This is a TLS-stack launch, not a Blink launch, so it will take the following (estimated) shape:
- Beta in 115 - Experiment deployment to 1% Stable in 116 once the enterprise policy is available. We will send an Intent to Experiment prior to this, based on the results from Beta. - Eventually, 100% stable. We will send an Intent to Ship once everything stabilizes. The cipher is already implemented in Chrome, behind the enable-tls13-kyber flag. On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 3:14 PM David Adrian <dadr...@google.com> wrote: > Contact emailsdadr...@google.com > > Explainer > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-02.html > > Specification > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00-02.html > > Summary > > Protect current Chrome TLS traffic against future quantum cryptanalysis by > deploying the Kyber768 quantum-resistant key agreement algorithm. This is a > hybrid X25519 + Kyber768 key agreement based on an IETF standard. This > specification and launch is outside the scope of W3C. This key agreement > will be launched as a TLS cipher, and should be transparent to users. > > > Blink componentInternals>Network>SSL > <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3ESSL> > > Motivation > > In order to protect today’s network traffic against future quantum > cryptanalytic attacks, we need to begin migrating network security > protocols, like TLS, to use quantum-resistant cryptography. TLS will need > to update to quantum-resistant cryptography in three separate areas: - > Establishing, or agreeing upon a symmetric session key - Authenticating the > server’s identity (e.g. X.509 certificate validation) - Authenticating the > connection was established by the holder of the server’s private key This > feature makes incremental progress on “External Encryption in Transit” by > migrating TLS key agreement to a Kyber768 key encapsulation mechanism (ISE > on Kyber and PQC strategy). Migrating TLS key agreement to > quantum-resistant cryptography provides two important properties: - > Protecting future network traffic against real-time interception and > decryption - Protecting past and current network traffic against the > store-and-decrypt attacks While the capability to break currently-deployed > cryptography with quantum cryptanalytic attacks has not yet been publicly > demonstrated, it is widely accepted that the “store” component of > store-and-decrypt attacks are already underway and must be defended > against. Past cryptographic algorithm rollouts have demonstrated that these > migrations can take a significant amount of time to deploy, so its > important to start before quantum computers exist > > > Initial public proposalNone > > Search tagstls <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:tls>, kem > <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:kem>, kyber > <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:kyber>, postquantum > <https://chromestatus.com/features#tags:postquantum> > > TAG review > > TAG review statusPending > > Risks > > > Interoperability and Compatibility > > Post-quantum secure ciphers are larger than classical ciphers. This may > cause compatibility issues with middleboxes. > > > *Gecko*: No signal > > *WebKit*: No signal > > *Web developers*: No signals > > *Other signals*: > > WebView application risks > > Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that > it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications? > > > > Debuggability > > > > Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> > ?No > > Flag name on chrome://flagsenable-tls13-kyber > > Finch feature namePostQuantumKyber > > Requires code in //chrome?False > > Tracking bughttps://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1442377 > > Launch bughttps://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4252981 > > Estimated milestones > DevTrial on desktop 115 > DevTrial on Android 115 > > Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status > https://chromestatus.com/feature/5257822742249472 > > Links to previous Intent discussions > > This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status > <https://chromestatus.com/>. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAGkh42%2Bdew%2B8RvppNu09mHSYYTgsjacd1fDcimE-qds8UTHnnw%40mail.gmail.com.