At 1:57 PM -0400 16/12/2000, Darryl Shannon wrote:
>OK Gord. I've mentioned this before, but consider this. Cultural
>relativism is itself an cultural assumption.
Sorry, this is long again.
Well, that's an often-used argument. Here's my response: cultural
relativism is a way of trying to perceive that steps as far as possible
outside of one's immediate cultural environs in order to allow one to
reassess the assumptions underlying not only one's own culture, but others'
as well. While attempting to do so, it also acknowledges that this is to
some degree impossible, and that one's observations made using this
methodology are imperfect. Finally, as I argued, it is most useful when
considering *divergent* problems -- those not solvable purely by
observation, such as questions of good and evil or how humans ought to
choose live.
>That means that,
>according to cultural relativism, it is merely one choice among others,
>and does not occupy any priveleged position. Therefore, if cultural
>relativism is true, we have no reason to suppose it is true.
We have plenty of reason to suppose it is true . . . observation helps.
After all, I don't see where you get this idea that one, to be a cultural
relativist, has to be ignorant of, say, science, or somehow magically all
cultural relativists are Hegelians. It doesn't wash, though, and I see it a
lot here. Admitted, I have seen some humanities academics aspouse such
stupidity, but then again I've talked with physicists whose approach to,
say, biology was so reductive as to miss important factors, yet heard them
speak in such a way that it sounds authoritative.
Cultural relativism is actually grounded in observation -- that other
cultures contain different ideological systems and those systems are, at
many points, only loosely connected with anything actually universal, but
are generally thought to be either universally or absolutely true by their
adherents. This is cultural relativism taking the cue from science, in
fact.
I don't know anyone personally, though, who believes in the kind of
cultural relativism that you're knocking. I don't know anyone who couldn't
reconcile cultural relativism with science in the way that I demonstrated
in my original email on the subject, and you nicely recapitulated (with the
one error of confusedly missing my very point). In fact, I think we are
saying the same exact thing, except that I disagree with you that cultural
relativism NEED mean only an idiotic, totalizing form of that approach.
As for why I personally think that democracy or freedom or socialism are
good things, cultural attributes that I would seek to promote, I could make
a very long explanation, but the essentials would be laid out as follows:
from a utilitarian perspective, I would prefer to minimize suffering and
maximize happiness. Now, both of those terms being subjectively defined,
but suffering at least being probably easily definable among us, because
the effects of suffering are something we can clearly observe in others.
Depending on one's life experience and jadedness, of course, this may be
limited to one's loved ones, but even so, we as humans are equipped with
the potential to observe suffering in others, and to imagine ourselves in
that position. We are physically capable of it, is all I need to argue
here.
Here's the point: nothing priviledges my viewpoint. It is not absolutely
true, and certainly there are elements
I can see your point about arguing with someone who says that they don't
believe in logic. But on the other hand, I don't see how one can believe
EXCLUSIVELY in logic -- in fact, it's impossible to do so. One can either
believe that ones bases for belief in more than pure logic are based on
subjective experience, or one can claim that one's bases are in some
absolute truth. After all, all deduction depends upon a primary induction.
See below for more about why this is important.
>And it seems to me that cultural relativism sort of recognizes that,
>and says that since we have to start in the middle, since there is no
>ultimate epistemology that we can anchor our ideas on, that we are
>therefore obliged to just give up and say that we cannot make any
>choices, or that we can make choices but there is no way to say which
>choices are better than any others.
No, it doesn't necessarily; all it says is that all viewpoints are
necessarily based on subjective value-judgments. The problem that one finds
oneself confronted with when one is examining other cultures, specifically,
is that one is in a precarious conundrum when one tries to position oneself
in critique of other cultures, as much as one's own. It is impossible to
authoritatively dictate morality to others. Even when one can prove
scientifically that the reasoning used to promulgate such claims (such as,
that infibulation makes for a more stable society -- if, that is, we take
out the time to work out a shared definition of "stable"), the problem is
that this reasoning usually is hokum and erected to protect what is more of
a subjective attitude toward, in this case, women on the one hand and
traditions on the other.
In no wise is a cultural relativist obligated to either affirm all choices
as equally admirable, or simply throw his or her hands up and give up. But
they are obligated to be conscious of the fact that their own biases are
often rooted in subjectivities. I will argue for equality but I cannot
prove equality. It's a leap of faith -- but the difference is that I know
it is not rooted in the absolute. I am not *right*, and there are very
likely flaws in my own arguments to which I am essentially blinded by my
own acculturation. In other words, I can argue that my own system of
morality is more compassionate than someone else's, and that I think
compassion is a fundamental axiom which is worth adhering to, but I cannot
declare myself absolutely right in my moral claims. It's only an idea, one
I have received and reconceived imperfectly and incompletely. It is also an
idea which could disappear (as completely as is possible for
idea-frameworks that are not implicit in the hardwiring of our brains, if
any are at all) if I failed to convince others of its truth, in which case
it would die out.
>But we can't just throw up our hands...even you recognize that certain
>things should be opposed. And why? Because you have a scientific
>ideology after all, you just pretend not to, or tell yourself that you
>don't.
What a wonderfully interesting argument. And how does one derive something
like morality from science? I would like to see you sketch that one out for
me. Even one simple case that does not rely on any absolute, unobserved,
premise. You can't do it.
I dare you to try. But maybe the following will save you the trouble . . .
Yes, Darryl, *even* I, nasty vile well-poisoning traitorous baby-eating red
Hegelian that I seem to be taken for here (*grin*), recognize that certain
things ought to be opposed. But I can't base that in science. I can base it
in observation, and in compassion, but not in science. The leap of faith is
one that I am willing to make, but I recognize it is subjective. I
*believe* that human life has value. I *believe* that others essentially
are like me in not wanting to suffer. I can't prove or demonstrate
satisfactorily, nor can I prove or demonstrate that freedom from suffering
(for example) is something everyone will enjoy. After all, the masses only
rise and revolt once in a blue moon: maybe they like suffering. Maybe they
are right and regicide is a sin against their God. But I subjectively and
with no real grounds for proof, *believe* that my *compassion* for the
person suggests a relationship of kinship, and of responsibility. I believe
that the fact other people can suffer *matters*.
This cannot be proven using logic, any more than love can be. These are
fundamental axioms of my daily thinking, but they are rooted where? In
absolute truth?
No, in ideas. Tenous, vulnerable ideas. As we have observed in the past,
ideas are breakable, or lose-able. Whole languages and worldviews have died
out in the past. Sometimes ideas that from my point of view are good simply
don't become popular (such as, say, sharing and sharing alike) and
sometimes ideas that are bad from my point of view become popular (such as
racism or sexism). How can I declare sexism bad? I would declared it bad on
the axiom that unfair discrimination is bad. Can I prove that axiom by
either logic or science alone?
No, I cannot. It's an idea that I think is worthwhile, powerful, and not
completely applied to our society; I think that other ideas in our society
oppose it (such as constructions of sexuality, for example, or aspects of
the economic system) and I think that others uphold it (such as
increasingly sensitive education and widespread everyday acknowledgement of
equality). But is the fundamental axiom "sexism is bad"? No. It's be
something more general, like, "all people are equal." Can I prove that? I
can disprove that some of the pseudoscience claiming race is a determinant
of natural hierarchy. Can I prove that this matters, to someone who is
still convinced that one race is better than another? No, because anyway
the pseudoscience is the retroactively appropriated trappings of science
that were fashioned into a suit of armor protecting the subjective opinion
of the racist. And anyone who tries to derive morality from science is in
engaged in the same sophistry.
All I can do is take my ideas, which I think are ones that work and which
seem to produce (from my observation) minimization of suffering, and try to
argue them passionately to others, and demonstrate their facility.
But if you wish to try to derive morality from science, go ahead. I'd like
to try watch. Here's the question: from where does the imperative for any
given axiom come? If it comes from science, it must be absolutely true.
Evil things should be avoided.
Science shows that infibulation is evil.
Science shows that infibulation should be avoided.
However, the minor premise is not demonstrable. Evil is subjective; science
can show us that infibulation causes great suffering, for example:
Things that cause great suffering are evil.
Infibulation causes great suffering.
Infibulation is evil.
But here, you are not using science to derive the major premise: you're
taking a leap of faith, that the causing of suffering is evil. That's a
moral axiom, and one we'd both happily agree on: but I am asking, do you
think this axiom issues from absolute truth? Or from subjective faith and
acculturation?
To bring this discussion back to memes, I would say that meme-sets are
essentially composed of many specifics, such as "the frontier meme" (which
would actually be a set of memes), but also includes memes like the major
premise of the above syllogism, memes that posit moral axioms. "Causing
suffering is bad" is an idea, and thus arguably a meme. And it seems to me
that if one can take this notion and argue that it spread not because of
the absolute truth of the statement, but rather the way that it interacts
with already-in-place memes in others, and so on, then one is taking a
cultural relativist stance.
Does this mean one must throw one's hands up in the air? No. But one cannot
claim that memes are an essentially valid analogy and then turn around and
claim that one has access to absolute truth (as opposed to facts,
observation, in combination with subjective evaluation). If one brings
absolute ethical truth into the picture, the idea of memes I think
necessarily falls apart.
The other option is to embrace the fact that one is living in
subjectivities, and then struggle to find the most serviceable one and
fight for its promulgation, without being rigid in its specifics; one must
open one's moral code to its tentativeness, incompleteness, and inherent
subjectivity, but also strive to demonstrate to others why it is so
appealing and serviceable (as we used to sing in Church when I was a kid,
"They will know we are Christians by our love." -- the point being that
the validity of a meme-set is subjective, but so is the human appraisal of
meme-sets). Essentially, you have to be willing to say that you don't have
the absolute truth, but you can still be willing to think your ideas are
pretty damn good, and worth sharing. Not "Listen to me because I know the
truth" as much as "Listen to me, I have an idea I want to share with you"
or, more effectively, "Did you need help with those groceries, ma'am," or
"Leave him alone, and don't call him '<racial epithet>'," or whatever.
Essentially, I would say a cultural relativist would argue that arguements
are about how one "can" choose to live, instead of how one "ought" to
choose to live. The "can" involves an assumption of goodwill in most
people, and a conception of freedom which necessitates taking the long view
of cultural change.
If I am wrong, however, I would love to see a demonstration of how you can
derive absolute ethical truth from science.
>And the great thing about a scientific ideology is that it can
>examine itself without unravelling, unlike cultural
>relativism/nihilism.
I object strongly to your equating cultural relativism and nihilism. That
is essentially unsupportable, for all the points I mentioned far above.
You're begging the question, and in this case you are overtly doing what
you accused Kat of doing in the _1984_ thread, by equating two things which
are not the same. If I were obliged to link Cultural Relativism of the type
I have sketched out here with any one philosophical system I would say it
would be most amenable to Absurdism as I know it from my cursory readings
of Camus, specifically in _The Myth of Sisyphus_, in which one is willing
to commit to a given belief system and life-path while fully cognizant that
it is rooted in the subjective and the arbitrary. [The one revision I would
make is that this is not so much oppressive, in the sense I get from some
of _Sisyphus_, as it is freeing and empowering, because humanity has the
great ability to make meaning . . . and once humanity is within meaning, it
also finds obligations and resposibilities arising *within* that framework,
which while not absolutely true, is compelling and habitable.]
Am enjoying this immensely, Darryl and William; I sneak outta town in a few
days but will check the brinl on egroups to see how this progresses. If I
can I will get a response written for William's post before I go, but if
not it'll be sometime next week.
Gord
