--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Marvin Long, Jr." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Dan Minette wrote:
>>>Realism is the philosophy that there is a real world, apart from >>>our
existance and that we have direct access to that world via our >>>senses.
Books, tables, chairs, electrons, stars, the universe all >>>exist apart
from our observations.
>
> Alberto Monteiro wrote:
> > How can such simple and logical hypothesis be challenged
> > by QM really puzzles me :-)
>
I'll try to answer two at once here. If photons and electrons are things
that exist apart from us, why don't they have positions between
observations, and why are there time when they don't have fundamental
properties, such as spin or polerization, before observation.
> My questions at this point echo Alberto's puzzlement.
>
>1. Is realism, so defined, a metaphysical theory or an empirical/
>physical generalization?
It's metaphysical, as far as I see. Theories of science do not address the
ontological status of what we observe. If you expand your definition of
realism to merely make it "there are things that really exist apart from our
observations" then Plato was a realist. But, Plato is considered the poster
child of idealism.
>If realism is truly a metaphysical theory, however, then one should >be
able to understood it as eschewing from making statements or >predictions
about the structure of what we colloquially call the >physical world (hence
*meta* physics).
Actually the term metaphysics comes from Aristotle's book metaphysica, which
was so named because it was the book after Physica.
Metaphysics adresses questions such as ontology, epistemology, and
teleology.
>Likewise, no scientific discovery should be able to confirm or
>refute the realistic philosophy as metaphysics.
Well, in general, that's true. But I'm not arguing for something as strong
as confirmation or denial. I'm just pointing out that all four
interpretations of QM, including the two realistic ones, have something that
looks a lot more like nomenon that what realists have traditionally
considered as the foundation of things.
Observations cannot confirm or deny metaphysics. But, some philosophies are
routinely dismissed because they are hard to reconcile with how we live the
world. For example, few idealists hold that what we perceive in this world
has absolutely no connection to reality. Narcissism is not taken seriously
in most philosophical circles.
>
> The same rule would hold for Kant's metaphysics.
>
> Immanuel Kant:
> "First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very
> concept implies that they cannot be empirical.
>
Well, I tend to agree with Kant, but he wasn't a realist. Realists believe
that we can gain understanding of reality through observations. If you
read realists like Aristotle, Aquinas, early Wittgenstein, you will tend to
get that feeling. Barkely and Hume were empiricists, and doubted the
possibility of certain knowledge at all. They argued that even systems of
mathematical understandings were based on empirical observations.
So, if you think of it, all I am saying is that Kant was write in that the
empirical is not the source of metaphysical cognition.
>
> 2. How can any scientific discovery, if science is so defined, have any
> consequences, for or against, any metaphysical theory, whether that theory
> is realism or Kant's?
>
Well, that is a reasonable question. The best way to say this is that the
strongest realistic philosophies tend to have general observable
consequences. If you asked most realistic philosophers from the last 2000
years if part of their metaphysics was that trees, rocks, oceans, etc.
existed apart from humans, they would respond, (probably unanimously) with a
loud yes.
> 3. Why does QM support the idea that the things we observe have a
> noumenal aspect?
Well, because its hard to match QM with a viewpoint that microscopic things
that we observe are always where they are and what they are when we don't
look. (By what they are, I mean having definite values for their observable
properties.)
Dan'm Traeki Ring of Crystallized Knowledge.
Known for calculating, but not known for shutting up
