This is a TLS-stack launch, not a Blink launch, so it will take the
following (estimated) shape:

   - Beta in 115
   - Experiment deployment to 1% Stable in 116 once the enterprise policy
   is available. We will send an Intent to Experiment prior to this, based on
   the results from Beta.
   - Eventually, 100% stable. We will send an Intent to Ship once
   everything stabilizes.

The cipher is already implemented in Chrome, behind the enable-tls13-kyber
flag.

On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 3:14 PM David Adrian <dadr...@google.com> wrote:

> Contact emailsdadr...@google.com
>
> Explainer
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-02.html
>
> Specification
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-02.html
>
> Summary
>
> Protect current Chrome TLS traffic against future quantum cryptanalysis by
> deploying the Kyber768 quantum-resistant key agreement algorithm. This is a
> hybrid X25519 + Kyber768 key agreement based on an IETF standard. This
> specification and launch is outside the scope of W3C. This key agreement
> will be launched as a TLS cipher, and should be transparent to users.
>
>
> Blink componentInternals>Network>SSL
> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3ESSL>
>
> Motivation
>
> In order to protect today’s network traffic against future quantum
> cryptanalytic attacks, we need to begin migrating network security
> protocols, like TLS, to use quantum-resistant cryptography. TLS will need
> to update to quantum-resistant cryptography in three separate areas: -
> Establishing, or agreeing upon a symmetric session key - Authenticating the
> server’s identity (e.g. X.509 certificate validation) - Authenticating the
> connection was established by the holder of the server’s private key This
> feature makes incremental progress on “External Encryption in Transit” by
> migrating TLS key agreement to a Kyber768 key encapsulation mechanism (ISE
> on Kyber and PQC strategy). Migrating TLS key agreement to
> quantum-resistant cryptography provides two important properties: -
> Protecting future network traffic against real-time interception and
> decryption - Protecting past and current network traffic against the
> store-and-decrypt attacks While the capability to break currently-deployed
> cryptography with quantum cryptanalytic attacks has not yet been publicly
> demonstrated, it is widely accepted that the “store” component of
> store-and-decrypt attacks are already underway and must be defended
> against. Past cryptographic algorithm rollouts have demonstrated that these
> migrations can take a significant amount of time to deploy, so its
> important to start before quantum computers exist
>
>
> Initial public proposalNone
>
> Search tagstls <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:tls>, kem
> <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:kem>, kyber
> <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:kyber>, postquantum
> <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:postquantum>
>
> TAG review
>
> TAG review statusPending
>
> Risks
>
>
> Interoperability and Compatibility
>
> Post-quantum secure ciphers are larger than classical ciphers. This may
> cause compatibility issues with middleboxes.
>
>
> *Gecko*: No signal
>
> *WebKit*: No signal
>
> *Web developers*: No signals
>
> *Other signals*:
>
> WebView application risks
>
> Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that
> it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
>
>
>
> Debuggability
>
>
>
> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
> ?No
>
> Flag name on chrome://flagsenable-tls13-kyber
>
> Finch feature namePostQuantumKyber
>
> Requires code in //chrome?False
>
> Tracking bughttps://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1442377
>
> Launch bughttps://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4252981
>
> Estimated milestones
> DevTrial on desktop 115
> DevTrial on Android 115
>
> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5257822742249472
>
> Links to previous Intent discussions
>
> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status
> <https://chromestatus.com/>.
>

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