_I_ don't think we should do that, but I'd defer to Titouan's preference. :)

-mike


On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:14 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote:

> Thanks - I also don't think there's a lot of value in this particular
> header being the odd-one-out, just wanted to confirm we're not going to
> ship "true" first and try to change that to ?1 later (which is always
> challenging).
>
> On 12/2/21 11:11 AM, Mike West wrote:
>
> I'm not sure it makes sense to introduce a structured header here, given
> that it's layering on top of CORS headers that I don't think there's
> substantial interest in changing.
>
> -mike
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:55 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev <
> blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Mike,
>>
>> There is no support for structured headers so far, for consistency
>> reasons, and there has been no movement to deprecate the "true" value for
>> Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The value of such a deprecation seems
>> minimal.
>>
>> I could pretty easily add support for the structured "?1" value on top of
>> the "true" token for the new Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header,
>> and specify that, but I'm not sure it would be terribly useful. Do you
>> think otherwise?
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Titouan
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Titouan,
>>>
>>> I'm curious what the plan is for structured headers.
>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45 is marked as
>>> blocked - has there been other progress or thinking behind the scenes?
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Mike
>>>
>>> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev wrote:
>>>
>>> Contact emails tito...@chromium.org, v...@chromium.org,
>>> cl...@chromium.org
>>>
>>> Explainer
>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md
>>>
>>> Specification https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/
>>>
>>> Design docs
>>>
>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit
>>>
>>> Summary
>>>
>>> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any private network requests for
>>> subresources, asking for explicit permission from the target server. A
>>> private network request is any request from a public website to a private
>>> IP address or localhost, or from a private website (e.g. intranet) to
>>> localhost. Sending a preflight request mitigates the risk of cross-site
>>> request forgery attacks against private network devices such as routers,
>>> which are often not prepared to defend against this threat.
>>>
>>>
>>> Blink component Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess
>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>
>>>
>>> TAG review https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572
>>>
>>> TAG review status Pending
>>>
>>> Risks
>>>
>>>
>>> Interoperability and Compatibility
>>>
>>> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if other browser engines
>>> do not implement this. Compat risk is straightforward: web servers that do
>>> not handle the new preflight requests will eventually break, once the
>>> feature ships. The plan to address this is as follows: 1. Send preflight
>>> request, ignore result, always send actual request. Failed preflight
>>> requests will result in a warning being shown in devtools. 2. Wait for 3
>>> milestones. 3. Gate actual request on preflight request success, with
>>> deprecation trial for developers to buy some more time. 4. End deprecation
>>> trial 4 milestones later. UseCounters:
>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753
>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755
>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757 The
>>> above measure pages that make at least one private network request for
>>> which we would now send a preflight request.
>>>
>>>
>>> Gecko: Worth prototyping (
>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143)
>>>
>>> WebKit: No signal (
>>> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html)
>>> Pending response.
>>>
>>> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so far suggests that most
>>> web developers are OK with this new requirement, though some do not control
>>> the target endpoints and would be negatively impacted.
>>>
>>> Other signals:
>>>
>>> Ergonomics
>>>
>>> None.
>>>
>>>
>>> Activation
>>>
>>> Gating access to the private network overnight on preflight requests
>>> would likely result in widespread breakage. This is why the plan is to
>>> first send requests but not act on their result, giving server developers
>>> time to implement code handling these requests. Deprecation warnings will
>>> be surfaced in DevTools to alert web/client developers when the potential
>>> for breakage later on is detected. Enforcement will be turned on later
>>> (aiming for 3 milestones), along with a deprecation trial for impacted web
>>> developers to buy themselves some more time. Experience suggests a large
>>> fraction of developers will not notice the advance deprecation warnings
>>> until things break.
>>>
>>>
>>> Security
>>>
>>> This change aims to be security-positive, preventing CSRF attacks
>>> against soft and juicy targets such as router admin interfaces. DNS
>>> rebinding threats were of particular concern during the design of this
>>> feature:
>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9
>>>
>>>
>>> Debuggability
>>>
>>> Relevant information (client and resource IP address space) is already
>>> piped into the DevTools network panel. Deprecation warnings and errors will
>>> be surfaced in the DevTools issues panel explaining the problem when it
>>> arises.
>>>
>>>
>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
>>> ? Yes
>>>
>>> DevTrial instructions
>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md
>>>
>>> Flag name PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults
>>>
>>> Requires code in //chrome? False
>>>
>>> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068
>>>
>>> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149
>>>
>>> Estimated milestones
>>> DevTrial on desktop 98
>>> DevTrial on android 98
>>>
>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>>>
>>> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to prototype:
>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ
>>>
>>>
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>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>.
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