Before I answer specific questions, I want to clarify something. When I
described my "type 1" and "type 2" atheists, I didn't mean to assert that
atheism is rational as such, or that having faith is irrational as such.
My purpose was to show that opposing faith to reason as though they were
mutually exclusive belief systems is an oversimplification of human
nature.
On Sun, 2 Sep 2001, Dan Minette wrote:
>
> Well, there is a difference. Fairies and unicorns are emperical objects.
> God is a transcendent being. Much more akin to the existance of God is the
> existance of truth, good, human dignity, human rights, etc., as anything
> more than arbitrary cultural constructs.
I'm not sure that fairies and unicorns are just empirical objects. These
two examples aren't very good because we're so accustomed to thinking of
them as staples of fiction rather than genuine myth, so better examples
might things like the Olympian or Celtic gods, nature spirits of animistic
religions, and so on. What reason can be produced to show that I should
worship Christ rather than Apollo? Better yet, what reason could I
produce for a Greek living in 1000 BCE that he should worship Yahweh
rather than Apollo or Zeus? I'm not sure there are any reasons that
wouldn't fall in the category of artistic fancy rather than argument by
the "facts," all of which would presumably be in dispute.
I think that the laguage of fairies and elves and mythic beings probably
points to a transcencance and a source of values in a manner very similar
to the languages of Christianity and Hinduism, say. The latter may be
more theologically sophisticated, but are no more "transcendent" in their
function.
But, where I feel no urge to believe in Apollo, I do feel an urge to
believe in Christ thanks to my upbringing. I'd be very hard put, however,
to better justify a belief in Christ than a belief in Apollo in anything
approaching factual terms.
>
> > Based on my observance of myself and others, I think there are really two
> > kinds of atheism. Type 1 Atheism goes something like this: "If lack of
> > evidence leads me to disbelieve in Quetzocoatl and Zeus and Ishtar, then
> > by that same reasoning I disbelieve in Jesus, the prophets, and the
> > saints. Cool!" Type 1 atheism is a rational judgement.
>
> Actually, it involves a presupposition: all that exists is emperical. As
> before, I'd be more than happy to debate the consequences of accepting or
> rejecting that presupposition.
I'm not sure my "type 1" or casual atheist really requires that
presupposition. It may just be that the individual wasn't brought up in
church and as a consequence feels no need to adopt the beliefs involved
in religion. Having no need, he doesn't search for reasons, and the
reasons presented by others may never be sufficient to persuade him.
In other words, disbelieving in god(s) doesn't require the empirical
presupposition. All it really requires is the assumption that the burden
of proof is on the believer/persuader, just as it would be for the
existence of fairies or for cold fusion.
> Rationality allows us to proceed from axioms to theorems. It is not
> determining which axioms to accept. It does allow one to point out
> contradictions between axioms, but there is no means to determine which of
> several internally consistant systems one should accept solely through the
> use of reason.
True enough. On the other hand, rationality does allow us to apply
certain kinds of rules of thumb. If the world has a thousand religions,
all proclaiming the others false, then it might be reasonable to conclude
that none are true (or that all are true in a general sense, but none in
their particulars).
Marvin Long
Austin, Texas
For music that won't bugger your soul: www.guyforsyth.com
"The ego that sees a 'thou' is fundamentally different from an ego that
sees an 'it.'" -- Joseph Campbell
