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Explainer https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/master/explainer.md Specificationhttps://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/ Design docs https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x1a1fQLOrcWogK3tpFBgQZQ5ZjcONTvD0IqqXkgrg5I/edit#heading=h.7nki9mck5t64 Summary Requires that private network requests for subresources *from public websites* may only be initiated from a secure context. Examples include internet to intranet requests and internet to loopback requests. This is a first step towards fully implementing Private Network Access: https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/ Reason this trial is being extended The main workaround suggested to impacted websites was to use WebTransport's serverCertificateHashes feature. That is only shipping in Chrome 100; developers need more time to try it out. In addition, some issues have been identified with WebTransport that are prompting us to re-evaluate alternatives. In the meantime, keeping the trial going helps "staunch the bleeding" and provides a channel for discussing plans with affected web developers. Previous experiment timeline: M94 to M101 Requested extension timeline: M102 to M106 Blink componentBlink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess> TAG reviewhttps://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572 TAG review statusIssues addressed Risks Interoperability and Compatibility No interoperability risks. Compatibility risk is the main issue. UseCounters show ~0.1% of page visit making use of this feature. A few hundred websites signed up to the deprecation trial. Rolling this deprecation out to beta per the previous I2S resulted in more feedback about the compatibility risk and the need for a time extension. See the following doc for an extensive discussion: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit Gecko: Worth prototyping ( https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143) WebKit: Positive ( https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-May/031837.html) Web developers: Negative ( https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit) Some websites, broadly falling in the category of controller webapps for IoT devices, find this change incompatible with their use cases. While some use cases can be solved with specific workarounds, many still require further engagement. Activation Developers of non-secure sites that rely upon local servers will need to upgrade to HTTPS. This might cause some complications, as mixed-content checks will begin to apply. Chrome carves out HTTP access to loopback (as per https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#localhost), which is a release valve for folks who don't want to go through the effort of securely-distributing certs for local servers. The initial launch in M92 was delayed due to compatibility risks surfaced during the rollout to beta. See this doc for a lot more details: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit Security This change should be security-positive. WebView Application Risks This change is disabled on WebView due to its lack of support for origin/deprecation trials. Debuggability When a request is made that violates this restriction and the feature is not enabled, three things happen: 1. A warning message is logged to the DevTools console. 3. An issue is surfaced in the DevTools Issues panel. Likewise, when the feature is enabled and a request is blocked, the same happens except that the message logged to the DevTools console is an error and its text is slightly different. The devtools network panel shows information about the source and remote address spaces at play. Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> ?Yes Flag nameBlockInsecurePrivateNetworkRequests Requires code in //chrome?False Tracking bughttps://crbug.com/986744 Launch bughttps://crbug.com/1129801 Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status https://chromestatus.com/feature/5436853517811712 Links to previous Intent discussionsIntent to prototype: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/EeGg7TxW6U4/m/7ZvqAqHLAwAJ Ready for Trial: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/EeGg7TxW6U4/m/7ZvqAqHLAwAJ Intent to Experiment: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/vlDZXlPb00k/m/1421ACiuAAAJ Intent to Ship: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/cPiRNjFoCag/m/DxEEN9-6BQAJ This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status <https://chromestatus.com/>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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