_I_ don't think we should do that, but I'd defer to Titouan's preference. :)
-mike On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:14 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote: > Thanks - I also don't think there's a lot of value in this particular > header being the odd-one-out, just wanted to confirm we're not going to > ship "true" first and try to change that to ?1 later (which is always > challenging). > > On 12/2/21 11:11 AM, Mike West wrote: > > I'm not sure it makes sense to introduce a structured header here, given > that it's layering on top of CORS headers that I don't think there's > substantial interest in changing. > > -mike > > > On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:55 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev < > blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> >> There is no support for structured headers so far, for consistency >> reasons, and there has been no movement to deprecate the "true" value for >> Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The value of such a deprecation seems >> minimal. >> >> I could pretty easily add support for the structured "?1" value on top of >> the "true" token for the new Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header, >> and specify that, but I'm not sure it would be terribly useful. Do you >> think otherwise? >> >> Cheers, >> Titouan >> >> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Titouan, >>> >>> I'm curious what the plan is for structured headers. >>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45 is marked as >>> blocked - has there been other progress or thinking behind the scenes? >>> >>> thanks, >>> Mike >>> >>> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev wrote: >>> >>> Contact emails tito...@chromium.org, v...@chromium.org, >>> cl...@chromium.org >>> >>> Explainer >>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md >>> >>> Specification https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/ >>> >>> Design docs >>> >>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit >>> >>> Summary >>> >>> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any private network requests for >>> subresources, asking for explicit permission from the target server. A >>> private network request is any request from a public website to a private >>> IP address or localhost, or from a private website (e.g. intranet) to >>> localhost. Sending a preflight request mitigates the risk of cross-site >>> request forgery attacks against private network devices such as routers, >>> which are often not prepared to defend against this threat. >>> >>> >>> Blink component Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess >>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess> >>> >>> TAG review https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572 >>> >>> TAG review status Pending >>> >>> Risks >>> >>> >>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>> >>> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if other browser engines >>> do not implement this. Compat risk is straightforward: web servers that do >>> not handle the new preflight requests will eventually break, once the >>> feature ships. The plan to address this is as follows: 1. Send preflight >>> request, ignore result, always send actual request. Failed preflight >>> requests will result in a warning being shown in devtools. 2. Wait for 3 >>> milestones. 3. Gate actual request on preflight request success, with >>> deprecation trial for developers to buy some more time. 4. End deprecation >>> trial 4 milestones later. UseCounters: >>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753 >>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755 >>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757 The >>> above measure pages that make at least one private network request for >>> which we would now send a preflight request. >>> >>> >>> Gecko: Worth prototyping ( >>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143) >>> >>> WebKit: No signal ( >>> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html) >>> Pending response. >>> >>> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so far suggests that most >>> web developers are OK with this new requirement, though some do not control >>> the target endpoints and would be negatively impacted. >>> >>> Other signals: >>> >>> Ergonomics >>> >>> None. >>> >>> >>> Activation >>> >>> Gating access to the private network overnight on preflight requests >>> would likely result in widespread breakage. This is why the plan is to >>> first send requests but not act on their result, giving server developers >>> time to implement code handling these requests. Deprecation warnings will >>> be surfaced in DevTools to alert web/client developers when the potential >>> for breakage later on is detected. Enforcement will be turned on later >>> (aiming for 3 milestones), along with a deprecation trial for impacted web >>> developers to buy themselves some more time. Experience suggests a large >>> fraction of developers will not notice the advance deprecation warnings >>> until things break. >>> >>> >>> Security >>> >>> This change aims to be security-positive, preventing CSRF attacks >>> against soft and juicy targets such as router admin interfaces. DNS >>> rebinding threats were of particular concern during the design of this >>> feature: >>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9 >>> >>> >>> Debuggability >>> >>> Relevant information (client and resource IP address space) is already >>> piped into the DevTools network panel. Deprecation warnings and errors will >>> be surfaced in the DevTools issues panel explaining the problem when it >>> arises. >>> >>> >>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>> ? Yes >>> >>> DevTrial instructions >>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md >>> >>> Flag name PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults >>> >>> Requires code in //chrome? False >>> >>> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068 >>> >>> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149 >>> >>> Estimated milestones >>> DevTrial on desktop 98 >>> DevTrial on android 98 >>> >>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688 >>> >>> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to prototype: >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ >>> >>> >>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9f3dAnHromxwvp8jWRxVLYVKZ0PAG5snX2KDFAYz4kc7Q%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9f3dAnHromxwvp8jWRxVLYVKZ0PAG5snX2KDFAYz4kc7Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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