On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 9:19 PM Lauren N. Liberda <liberda...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >I have encouraged the team working on this to ignore feedback in any > forum in which something like Chromium's code of conduct > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md#:~:text=Be%20respectful%20and%20constructive.,condescension%2C%20whether%20blatant%20or%20subtle.> > is not being maintained as anything else would be creating an unsafe > working environment. It's somewhat ironic to me that some folks arguing > passionately for the openness of the web (something I and many of the > proposal contributors are also passionate about) are relying on physical > threats and other forms of abuse, which of course means we must limit the > engagement on this topic such that their voices are ignored completely (the > antithesis of the openness they are advocating for). > > I'm gonna say this as politely as I can. Google has got into hugely > dominant positions with Chromium and Android. I don't think I have to > explain here how much these 2 projects dominate the web and mobile spaces. > They are both under Google's governance, and treated by Google as its > backyard. Chromium comes up with whatever Chromium wants to implement, and > can ignore everyone else. Android keeps getting moved from AOSP to Google > Play Services. Nobody can stop this. Nobody can stand up against this. > > This, in a direct consequence, means whatever Google does with these > projects *will* be watched closely and with little trust, like a government > is. If this is a problem for you, maybe suggest to the more important > people to stop that. I don't know, turn them into independent non-profit > projects, separate from Chrome and Google Play? Request Firefox is shipped > by OEMs on some Android phones instead of Chrome? Send some bigger one-time > donations for Servo and Ladybird development, with no requests made? I'm > not getting paid to give you advice. > > WEI is also an especial, highly flammable combo, because it touches (risks > of) all of: anti-end user practices, setting Google as an authority to > trust with decisions about user's faith, reinforcing user reliance on > Chrome specifically and Google Play Services, fight on ad blockers, > scraping, and unofficial clients. If I continue with the government > analogy, Google is here an unelected official whose death would start > street parties. I know, I know, this is just "an experiment", "not a goal", > and actually "for privacy". > > Currently, as I'm on Android, my banking apps will refuse to enable some > features, Snapchat will refuse to log in, and the McDonald's app will > refuse to launch if I don't get Google to sign some magic string these apps > get from a server. I'm, according to the Play Integrity API documentation, > supposed to not get it signed, because I have access to my own device's > root user. I want to update apps from my F-Droid as easily as those from > Google Play, stop traffic to some domains by editing /etc/hosts, and have a > possibility to backup some of my installed apps with their data, but I > guess that's too much freedom to have a McDonald's equivalent of a loyalty > card. Maybe I'll self-report here now that I also have access as an > Administrator to my Windows machine. > > The current proposal is to extend this to the web. Apparently if I have > root access on my phone, this means I must be a robot that shouldn't see > the website that has ads (referring to the first example from the > explainer's introduction). That's correct, I don't want to be human. > Especially if my humanity is reduced to "advertisement watcher". The > left-over crumbs of humanity that used to be in this body are only here to > check the "I'm not a robot" boxes. > FWIW I agree with you personally. The web is special because it's open and can be reached by anyone, not just some whitelisted set of UAs. That's a core property of the web that I'll personally always fight for. I appreciate that Google doesn't have a lot of trust with the community here, and people are going to assume bad intent. I've come to terms with that and hope to combat it primarily not through promises, but through helping drive positive actionin Chrome. Eg. I initiated our interop efforts <https://www.chromium.org/blink/platform-predictability/> years ago to reduce the risk of the web getting locked into chromium. >Attacks and doxing make me personally MORE likely to support stronger > safety features in chromium, as such acts increase my suspicion that there > is significant intimidation from criminals who are afraid this feature will > disrupt their illegal and/or unethical businesses, and I don't give in to > criminals or bullies. > > If wanting to see the news, watch some user-uploaded videos, or scroll > some social media feed on the internet is gonna side me with criminals, > then at this point maybe I should simply become one. This makes "unethical > businesses" sound like they might actually be a moral choice. Torrents > actually give me movies, not "The WidevineCdm plugin has crashed". The site > you probably know well wants, at worst, 2,80 Euro for a thousand checked > boxes, while I'd need half a minute to fill each myself. With mass use of > attestation (availability on web *will* increase it on all platforms), APIs > returning tokens signed by Google will only become a matter of the price > per 1000, not of a fact. If the "strong safety features" mean making it > annoying enough to cost 15 Euro instead of 1, while a genuine Huawei user > will not be able to get any, and actual criminals already send phones to > package lockers as a way of selling bank account access, then maybe this is > not safety. (Just kidding. I would never do cybercrime.) > It's been pointed out to me that my wording could be taken to suggest that I think folks who oppose WEI are criminals. That was absolutely not my intent and I apologize for not being more careful in my wording. I'm also the kind of person who likes to run rooted devices (used to compile my own NetBSD kernel from scratch weekly), custom browser builds, etc. and so I sympathize heavily with that use case myself and don't see how I could support a proposal which seriously risked the outcome you describe - users of such devices / niche browsers being locked out of important parts ot the web. AFAIK there is no serious debate as to whether such an outcome would be acceptable for the web (it's not), the debate is whether this proposal could possibly achieve it's aims without causing such an outcome. There's been lots of strong words saying it's impossible to reduce fraud risk without threatening the openness of the web and perhaps that's right, but I, for one, am always willing to be shown that something I thought was impossible was in fact doable with sufficient ingenuity and care. If I've learned anything from my tiny forays into the W3C anti-fraud community group it's that there's a lot of complexity and expertise in this space of which I know almost nothing, so I'm open to new ideas. I'm thrilled to see anti-fraud experts actually collaborating openly and publicly for, perhaps, the first time in Internet history. My primary intent with the word "criminal" was to take a strong stand against physical threats and doxxing - IMHO that is criminal activity and is inexcusable. To be consistent with our code of conduct we need to be absolutely clear that any change in direction here will come from the respectful and thoughtful comments on this thread and elsewhere (including your blog <https://liberda.nl/weblog/trust-no-client/>, which I quite enjoyed), not the intimidation tactics occurring on the GitHub repo and elsewhere. Sorry for not being more careful to clearly separate these things in my response. Rick > On 28/07/2023 21:08, 'Rick Byers' via blink-dev wrote: > > As one of the API owners and chromium community leaders, I'd just like to > chime in on this personally with a meta-point: > > Thank you all for the thoughtful and constructive debate in this forum. As > I'm sure you know, this topic has gotten a lot of disrespectful, abusive > and overly-simplified criticism in other public forums which IMHO has made > it hard to get any useful signal from the noise there. I have encouraged > the team working on this to ignore feedback in any forum in which something > like Chromium's code of conduct > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md#:~:text=Be%20respectful%20and%20constructive.,condescension%2C%20whether%20blatant%20or%20subtle.> > is not being maintained as anything else would be creating an unsafe > working environment. It's somewhat ironic to me that some folks arguing > passionately for the openness of the web (something I and many of the > proposal contributors are also passionate about) are relying on physical > threats and other forms of abuse, which of course means we must limit the > engagement on this topic such that their voices are ignored completely (the > antithesis of the openness they are advocating for). Attacks and doxing > make me personally MORE likely to support stronger safety features in > chromium, as such acts increase my suspicion that there is > significant intimidation from criminals who are afraid this feature will > disrupt their illegal and/or unethical businesses, and I don't give in to > criminals or bullies. > > But then I'm grateful that the blink-dev community remains a place where > we can disagree respectfully and iterate openly and publicly on difficult > and emotionally charged topics, backing us away from thinking and acting in > an "us-vs-them" fashion. I also want to point out that while open to > anyone, this forum is moderated for new posters. Moderators like myself > approve any post which is consistent with chromium's code of conduct > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md>, > regardless of the specific point of view being taken. The thoughtful > comments here over the past few days have been educational and overall > calming for me, thank you! > > This community and moderation practices represents the sort of balance > between openness and safety which I believe the WEI proposal authors are > striving for. At the same time, I believe it's clear to many of us that the > tradeoffs being struck by the current proposal do not yet meet the minimum > bar necessary to uphold chromium's values > <https://www.chromium.org/blink/guidelines/values/>. That's OK - that's > the whole point of designing in the open and having public debate is to > find reasonable compromises between stakeholders with very different > perspectives, and creating a safe place to experiment (as we expect most > experiments to fail!). In order to start even an origin trial in Chrome, > this proposal would need approval from API owners like myself, and the > current state of the proposal is not something I'd personally approve due > to many of the concerns being raised. At the same time I do think there's > an urgent opportunity for chromium to do more to help with the problem of > inauthentic traffic, and (like everything we do) some amount of > experimentation seems essential to that. I believe the team working on this > proposal is taking some time to regroup (and recover from all the stress) > and rethink at least the framing, if not some of the core design properties > of this feature. I'm sure we'll get an update from them when they feel > ready and sufficiently recovered to engage in public again. In the interim, > please keep the constructive and respectful criticism coming. Bonus points > if you also have suggestions or data on how to actually make meaningful > progress on the problem of inauthentic traffic in a way that's fully > consistent with the openness of the web :-). > > Cheers, and I hope you all have a stress-free weekend, > Rick > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 11:48 AM Justin Schuh <jsc...@chromium.org> wrote: > >> Hopefully I'm not adding to the noise, but I wanted to call out a few >> things as an independent observer with some background in the problem >> space. (My comments are beyond the process and structure things, which Alex >> already addressed.) >> >> First, I suggest that anyone commenting on this explainer as currently >> written should also read the initial public proposal linked in Ben's >> email <https://github.com/antifraudcg/proposals/issues/8>, which gives >> more context on the problem space. To use the terminology from that >> discussion, this proposal is about detecting/blocking IVT (invalid >> traffic), which encompasses things like fraud, spam, coordinated >> disinformation, etc. that originate from inauthentic users (e.g. bots, >> farms). Site operators have historically relied on fingerprinting and other >> tracking signals to identify IVT, but as browser makers eliminate >> fingerprinting/tracking surfaces, site operators need privacy preserving >> ways to detect/block IVT. >> >> That context sort of comes across from the explainer and linked >> resources, but IMHO it really needs to lead with plainly stating this. >> Because the CG discussions show broad consensus on the nature of the >> problem and the importance of addressing it, but the explainer is written >> in a way that largely assumes understanding of all the context (which is >> clearly not the case). >> >> The next big thing that jumps out at me is that the only solution even >> considered for IVT seems to involve wrapping device attestation APIs (e.g. >> Android Safety Net and iOS App Attest). This is a common enough approach >> for native apps dealing with IVT (it basically repurposes a DRM mechanism, >> with all the baggage that entails). However, it also seems to ignore the >> fundamentally different privacy and security considerations of the Web >> platform. Most concerningly, it tightly couples user authenticity to device >> integrity. I have my doubts that this is necessary, and I think most of the >> concerns arise from conflating these two concepts. >> >> My recollection is that there was a lot of work done with PrivacyPass >> <https://privacypass.github.io/> to explicitly decouple user >> authenticity from other ambient state. I also see from the CG discussions >> that PrivacyPass was not considered adequate for addressing IVT. If I were >> in a position of assessing this proposal, I know that I'd need more detail >> in the explainer on specifically how PrivacyPass was lacking, and why a >> narrower extension of the protocol is insufficient. >> >> I also see questions about holdback, but I feel like that's a bit >> backwards. I appreciate the need to detect ever evolving adversaries, but >> IVT is a problem that happens at scale. So, if more signals are needed to >> stay ahead of the threats, then a conservative sampling rate should be more >> than adequate to detect new patterns and identify coincident signals. >> Something like that could mitigate many of the concerns around sites >> misusing this sort of thing. >> >> Perhaps these sorts of discussions took place in the CG and I just didn't >> find them. But it certainly isn't captured in the explainer, and the CG >> discussion read to me like everyone started with the assumption that the >> solution was to just wrap the Android/iOS native approach. >> >> >> >> P.S. This may be total bikeshedding, but I really don't like the term >> IVT, since invalid traffic is too broad of a concept. The problem space >> here is concerned with inauthentic traffic at scale, so I'd suggest zeroing >> in a term that better conveys that reality. >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 25, 2023 at 7:32 AM Dominic Farolino <d...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> At the very least, an explicit commitment to a holdback would seem to >>> quell *some* of the concerns about this feature. But one thing I'm >>> concerned about is if there'd be a difference in holdback between Chrome >>> and WebView. Since WebView isn't always considered a "real browser" I could >>> see this as an opening to try and not implement holdbacks on WebView. I'm >>> not sure how API OWNERs would evaluate that, but the risks there seem >>> pretty interesting, as I imagine it'd force some sites to aggressively >>> UA-sniff to determine whether they're in a WebView and can interpret the >>> absence of attestation as a perfect signal, vs. a possible holdback user in >>> a browser where lack of attestation is "OK". Having the adoption of an API >>> hinge on that kind of ugly practice seems unfortunate. >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 12:10 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> /* with my API OWNER hat on */ >>>> >>>> Examining this proposed change, it seems to me that the most risky part >>>> in the signed attestation information >>>> <https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md#what-information-is-in-the-signed-attestation> >>>> is >>>> the part about "application identity". Providing that information to the >>>> server seems to go against our past efforts to GREASE UA-CH >>>> <https://wicg.github.io/ua-client-hints/#grease> and will prevent >>>> Chromium browsers from identifying themselves as Chrome, something they are >>>> (unfortunately) often required to do for compatibility reasons. >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 1:02 AM Dana Jansens <dan...@orodu.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> There's been a lot of strongly worded negative feedback for this >>>>> proposal in the Github, and I don't agree with how that feedback was >>>>> delivered but I do agree that this proposal if followed would not be good >>>>> for the web. >>>>> >>>>> The proposal talks about trust, but the server does not need to trust >>>>> the client. Like palmer said, they can never trust the client, this >>>>> doesn't >>>>> allow them to trust the client in a way that could be considered a >>>>> security >>>>> boundary. That is a fundamental design choice of client-server with open >>>>> user agents, in place of closed apps/walled gardens. This is an >>>>> intentional >>>>> property of the web. >>>>> >>>>> But this proposal provides a mechanism for web sites to force their >>>>> ideals and preferences onto user agents, which takes away user autonomy >>>>> and >>>>> choice, and damages the trust held by Chromium as the dominant user agent >>>>> today. Let's push the world to be more open, to give more user control, >>>>> not >>>>> more controlled and closed. >>>>> >>>>> Dana >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, July 20, 2023 at 1:41:45 PM UTC-4 Reilly Grant wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Michaela, I think you are misunderstanding this proposal. This is not >>>>> a proposal for a site to prove its integrity to the user. It is a proposal >>>>> for the user agent to prove its integrity to the site, and that it is >>>>> acting on behalf of a real user. These are two largely independent >>>>> problems. I recommend looking at Isolated Web Apps >>>>> <https://github.com/WICG/isolated-web-apps>, which attempt to solve >>>>> exactly the problem you're discussing. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 8:18 AM 'Michaela Merz' via blink-dev < >>>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks @Chris Palmer for your input. Nobody is more opposed to DRM >>>>> than I am. Even today I refuse to load DRM extensions into the browser. I >>>>> think that DRM is wrong and the open web is the way to go. >>>>> >>>>> But providing provenance and integrity to a resource is not DRM. TLS >>>>> is not DRM. If you hit a page with an invalid TLS certificate, you are >>>>> free >>>>> to continue. If the power to be would decide to NOT allow us to continue >>>>> to >>>>> sites without a valid TLS certificate, you'll find me on the barricades >>>>> right along with you. >>>>> >>>>> Browsers already include a protection mechanism called "Subresource >>>>> Integrity" (SIR) . If the provided resource doesn't match the hash, the >>>>> browser refuses to load the resource. Together with "content security >>>>> policy" we can already create hardened web resources. But we're missing >>>>> one >>>>> crucial element: If the web site has been modified on the server. If a >>>>> malicious attempt to modify a web environment is successful right at the >>>>> source, we (and our users) have no way to protect us and our users. >>>>> >>>>> That's why I think it is important to extend the SRI with a "master >>>>> key" or certificate that can not be recreated without the knowledge of the >>>>> author of the web site. >>>>> >>>>> We can and must discuss the details of such a mechanism of course. I >>>>> am with you and don't want DRM through the back door. But I think it's >>>>> crucial for the web environment's credibility to have tools that can be >>>>> used to protect the integrity of the environment. >>>>> >>>>> m. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 7:05 AM Chris Palmer <pal...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Speaking as a recent former Chromie who wants you to succeed: retract >>>>> this proposal. >>>>> >>>>> * The web is *the* open, mainstream application platform. The world >>>>> really, really needs it to stay that way. >>>>> >>>>> * Whatever goals publishers might think this serves (although it >>>>> doesn't), extensions and Dev Tools (and other debuggers) neutralize it. >>>>> Extensions and Dev Tools are incalculably valuable and not really >>>>> negotiable. So if something has to give, it's DRM. >>>>> >>>>> * The document claims WEI won't directly break content blockers, >>>>> accessibility aids, et c. But: (a) this will be used as part of an >>>>> argument >>>>> to not bring extensions to Chrome for Android; and (b) assume/realize that >>>>> publishers will start rejecting clients that support extensions. Chrome >>>>> for >>>>> mobile platforms already doesn't support extensions, and mobile is the >>>>> largest platform class. So publishers might even have a decent chance of >>>>> getting away with such a restriction. >>>>> >>>>> * DRM will always be cracked and worked around, but that doesn't mean >>>>> that implementing this will be harmless. DRM still shuts out legitimate >>>>> use >>>>> cases (accessibility comes foremost to mind, but not solely), even when it >>>>> is broken. Everybody loses. >>>>> >>>>> * DRM misaligns incentives: the customer is now the adversary. This is >>>>> a losing move, both from a business perspective and from a technical >>>>> security engineering perspective. (Do you want an adversarial relationship >>>>> with security researchers? No, you do not.) WEI enables publishers to play >>>>> a losing game, not a winning one. >>>>> >>>>> * In ideal circumstances, WEI would be at best a marginal, >>>>> probabilistic, lossy 'security' mechanism. (Defenders must always assume >>>>> that any given client is perfectly 'legitimate' but 'malicious'. For >>>>> example, Amazon Mechanical Turk is cheap.) Holdbacks nullify even that >>>>> marginal benefit, while still not effectively stopping the lockout of >>>>> particular UAs and yet not effectively upholding any IP-maximal goals. >>>>> >>>>> * Chromium has a lot of credibility in safety engineering circles. >>>>> Don't spend it on this. >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, May 8, 2023 at 8:30:30 AM UTC-7 bew...@google.com wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Contact emails >>>>> >>>>> serg...@chromium.org, pb...@chromium.org, ryan...@google.com, >>>>> b...@chromium.org, erict...@chromium.org >>>>> Explainer >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md >>>>> Specification >>>>> >>>>> We do not have a specification yet, however we expect to publish in >>>>> the near future both the considered implementation options for the web >>>>> layer in an initial spec, which we suspect are not very controversial, and >>>>> an explanation of our approach for issuing tokens, which we expect will >>>>> spark more public discussion, but is not directly a web platform >>>>> component. >>>>> We are gathering community feedback through the explainer before we >>>>> actively develop the specification. >>>>> TAG Review >>>>> >>>>> Not filed yet. >>>>> Blink component >>>>> >>>>> Blink>Identity >>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3EIdentity> >>>>> Summary >>>>> >>>>> This is a new JavaScript API that lets web developers retrieve a token >>>>> to attest to the integrity of the web environment. This can be sent to >>>>> websites’ web servers to verify that the environment the web page is >>>>> running on is trusted by the attester. The web server can use asymmetric >>>>> cryptography to verify that the token has not been tampered with. This >>>>> feature relies on platform level attesters (in most cases from the >>>>> operating system). >>>>> >>>>> This project was discussed in the W3C Anti-Fraud Community Group on >>>>> April 28th, and we look forward to more conversations in W3C forums in the >>>>> future. In the meantime, we welcome feedback on the explainer >>>>> <https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md> >>>>> . >>>>> Motivation >>>>> >>>>> This is beneficial for anti-fraud measures. Websites commonly use >>>>> fingerprinting techniques to try to verify that a real human is using a >>>>> real device. We intend to introduce this feature to offer an adversarially >>>>> robust and long-term sustainable anti-abuse solution while still >>>>> protecting >>>>> users’ privacy. >>>>> Initial public proposal >>>>> >>>>> https://github.com/antifraudcg/proposals/issues/8 >>>>> Risks >>>>> >>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>> >>>>> We are currently working on the explainer and specification and are >>>>> working with the Anti-Fraud Community Group to work towards consensus >>>>> across the web community. The “attester” is platform specific so this >>>>> feature needs to be included on a per platform basis. We are initially >>>>> targeting mobile Chrome and WebView. >>>>> >>>>> Ergonomics >>>>> >>>>> See “How can I use web environment integrity? >>>>> <https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md#how-can-i-use-web-environment-integrity>” >>>>> in the explainer. Note that we are actively looking for input from the >>>>> anti-fraud community and may update the API shape based on this. We also >>>>> expect developers to use this API through aggregated analysis of the >>>>> attestation signals. >>>>> >>>>> Security >>>>> >>>>> See the “Challenges and threats to address >>>>> <https://github.com/RupertBenWiser/Web-Environment-Integrity/blob/main/explainer.md#challenges-and-threats-to-address>” >>>>> section of the explainer to see our current considerations. >>>>> >>>>> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, >>>>> Mac, Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)? >>>>> >>>>> We initially support this only for Android platforms (Android, and >>>>> Android WebView). This feature requires an attester backed by the target >>>>> platform so it will require active integration per platform. >>>>> >>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fchromium.googlesource.com%2Fchromium%2Fsrc%2F%2B%2Fmaster%2Fdocs%2Ftesting%2Fweb_platform_tests.md&data=04%7C01%7CAmanda.Baker%40microsoft.com%7C84c5e8a01bc1471e348f08d7c6b940f0%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637196371372857279%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C-1&sdata=M79bBRPkECK4YmZwW1JAdcqHCofWo6qpz3TFFwnvqB8%3D&reserved=0> >>>>> ? >>>>> >>>>> Web platform tests will be added as part of this work as part of the >>>>> prototyping. We will then feed those tests back into the specification. >>>>> >>>>> Requires code in //chrome? >>>>> >>>>> True >>>>> >>>>> Feature flag (until launch) >>>>> >>>>> --enable-features=WebEnvironmentIntegrity >>>>> >>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>> >>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5796524191121408 >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>>> Google Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/topic/blink-dev/Ux5h_kGO22g/unsubscribe >>>>> . >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>> blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/28a637ff-682c-4a38-b3a9-f2bfa2b48c44n%40chromium.org >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/28a637ff-682c-4a38-b3a9-f2bfa2b48c44n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKDb%2By7gDGdiWTKR832P7m2hH0p1VtxXqvnBxwYnAZ0AQjo4jQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAKDb%2By7gDGdiWTKR832P7m2hH0p1VtxXqvnBxwYnAZ0AQjo4jQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/b5f5a252-a0fc-4c37-8ae8-9a460d20373an%40chromium.org >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/b5f5a252-a0fc-4c37-8ae8-9a460d20373an%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfW0ztZ-R%2BA995PSVB6vh7tzszw8%2B%2BxE-6%2Bfnt_CLmHN%3DQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfW0ztZ-R%2BA995PSVB6vh7tzszw8%2B%2BxE-6%2Bfnt_CLmHN%3DQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>> . >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAP-uykBNk1Vpd85sEzRXrKTroxcy5wowspF0hmSkugX4dEw_qg%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAP-uykBNk1Vpd85sEzRXrKTroxcy5wowspF0hmSkugX4dEw_qg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CA%2BYmkXcj1eb5tbwrWNi_Y9pZ%2BcHn1CiBYZM9b8Nnpze5bWnOGQ%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CA%2BYmkXcj1eb5tbwrWNi_Y9pZ%2BcHn1CiBYZM9b8Nnpze5bWnOGQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/topic/blink-dev/Ux5h_kGO22g/unsubscribe > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAFUtAY-p5%3DG7fpjWVFA_5Z2saAUWdZcfjqG1CJJ6s9yUYsHRZA%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAFUtAY-p5%3DG7fpjWVFA_5Z2saAUWdZcfjqG1CJJ6s9yUYsHRZA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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