On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 4:37 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 6:45 AM Domenic Denicola <dome...@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> Great to hear! >> >> I see you've already updated the spec PR. My instinct is that we should >> give folks a week-ish to react to the new name, finish the spec review, >> etc. What do you think? >> > > Normally I would think this makes perfect sense. But given the 136 branch > point a week from now, I prefer one of the two options: > * Enable the flag in 136 before it branches and revert in the unlikely > case there's some disagreement on the spelling. > This option sounds good to me. LGTM1. > * Get help from Google folks to Finch enable it in 136 after branch point. > > Does that make sense? > > >> (Also, I can't quite understand what's blocking the spec PR from >> landing... I guess there's still some discussion about whether the bar is >> "2 interested implementers" or "2 actively implementing implementers"? >> Maybe it's worth poking to see if you can get more clarity on that?) >> > > I believe it's held back on getting SRI L2 to FPWD > <https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2025Mar/0011.html> > (as a future Living Standard), and then potentially on getting a working > mode agreed on, and for the PR to meet it. So it may take a while to land > the PR. > > +Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> - Is my understanding correct? > > >> On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 2:28 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < >> yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >> >>> Following discussions >>> <https://github.com/w3c/webappsec/blob/main/meetings/2025/2025-03-19-minutes.md#require-sri-for-compatibility-and-spelling> >>> at WebAppSec and the WAICT >>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/16-cvBkWYrKlZHXkWRFvKGEifdcMthUfv-LxIbg6bx2o/edit?tab=t.0> >>> proposal, I'm renaming the directive to `integrity-required`. (CL >>> <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/6382018>) >>> >>> That would also reduce the compatibility risk to zero AFAICT. >>> >>> On Monday, March 10, 2025 at 10:55:02 AM UTC+1 Yoav Weiss wrote: >>> >>>> FWIW, I'm planning to discuss >>>> <https://github.com/w3c/webappsec/issues/668#issuecomment-2709995028> >>>> a syntax change at next week's WebAppSec meeting, that can help us avoid >>>> these compat issues. >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2025 at 7:54 PM Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) < >>>> yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2025 at 6:08 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2/24/25 4:24 PM, Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2025 at 7:18 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2/21/25 8:33 AM, Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2025 at 1:56:59 PM UTC+1 Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2025 at 11:47:00 AM UTC+1 Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Contact emailsyoavwe...@chromium.org >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Explainerhttps://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource-inte >>>>>>> grity/pull/129#:~:text=for%20some%20assets.-,require%2Dsr >>>>>>> i%2Dfor%20CSP%20directive,-Subresource%2DIntegrity%20 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Specificationhttps://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource- >>>>>>> integrity/pull/129 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The feature and PR were discussed >>>>>>> <https://github.com/w3c/webappsec/blob/main/meetings/2025/2025-02-19-minutes.md#reviving-require-sri-for> >>>>>>> at the WebAppSec WG call. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No objection beyond questions on whether we'd need to expand this to >>>>>>> cover stylesheets as well. We'd be able to do that in the future (as a >>>>>>> separate intent) if needed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Summary >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The `require-sri-for` directive gives developers the ability to >>>>>>> assert that every resource of a given type needs to be integrity >>>>>>> checked. >>>>>>> If a resource of that type is attempted to be loaded without integrity >>>>>>> metadata, that attempt will fail and trigger a CSP violation report. >>>>>>> This >>>>>>> intent covers the "script" value of this directive. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Blink componentBlink>SecurityFeature>ContentSecurityPolicy >>>>>>> <https://issues.chromium.org/issues?q=customfield1222907:%22Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3EContentSecurityPolicy%22> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> TAG reviewhttps://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/1048 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> TAG review statusPending - No response just yet >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Risks >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the compatibility front: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This directive was already implemented in the past, and there are >>>>>>> some developer docs >>>>>>> <https://udn.realityripple.com/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/require-sri-for> >>>>>>> that still describe it. The current PR and implementation did not >>>>>>> diverge >>>>>>> from the past implementation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If developers deployed the feature in the past and are now relying >>>>>>> on it *not really working*, that may result in surprising breakage. >>>>>>> The HTTPArchive shows *0.0011% of page responses* (178 out of >>>>>>> 15760519) have an existing `require-sri-for` directive. That's an >>>>>>> upper bound - only those that enforce scripts, and have no integrity >>>>>>> attributes on some scripts may get broken. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Doing some more HA digging I found that it's 153 sites, which is not >>>>>>> significantly different. >>>>>>> I downloaded their URLs >>>>>>> <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NlFHLytc8lQcdP5FXXDltKEPQVE0e8oyjw9k1S-9KPI/edit?usp=sharing> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> started going to these sites with the feature enabled. >>>>>>> Of those 153, 22 had any blocked assets, 9 had broken functionality >>>>>>> or layout and 1 had missing ads. >>>>>>> Non-visiblity broken but blocked sites mostly had their analytics >>>>>>> blocked. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Extrapolating that data brings us to 0.000158% for any blocked >>>>>>> assets, and 0.000065% for broken functionality. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm planning to reach out to the broken sites and make them aware of >>>>>>> this change. Many of them seem to be coming from a single provider >>>>>>> (similar >>>>>>> site and breakage). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I also found ~3500 sites that have the `require-sri-for` string in >>>>>>> their response bodies (and hence may have it applied). >>>>>>> I put together a script that so far scanned ~1800 of them and found >>>>>>> no blocked assets. So, it seems like the risk is very low on that front. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, I appreciate you digging in to understand the possible >>>>>>> risks. My understanding of the compat risk goes something like (please >>>>>>> let >>>>>>> me know if I'm missing something): >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. This feature never really shipped, but was implemented behind a >>>>>>> flag. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2. Early adopter developers (or menu framework authors?) added >>>>>>> require-sri-for for some scripts that they wanted to lock down >>>>>>> >>>>>> Tiny correction: they added it to the document's CSP, not specific >>>>>> scripts. >>>>>> >>>>>>> (to prevent 3rd-party attackers from modifying them, etc). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3. Now, you actually ship the feature. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That means the risks are: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) Some CDN was compromised at some point, and now some sketchy >>>>>>> scripts will fail to load. Seems like that's security positive, even if >>>>>>> it >>>>>>> surprises users or developers. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> b) Perhaps more likely, a page was redesigned and they updated their >>>>>>> analytics provider but didn't remember to add hashes. Now some things >>>>>>> don't >>>>>>> work. >>>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect it's >>>>>> c) they added the header but never actually tested with the feature >>>>>> enabled, as it never shipped. >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems like they added the CSP header, but never added an >>>>>> "integrity" attribute to many/most of their scripts. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> From your sheet (which is great, thanks), it seems like largest >>>>>>> impact is busted menus. Is this a single library? Or common pattern? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems like a common provider. 6 out of the 9 sites with issues >>>>>> are Canadian health/edu related sites. >>>>>> >>>>>> Breaking health/edu-releated sites is not good... >>>>>> >>>>> Indeed, although I'm not sure how load-bearing they are.. >>>>> >>>>>> When broken, is it cosmetic, or are the links in the menu still >>>>>> accessible? (I see you're gathering contact info - let me know if you >>>>>> need >>>>>> help with that.) >>>>>> >>>>> It seems like the desktop view is functional, but the mobile view's >>>>> hamburger menu is not working (at least in some cases). >>>>> >>>>>> Assuming we can sort out the menu breakage somehow, I think for the >>>>>> rest - the best we can do is roll it out and be ready to killswitch if >>>>>> needed. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Gecko*: No signal (https://github.com/mozilla/st >>>>>>> andards-positions/issues/1173) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *WebKit*: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/sta >>>>>>> ndards-positions/issues/458) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Web developers*: Shopify is interested in this. I suspect PCIv4 >>>>>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RcUpbpWPxXTyW0Qwczs9GCTLPD3-LcbbhL4ooBUevTM/edit?tab=t.0> >>>>>>> would >>>>>>> make some developers interested in making sure their documents' scripts >>>>>>> have complete integrity checks. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Other signals*: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> WebView application risks >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such >>>>>>> that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based >>>>>>> applications? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> None >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>>> >>>>>>> None >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, >>>>>>> Mac, Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)?Yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>>> ?Yes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://wpt.fyi/results/content-security-policy/tentative/ >>>>>>> require-sri-for?label=experimental&label=master&aligned >>>>>>> <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5877633> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Flag name on about://flagsNone >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Finch feature nameCSPRequireSRIFor >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome?False >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Estimated milestonesShipping on desktop135DevTrial on desktop134Shipping >>>>>>> on Android135DevTrial on Android134Shipping on WebView135 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anticipated spec changes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Open questions about a feature may be a source of future web compat >>>>>>> or interop issues. Please list open issues (e.g. links to known github >>>>>>> issues in the project for the feature specification) whose resolution >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> introduce web compat/interop risk (e.g., changing to naming or >>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>> the API in a non-backward-compatible way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> None >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Statushttps://chromestatus.com/ >>>>>>> feature/5090023365672960?gate=5186570942152704 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Links to previous Intent discussionsIntent to Prototype: >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/ >>>>>>> CAOmohSJUygAmobR9dRkDr%3DBWQ1h5hv2Lj3WUFN31QZF360A47A >>>>>>> %40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>>> To view this discussion visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/8d3107ca-61cc-47f6-badd-8bc6a1f30145n%40chromium.org >>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/8d3107ca-61cc-47f6-badd-8bc6a1f30145n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/49037f78-2795-4d2e-9645-361e632c61f7n%40chromium.org >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/49037f78-2795-4d2e-9645-361e632c61f7n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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