Thanks for chiming in Matt. Is the scenario you described Windows-only (in which case we should be good with WARP), or also Linux?
Rick On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 1:22 PM Matt George <mattmg...@gmail.com> wrote: > Very happy to hear about exploring the use of WARP on windows. > > Just wanted to chime in that from the Esri perspective, we also have a > large number of users accessing our maps SDK from VMs without a GPU. This > is done for security reasons, & not uncommon for public sector clients. We > have a special codepath where when we detect software emulation is being > used, we only render every X frames & then use css transforms in-between. > This is fairly usable, though of course it's a much worse experience than > having a GPU. > On Tuesday, March 11, 2025 at 1:11:42 AM UTC-7 Ashley Gullen wrote: > >> Thanks for the update David - that sounds like a much less disruptive >> approach than removing it completely. >> >> >> On Mon, 10 Mar 2025 at 19:26, David Adrian <dad...@google.com> wrote: >> >>> To cover the testing use case, we have provided a CLI flag to enable >>> SwiftShader. This has been in the release notes since November. If this is >>> insufficient, we could add an enterprise policy. >>> >>> However, rather than attempt a straight removal, we are going to take a >>> multi-pronged approach to attempt to simultaneously reduce the situations >>> where SwiftShader is available, while maintaining compatibility with >>> devices that require it due to the GPU blocklist. >>> >>> - SwiftShader is already unused on many Mac clients, since it does >>> not support ARM. We will run an experiment where we fully remove it on >>> Mac, >>> where usage is much smaller. We expect this will be ~fine. >>> - Similarly, we will try the same on Linux, although this may not go >>> as well, as there are not a large number of ARM Linux clients. >>> - We will experiment with removing the automatic fallback to >>> SwiftShader after 3 OOMs, limiting it to just the devices without a GPU >>> or >>> on the GPU blocklist. This should reduce the attack surface across the >>> board, as attackers would be unable to arbitrarily cause SwiftShader to >>> be >>> used. In conjunction with this, we'll see if we can leverage Warp on >>> Windows. >>> >>> If we can get to a state where SwiftShader is off by default on Mac and >>> Linux, and replaced with Warp on Windows aside from the CLI flag, and the >>> fallback is not triggerable by an attacker on systems with a "normal" GPU, >>> we'll be in much better shape from a security standpoint. >>> >>> We will update this thread with the progress and results of these >>> experiments as they roll out. >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 3, 2025 at 2:27 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote: >>> >>>> +1 that providing temporary enterprise policy exceptions is standard >>>> practice <https://www.chromium.org/developers/enterprise-changes/> for >>>> breaking changes that we predict may have enterprise impact. >>>> >>>> Rick >>>> >>>> On Mon, Mar 3, 2025 at 2:24 PM Erik Anderson <erik.a...@microsoft.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Geoff, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My suggestion re: a policy was not to have one that is supported >>>>> indefinitely. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Many high-risk deprecations have had a policy lasting for, I believe, >>>>> as little as 3 major version releases. Having such a thing helps mitigate >>>>> the concern that the risk analysis was way off (which could then mean >>>>> needing to do a stable respin if your risk analysis was off). If a policy >>>>> is available, impacted enterprises can quickly self-remediate, report what >>>>> broke once you flip over the default, and have a little bit more of a >>>>> window to plan mitigations tied to the removal of the policy (since they’d >>>>> now be aware of what broke and why). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> >>>>> Erik >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From:* Ken Russell <k...@chromium.org> >>>>> *Sent:* Monday, March 3, 2025 10:39 AM >>>>> *To:* Ashley Gullen <ash...@scirra.com> >>>>> *Cc:* Geoff Lang <geof...@google.com>; Erik Anderson < >>>>> erik.a...@microsoft.com>; Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org>; David >>>>> Adrian <dad...@google.com>; blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org>; >>>>> geof...@chromium.org <geof...@chromium.org> >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Remove: >>>>> SwiftShader Fallback >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It's feasible, but a significant amount of engineering work that our >>>>> (Chrome Graphics) team would not be able to prioritize versus other >>>>> current >>>>> work that would impact a larger user base. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -Ken >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:45 AM 'Ashley Gullen' via blink-dev < >>>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Is it feasible to have SwiftShader (or WARP) run in its own process >>>>> with a stronger sandbox? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, 28 Feb 2025 at 15:25, Geoff Lang <geof...@google.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hey Erik, Ashley, Rick, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I want to be clear that I think having high WebGL availability is a >>>>> good thing. I don't think that users with software WebGL have a great >>>>> experience but it's likely better than no availability, at least for >>>>> drawing static things. What pushes this over the line and warrants this >>>>> discussion is that JITing code in the GPU process is a huge vulnerability >>>>> and is a rapidly increasing attack target. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We're investigating WARP as an alternative on Windows. You are right >>>>> that a large portion of the SwiftShader fallback is on machines with no >>>>> GPUs (headless or VMs). There are just many unknowns about the quality and >>>>> security of WARP, it will take a while to be confident in such a change >>>>> and >>>>> it still does not resolve the issue of JITing code in the weakly sandboxed >>>>> GPU process. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Regarding corporate policy, I'd much rather have these users fall back >>>>> in the same way as everyone else and work towards lowering the number of >>>>> users in this position. It would mean supporting and testing a feature >>>>> only used by enterprise users when we have no visibility into crashes, >>>>> bugs >>>>> or vulnerabilities that they face. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We're also disabling software fallback due to a crashes in the GPU >>>>> driver (as opposed to blocklisted GPU). Right now any user can fairly >>>>> easily trigger a GPU crash and fall back to software WebGL which opens up >>>>> vulnerabilities to all users instead of the 2.7%. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Geoff >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:28 PM Erik Anderson <erik.a...@microsoft.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi David, >>>>> >>>>> The initial message states that SwiftShader primarily covers older >>>>> Windows devices. Beyond those, there are a non-trivial set of enterprise >>>>> users that use thin clients to connect to a remote Windows device which is >>>>> often running in a VM without access to a physical GPU. >>>>> >>>>> For example, this applies to the Microsoft Dev Box offering ( >>>>> https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/dev-box/). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Unfortunately, enterprise clients often turn off telemetry. So, I >>>>> would assume any UMA-derived metrics to be undercounting the population. >>>>> >>>>> It’s likely there are certain line-of-business and/or >>>>> consumer-oriented sites that have a hard dependency on WebGL to be fully >>>>> functional. >>>>> >>>>> Have you considered, on Windows, targeting WARP ( >>>>> https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/direct3darticles/directx-warp) >>>>> instead? I don’t know if there are other viable alternatives on other >>>>> OSes, >>>>> but if the primary impacted clients are Windows perhaps that would be a >>>>> sufficient mitigation. >>>>> >>>>> To help enterprise customers reason about how much this is going to >>>>> impact them, it would be helpful to have an enterprise policy to control >>>>> this. This is a common pattern for potentially high-impact changes. >>>>> >>>>> In its initial phase, the policy would enable motivated enterprises to >>>>> forcibly disable SwiftShader as a scream test. And after you switch over >>>>> the default, it could enable enterprises caught unaware to have some >>>>> additional window of time to plan mitigations (by re-enabling it via >>>>> policy) before you proceed with fully deprecating support and remove the >>>>> policy. >>>>> >>>>> Can you comment on if you plan to add such a policy or, if not, why >>>>> not? >>>>> >>>>> Thanks! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From:* 'Ashley Gullen' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> >>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, February 27, 2025 4:14 AM >>>>> *To:* Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> >>>>> *Cc:* David Adrian <dad...@google.com>; blink-dev < >>>>> blin...@chromium.org>; geof...@chromium.org <geof...@chromium.org> >>>>> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [blink-dev] Intent to Remove: SwiftShader >>>>> Fallback >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for the response Rick, I agree with much of what you've said >>>>> and I think your views and suggested workarounds are all generally >>>>> reasonable. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I just realised I previously responded to this thread but only replied >>>>> to David - for transparency I've copied my previous response below. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I can confirm all content made with Construct since about 2018 >>>>> requires WebGL to work and will show an error message if WebGL is >>>>> unavailable. I've included a screenshot of the message Construct content >>>>> published to the web will display when WebGL is not supported, saying >>>>> "Software update needed", since that has usually been the best advice in >>>>> that situation in the past. As my previous message says we long ago >>>>> removed >>>>> any other fallback and are now likely too dependent on WebGL to feasibly >>>>> reimplement a canvas2d fallback. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Some other thoughts about workarounds/mitigations: >>>>> >>>>> - A swiftshader WASM module would at least give us a workaround, >>>>> but if that was something like a ~10 MB+ module it would be a very high >>>>> download overhead which we'd be obligated to include in every Construct >>>>> export for compatibility >>>>> - Swiftshader could be removed from insecure origins with little >>>>> impact to us, and using a permission policy for cross-site iframes >>>>> should >>>>> be straightforward to work with >>>>> - If it helps reduce the attack surface, we could live with >>>>> SwiftShader support for WebGL 1 only (no WebGL 2) with minimum >>>>> capabilities >>>>> (no extensions). >>>>> - A permission prompt to the user is not ideal but better than >>>>> nothing, and I imagine it would be tricky to explain to a normal web >>>>> user >>>>> though the prompt message (and makes obtaining a WebGL context >>>>> async...) >>>>> - Regarding getting WebGL to work on more devices, as I mentioned >>>>> in my previous message, reviewing the GPU blocklist to re-enable WebGL >>>>> for >>>>> older devices if drivers have been updated or workarounds for issues >>>>> can be >>>>> found would help reduce the number of devices subject to SwiftShader. >>>>> Being >>>>> able to enable at least WebGL 1 will still help with Construct content. >>>>> - If a software fallback can be securely implemented for WebGPU, >>>>> Construct has a WebGPU renderer too now so that would give us a >>>>> workaround >>>>> (and potentially for any other WebGL content - AFAIK many widely used >>>>> libraries like three.js now either support WebGPU or are working on it) >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for the consideration all. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Copy of my previous message: >>>>> >>>>> ----- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK, thanks for the information. I just want to point out that even >>>>> stopping WebGL content for only 2.7% of users is still potentially very >>>>> disruptive. Consider a web game on Poki that requires WebGL and gets a >>>>> million players. With this change, now 27,000 users will see a "WebGL not >>>>> supported" error message. That's then potentially a huge number of new >>>>> support requests to deal with. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > Can you share the number for Construct about what percentage of your >>>>> users are using the SwiftShader fallback? Again, our numbers indicate that >>>>> these are primarily older Windows workstations. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For the Construct editor itself, it is around 3%, so that seems in >>>>> line. But the key point here is that Construct is middleware: it is a tool >>>>> our users develop web games in and then publish independently of us. It is >>>>> much more important that WebGL works for players of those games than it >>>>> does for Construct itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Lots of people use older Windows workstations. We've had issues before >>>>> where for example a graphics driver bug affecting WebGL 1 caused a great >>>>> deal of trouble in a South American market, even though I suspect it only >>>>> affected a small percentage of devices - see >>>>> https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40941645 which was never resolved. >>>>> There are probably places in the world where there are large numbers of >>>>> people using older Windows workstations. I fear that pulling WebGL support >>>>> from those devices may result in much higher numbers of unsupported users, >>>>> and many more support requests, in the specific markets where such devices >>>>> are common. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is there anything that can be done to mitigate this change? Given >>>>> SwiftShader allowed WebGL to be considered ubiquitous for many years, >>>>> engines like Construct long ago removed any fallback for systems that do >>>>> not support WebGL; we moved forward assuming we could rely on WebGL, and >>>>> so >>>>> now it's probably infeasible to bring back any fallback as we have too >>>>> many >>>>> key features that fundamentally require WebGL. Could SwiftShader be >>>>> adapted >>>>> to not use JIT? Could some other fallback be found? Could the GPU >>>>> blocklist >>>>> be revised to enable WebGL on as many older devices as possible? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think the number of affected users should be <1% to minimise the >>>>> impact from such a change. At web scale 2.7% is still a lot. Perhaps with >>>>> revising the GPU blocklist and adding more workarounds this is feasible. I >>>>> fear if this goes ahead without any mitigation, it will cause a great deal >>>>> of trouble and is exactly the kind of thing sceptics of the web will bring >>>>> up to say that web technology sucks, browsers can't be trusted, and people >>>>> should just develop desktop games instead. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, 25 Feb 2025 at 22:31, Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for the delay from API owners, as discussed on chat the >>>>> chromestatus entry wasn't set up properly to request API owner review (now >>>>> fixed). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is a tricky one indeed (thanks for your input Ashley!). It looks >>>>> like >>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/4026> >>>>> WebGL is used on about 20% of page loads, so 2.7% of that is ~0.5% of page >>>>> loads which is very high risk according to our rules of thumb >>>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RC-pBBvsazYfCNNUSkPqAVpSpNJ96U8trhNkfV0v9fk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.mqfkui78vo5z> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Of course that's an upper-bound, how many will have a fallback? One >>>>> option would be to collect some UKM data for SwiftShader usage and review >>>>> a >>>>> random ~50 sites to observe the user experience in practice. That could >>>>> give us a better sense of what the real user impact would likely be. Or >>>>> Maybe Ashley can give us some examples of some web games just to confirm >>>>> they indeed go from being playable to unplayable without swiftshader on >>>>> some specific devices? David, do you have a device yourself you can test >>>>> with that doesn't support GPU WebGL? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Regardless, unless sites have been really good about almost always >>>>> falling back somehow, I suspect we'll find that there's enough end-user >>>>> impact to make this a high-risk change (but I could be convinced otherwise >>>>> such as via a thorough UKM analysis). In which case then we could start >>>>> working through our playbook for a phased plan for risky breaking changes. >>>>> Not unlike what we did for flash removal >>>>> <https://www.chromium.org/flash-roadmap/>, or WebSQL >>>>> <https://developer.chrome.com/blog/deprecating-web-sql> (both big >>>>> security benefit but big web compat risk). For example: >>>>> >>>>> - Explore whether we can build swiftshader into a wasm module that >>>>> sites can use as a (probably even slower) fallback themselves. This >>>>> turned >>>>> out to be the key to making WebSQL deprecation tractable. In general >>>>> our >>>>> policy >>>>> >>>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RC-pBBvsazYfCNNUSkPqAVpSpNJ96U8trhNkfV0v9fk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.x5bhg5grhfeo> >>>>> is that we don't take functionality away that developers can't replace >>>>> with >>>>> some other substitute except in pretty extreme circumstances. >>>>> - Prompt the user on whether or not to enable it per-origin (like >>>>> a permission) >>>>> - Put 3p usage behind a permission policy so the top-level site >>>>> has to opt-in to allow 3p iframes to use swiftshader >>>>> - Rely on some heuristics, (perhaps crowd-sourced signals) to try >>>>> to find a sweet spot in the safety vs. functionality tradeoff space. >>>>> We did >>>>> this for flash initially with things like blocking it for very small >>>>> canvases. >>>>> - Anything we can do to make WebGL work on a larger set of devices? >>>>> - Probably lots of other ideas that aren't occurring to me right >>>>> now, more examples in bit.ly/blink.compat. >>>>> >>>>> On the other side of the equation, API owners can be convinced to >>>>> accept more compat risk the more significant the security benefits are. >>>>> Are >>>>> there more details you can share? Such as: >>>>> >>>>> - Are we confident that an attacker can only trigger swiftshader >>>>> on somewhere around 3% of users (vs. some knob which can force it to be >>>>> used on a larger fraction)? To what extent do we have reason to believe >>>>> that the vulnerable population size is large enough to be a plausible >>>>> target for attackers? Is there anything we can do to make the >>>>> vulnerable >>>>> user base more reliably contained? >>>>> - How does swiftshader compare to other areas in terms of the >>>>> number of vulnerabilities we've found in practice? Are there any >>>>> reports of >>>>> ITW exploits of it? It looks like >>>>> >>>>> <https://chrome-commit-tracker.arthursonzogni.com/cve/reward_per_components?start=2019-12-27&end=2025-02-25> >>>>> since 2020 SwiftShader has been about 8% of Chrome's VRP spend - that >>>>> seems >>>>> quite significant to me, but probably not in the top 5 areas of >>>>> concern. >>>>> This was obviously key to the immense cost and pain of Flash removal - >>>>> we >>>>> kept having severe security incidents in practice. >>>>> >>>>> So assuming Ashley and I are right that this isn't likely to be easy, >>>>> that means it's likely quite a lot of work to attempt to phase-out >>>>> SwiftShader in a responsible fashion. But with luck maybe we can find a >>>>> first step that is a good cost-benefit tradeoff (like putting 3P usage >>>>> behind a permission prompt)? Or maybe it's just a better cost-benefit >>>>> tradeoff to invest in other areas which pose a threat to a greater number >>>>> users (hardening ANGLE perhaps)? But of course I will defer to the >>>>> judgement of security and GPU experts like yourself on that question, I'm >>>>> happy to consult and support if you want to invest in a plan that API >>>>> owners can approve. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Rick >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Feb 19, 2025 at 2:48 PM 'David Adrian' via blink-dev < >>>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > I wrote about this previously but I'm still concerned this is a >>>>> major breaking change for existing published WebGL content on the web. If >>>>> the figure of 2.7% comes from my previous citing of Web3DSurvey >>>>> >>>>> It does, not it comes from Chrome's metrics system. >>>>> >>>>> > Does Google have their own internal data about the usage of >>>>> SwiftShader? >>>>> >>>>> It is the 2.7% number. >>>>> >>>>> > Suppose this change rolls out and we get reports that say our WebGL >>>>> content no longer works for 10% of users in a South American market. Then >>>>> what? There is nothing feasible we can do about it. These customers were >>>>> previously getting by with SwiftShader, but now they get an error message. >>>>> So I fear this risks disaster for web games in some markets. >>>>> >>>>> > I mentioned I don't think it should be used as evidence to make such >>>>> a big change as this. Maybe in some places it will affect 25% or 50% of >>>>> users - who knows? How can we be sure? >>>>> >>>>> Can you share the number for Construct about what percentage of your >>>>> users are using the SwiftShader fallback? Again, our numbers indicate that >>>>> these are primarily older Windows workstations. Notably, SwiftShader is >>>>> not >>>>> used at all on mobile. >>>>> >>>>> > V8 does JIT with untrusted JavaScript code and that is generally >>>>> considered reasonably secure, is there any particular technical reason >>>>> SwiftShader is not considered as secure? >>>>> >>>>> Yes. The GPU process is shared between all sites, whereas the V8 JIT >>>>> is per-site. This means compromising the GPU process can be enough to >>>>> bypass site isolation protections with a single bug. Additionally, V8 bugs >>>>> can be reliably patched in the browser, whereas SwiftShader "bugs" can be >>>>> user-mode graphics driver bugs that are simply more exposed via >>>>> SwiftShader >>>>> than they would be otherwise. In this case, the browser can't patch the >>>>> bug >>>>> because it's in the driver. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, February 13, 2025 at 12:12:07 PM UTC-5 ash...@scirra.com >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I wrote about this previously but I'm still concerned this is a major >>>>> breaking change for existing published WebGL content on the web. If the >>>>> figure of 2.7% comes from my previous citing of Web3DSurvey ( >>>>> https://web3dsurvey.com/) then this should be seen as very much an >>>>> underestimate, because that site uses a relatively small sample size that >>>>> is more likely to be focused on high-end devices (samples are taken from >>>>> developer-focused sites like the three.js website, WebGPU fundamentals >>>>> etc). I would not be surprised if the real worldwide average was more like >>>>> 4-5%. Then if that's a worldwide average, there will probably be some >>>>> specific countries or markets where the figure could be more like 10%. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Suppose this change rolls out and we get reports that say our WebGL >>>>> content no longer works for 10% of users in a South American market. Then >>>>> what? There is nothing feasible we can do about it. These customers were >>>>> previously getting by with SwiftShader, but now they get an error message. >>>>> So I fear this risks disaster for web games in some markets. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Does Google have their own internal data about the usage of >>>>> SwiftShader? Can more data about this be shared? I respect the work done >>>>> by >>>>> Web3DSurvey but unfortunately for the reasons I mentioned I don't think it >>>>> should be used as evidence to make such a big change as this. Maybe in >>>>> some >>>>> places it will affect 25% or 50% of users - who knows? How can we be sure? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Can there not be some other fallback implemented? V8 does JIT with >>>>> untrusted JavaScript code and that is generally considered reasonably >>>>> secure, is there any particular technical reason SwiftShader is not >>>>> considered as secure? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I'd also point out that any website that has a poor experience with >>>>> SwiftShader can already opt-out using the failIfMajorPerformanceCaveat >>>>> context flag. If there is some other mode that can be used instead, or >>>>> just >>>>> showing an error message is acceptable, then websites can already >>>>> implement >>>>> that. In our case with Construct we specifically attempt to obtain >>>>> hardware-accelerated WebGPU, WebGL 2, or WebGL 1; only failing that do we >>>>> resort to using SwiftShader on the basis that showing the content with >>>>> potentially poor performance is better than not showing it at all. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, 13 Feb 2025 at 15:46, 'David Adrian' via blink-dev < >>>>> blin...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Contact emails >>>>> >>>>> dad...@google.com, geof...@chromium.org >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Summary >>>>> >>>>> Allowing automatic fallback to WebGL backed by SwiftShader is >>>>> deprecated and will be removed. This has been noted in DevTools since >>>>> Chrome 130. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> WebGL context creation will fail instead of falling back to >>>>> SwiftShader. This is for two primary reasons: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 1. SwiftShader is a high security risk due to JIT-ed code running in >>>>> Chromium's GPU process. >>>>> >>>>> 2. Users have a poor experience when falling back from a >>>>> high-performance GPU-backed WebGL to a CPU-backed implementation. Users >>>>> have no control over this behavior and it is difficult to describe in bug >>>>> reports. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SwiftShader is a useful tool for web developers to test their sites on >>>>> systems that are headless or do not have a supported GPU. This use case >>>>> will still be supported by opting in but is not intended for running >>>>> untrusted content. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To opt-in to lower security guarantees and allow SwiftShader for >>>>> WebGL, run the chrome executable with the --enable-unsafe-swiftshader >>>>> command-line switch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> During the deprecation period, a warning will appear in the javascript >>>>> console when a WebGL context is created and backed with SwiftShader. >>>>> Passing --enable-unsafe-swiftshader will remove this warning message. This >>>>> deprecation period began in Chrome 130. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Chromium and other browsers do not guarantee WebGL availability. >>>>> Please test and handle WebGL context creation failure and fall back to >>>>> other web APIs such as Canvas2D or an appropriate message to the user. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SwiftShader is an internal implementation detail of Chromium, not a >>>>> public web standard, therefore buy-in from other browsers is not required. >>>>> The devices covered by SwiftShader (primarily older Windows devices) are >>>>> likely already incompatible with WebGL in other browsers. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SwiftShader is not used on mobile; this only applies to Desktop >>>>> platforms. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Blink component >>>>> >>>>> Blink>WebGL >>>>> <https://issues.chromium.org/issues?q=customfield1222907:%22Blink%3EWebGL%22> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Motivation >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/gpu/swiftshader.md#automatic-swiftshader-webgl-fallback-is-deprecated >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Risks >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> SwiftShader is used by devices without hardware acceleration for >>>>> WebGL. This is approximately 2.7% of WebGL contexts. However, WebGL is >>>>> considered fallible and in many cases, these draws are not performant and >>>>> provide an effectively unusable experience for users. Many applications, >>>>> such as Google Maps, prefer to fail out rather than use SwiftShader. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Debuggability >>>>> >>>>> None >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Flag name on about://flags >>>>> >>>>> --enable-unsafe-swiftshader command-line switch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Finch feature name >>>>> >>>>> AllowSwiftShaderFallback >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Tracking bug >>>>> >>>>> https://issues.chromium.org/40277080 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Launch bug >>>>> >>>>> https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4351104 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>> >>>>> Shipping on Desktop 137 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>> >>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5166674414927872?gate=5188866041184256 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAGkh42KV4DrSSyEgJaF4DnFOXAye-wRLrfD-LKGNkWhyWzshLA%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAGkh42KV4DrSSyEgJaF4DnFOXAye-wRLrfD-LKGNkWhyWzshLA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/c5131675-dff4-4aa0-8e84-4cdc373e3035n%40chromium.org >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/c5131675-dff4-4aa0-8e84-4cdc373e3035n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAABs73jWBkuxvj%3DDDXmEQNwLfCa_uV5OZZ5nZJRj9ZMgP9yk7Q%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAABs73jWBkuxvj%3DDDXmEQNwLfCa_uV5OZZ5nZJRj9ZMgP9yk7Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAABs73hYs9O-2hdmfn37fQb-U-8m_-08i3Qg9dkUhKNQQvNLSg%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAABs73hYs9O-2hdmfn37fQb-U-8m_-08i3Qg9dkUhKNQQvNLSg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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