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are also certain resolvers that will "helpfully" map an >>>>>>> all-numeric hostname presented in DNS to an IP address without asking >>>>>>> anyone. >>>>>>> So if those two bugs (or "archaic features") occur together, the >>>>>>> result may be a successful resolution. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No idea why it would occur more often on Android than on Windows, >>>>>>> though. And my Linux boxes don't resolve 127.0.1 to anything. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:42 PM Yoav Weiss <yoav...@chromium.org> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interesting! What happens then in the "successful resolution" case >>>>>>>> Matt mentioned? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:39 PM Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Department of odd facts: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - The ICANN rules for new TLDs forbid all top level domain names >>>>>>>>> that start with a digit >>>>>>>>> - The IDNA rules for bidirectional scripts forbid domain names >>>>>>>>> that start with a digit (Unicode bidi afficandoes will know why) >>>>>>>>> - The only real reason why leading digits aren't outlawed in >>>>>>>>> domain names at the second level is 3com. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It seems safe to say that no legitimate fully qualified hostname >>>>>>>>> will ever have a last component consisting only of digits. >>>>>>>>> That means the only time we could get a legitimate hostname is for >>>>>>>>> something that has to be resolved via a search path. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:33 PM Yoav Weiss <yoav...@chromium.org> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:28 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I created the title using Chrome Status's deprecation >>>>>>>>>>> template, so any confusion should be blamed on that. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> +Jason Robbins - on the title issues. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I used the "Draft Intent to Deprecate and Remove email" button, >>>>>>>>>>> and assume I'd need to do a "Draft Intent to Ship email" before >>>>>>>>>>> shipping to >>>>>>>>>>> stable, after a 50% trial on prerelease channels. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There's no need for 2 emails for removals. We can discuss the >>>>>>>>>> full deprecation, experimentation/trials and removal on stable here. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 3:15 AM Yoav Weiss <yoav...@chromium.org> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:36 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 5:23 PM Yoav Weiss < >>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:18 PM Matt Menke < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mme...@google.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 4:53 PM Yoav Weiss < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 8:47 PM 'Matt Menke' via blink-dev < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Contact emailsmme...@google.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ExplainerNone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Specificationhttps://url.spec.whatwg.org/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Summary >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in numbers are treated as valid, and looked up via DNS (e.g., >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://foo.127.1/). Per the Public Suffix List spec, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eTLD+1 of the hostname in that URL should be "127.1". If that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is ever fed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> back into a URLs, "http://127.1/ <http://127.0.0.1/>" is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapped to "http://127.0.0.1/"; by the URL spec, which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems potentially dangerous. "127.0.0.0.1" could also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> potentially be used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to confuse users. We want to reject URLs with these hostnames. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blink componentInternals>Network>DNS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3EDNS> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Motivation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in numbers are treated as valid hostnames, and looked up via >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DNS. Example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hostnames: 127.0.0.0.1, foo.0.1, 10.0.0.09, 08.1.2.3. These >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problematic for the following reason: * "http://foo.127.1/"; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has an eTLD+1 of "127.1", per the public suffix list spec. If >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that's ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used as the hostname in a new URL, however, as in " >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://127.1 <http://127.0.0.1/>", it will then get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapped to "http://127.0.0.1/";, per the URL spec, which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a different host, which is not safe. * "http://127.0.0.0.1"; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and "http://1.2.3.09";, both of which are looked up via >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DNS rather than failing or being treated as IPv4 hostnames, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also seem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> potentially confusing. While no exploit is currently known >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, we want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remove support for these as a preventative security measure. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The URL spec >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated so that any URL with a hostname ending in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number that's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not an IPv4 address (including, e.g., http://foo.1./, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not http://foo.1../) is considered invalid. Since this is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part of the URL spec, not the DNS spec, we want to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these URLs are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the GURL layer, for URLs with appropriate protocols (http, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https, ws, wss, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> file). For consistency, we should also fail DNS lookup >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempts of these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sorts of hostnames. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Initial public proposal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG reviewNot required for an Intent to Deprecate, I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> believe. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG review statusNot applicable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Risks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Any URL with an affected hostname will fail to load, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will need to be migrated to another hostname. URLs of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> form do appear >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be in use, though it's not clear under what circumstances. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No entry in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the public suffix list is affected. Affected URLs make up no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 0.0003% of hostnames looked up via the host resolver on any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> platform, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are basically not used in any file URLs, according to our >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metrics. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do we have reason to believe these hostnames are not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> legitimate ones? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately, we have no insight into them - they could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistyped URLs sent to typo squatting ISPs that OSX lets through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Windows host resolver blocks, and various flavors of Linux treat >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> differently. Or they could be mapped via a hosts file, or they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hostnames that only resolve on public networks. Could be some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network tool >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that uses them when installed locally, but is only available on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certain >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> platforms. No reason to think one possibility is more likely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do we have UKM for them that would enable us to test a random >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sample? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm concerned about blocking those hostnames if they are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> legitimate, as that's something that a web developer can't do >>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So even if the number of hosts is small, I'd like to get more >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainty that they are *not* legitimate hosts before blocking >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> We have UKM on their number (0.0003% of DNS lookups on OSX, >>>>>>>>>>>>> less elsewhere - we can't meaningfully instrument percent of >>>>>>>>>>>>> created GURLs), but we don't have their hostnames, what they >>>>>>>>>>>>> resolve to, or >>>>>>>>>>>>> know anything else about them, unfortunately. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Navigation to a subset of these as frame URLs were broken at >>>>>>>>>>>>> one point - I'm pretty sure the breakage even made it to stable: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://crbug.com/1173238. There were no reports of >>>>>>>>>>>>> problems. Only non-IPv4 URLs where the last two components were >>>>>>>>>>>>> broken, >>>>>>>>>>>>> though, and it didn't affect subresources. On OSX and Android, >>>>>>>>>>>>> over 99% of >>>>>>>>>>>>> successfully resolved problematic hostnames fit into that bucket, >>>>>>>>>>>>> though on >>>>>>>>>>>>> Linux, only about 2% do. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> That doesn't give us any hard conclusions, except they're >>>>>>>>>>>>> either not deliberate navigations on OSX/Android, or they're not >>>>>>>>>>>>> navigations. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> :| >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> One more question: Is this an intent to Prototype or an intent >>>>>>>>>>>> to deprecate? The title is a bit unclear.. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On OSX and Android, about 90% of host resolver lookups for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these hostnames succeed, 60% do on Linux, and 2% on Windows >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and ChromeOS. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you know where those failures are coming from? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could be typos, could be the Windows and ChromeOS host >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> resolvers don't let them through. Since we've had no filed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bugs about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them, I suspect the failures are not deliberate navigations or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intended >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network requests. I'm much more interested in where the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successes are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coming from, myself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To allow for emergency disabling in case of wider than >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expected breakage, I intend to add a feature for it, and do a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 50% field >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trial on pre-release channels, though plan to just enable the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> feature, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rather than do a gradual rollout to stable, given the low >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usage. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gecko: Positive ( >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619#issuecomment-890826499 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/admin/features/launch/5679790780579840/1?intent=1> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Can you file an official position request? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://bit.ly/blink-signals >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Done for Mozilla: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/568 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Should I also do this for WebKit as well? They have in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process CLs, so not sure if it's still needed. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Agree that in-flight patches for WebKit are a sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>> positive signal. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WebKit: In development ( >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=228826) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Web developers: No signals >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Activation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This breaks anything using one of these domains, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requires migrating to other hostnames. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Security >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> None >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> These will act like any other invalid URL. Behavior is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> context dependent. Since this is logic deep within GURL, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> GURLs are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> created in a great many places, console warnings specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for this seem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not practical. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?No. Javascript URL construction is tested, but URLs are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in a great many other places, which don't have test >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coverage, since >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DNS lookups for these domains must succeed in the first place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the tests >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be meaningful. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Flag name >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome?False >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking bughttps://crbug.com/1237032 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on desktop 95 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on Webview 95 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5679790780579840 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Status <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from it, send an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the >>>>>>>>>> Google Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfWB4wVuGshgPaLVXp%3DYsWUiXgJhUABD3ZFJ9xbhg1J3ww%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfWB4wVuGshgPaLVXp%3DYsWUiXgJhUABD3ZFJ9xbhg1J3ww%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvqM3xXaW_TYsjsF5Bv55Ye6SOgL5DRoZ7ma5ZZ5RsW%3Dbg%40mail.gmail.com.
