> Behalf Of John Garcia > > > >Strange how I can find no mention of Generals Monash or Chauvel in my > >histories of WWI (I have Keegan's The First World War; Marshall's World > >War I; and Liddell-Hart's The Real War 1914-1918). Admittedly, no > >historian can cover all personalities and aspects of a > particular war, and > >other division and corps commanders are also not covered, but this is a > >bit bothersome.
Australians in general don't get a lot of mention in the war histories, pretty much the same as the Kiwis, Canadians or Indians. At best, we seem to be mentioned for Gallipoli. We are usually all just mentioned under the generic heading "British." Of course, most of the histories are written by British or American writers, rather than Australians. Australian troops made up about 10% of total British forces in WW1. They were credited with around 20% of the gains in land, prisoners and German guns during 1918. No Australian force larger than a Battalion had ever been pushed back from its line, and that only once. Ludendorf, however, like Rommel in the next war, specifically complimented the quality of the Australian troops. Someone was at least taking notice! (Rommel's comment was along the lines of his respect and wonderment at Montgomery, who controlled 3 Australian Divisions, where Rommel couldn't see how anyone could control one Australian Division. He ended up saying the Kiwis were the best troops he faced because they were a bit more tractable than the otherwise very effective Australians) -From "The Desert Fox". It was Australians (with some British troops too) at Tobruk in 1941 that first stopped a German attack. At least one of Keegan's books (Soldier, I think) has a brief bit about the Australians in WW1. I'm most surprised at Liddell-Hart's non-mention. A couple of the biographies of Monash I've read have stated that Monash's tactics and orders for the 8 August 1918 attacks around Amiens were direct influences on Liddell-Hart's theories of the 20s and 30s, that themselves led to Guderian's development of blitzkrieg. Many sols ago, when I was studying Australian History the main topic was on the conscription plebiscites of 1916 and 1917. So I started reading a lot about WW1. It was only when I started reading "Anzac to Amiens" by CEW Bean, the Australian Official Historian for WW1 that I suddenly found out that so many of the battles that I'd previously read as "British advances" during 1917 and 1918 actually turned out to mainly be Australian advances. The term "British" has pretty wide usage, covering troops from all of the Empire when needed, rather than just the troops from Great Britain. In fact, Empire casualties from WW1 (in particular) are usually all bundled together so you can't usually tell which are Canadian, New Zealand, Indian, or Australian, etc. Basically total WW1 Australian casualties were 64.98% of total embarkations, including nearly 20% KIA/DOW. From memory, only Germany and France had higher casualty rates. Also, the Australians especially tended to really piss the Brits off for a few reasons: 1. The Aust government refused to allow the death penalty for desertion, AWL, etc. This meant that the proportion of Australians in Divisional prisons for desertion (almost always AWL, rather than true desertion) was much higher than anyone else. Haig was forever requesting the government to allow a "very few" Australians to be executed "for example" and was always refused. 2. Partly due to reason 1. but also to the general egalitarianism within the Australian troops, they were seen to be very poorly disciplined. At least, out of the line: noone ever complained about Australian discipline under fire. They stood up for what they saw as their rights, especially as they looked on themselves as citizen soldiers. It was a totally volunteer army, the only one in Europe, and Australians in general have a thing about authority figures. The Australians also tended to be pretty bolshie, regularly releasing British soldiers found undergoing one of the field punishments the Brits used - tying the soldier to a gun wheel for a few hours. Wounded Australians ended up being separated from the rest of the Empire troops because of the lack of respect they showed their superiors. An example - Cassell, Flanders, 1917: A British MP sergeant is approached by one of a marching line of Australians. "I say, mate," said the Australian confidentially, "what've they done with all the sheilas in this place? Where's the nearest knocking shop?" And when the sergeant just stood there speechless the Aussie just added by way of explanation, "You know. The red light street...the nearest brothel?" When the Redcap had recovered he put the Australian under arrest immediately as being drunk, explaining later that he must have been to come to an MP with such a question. The soldier had no desire to be arrested, however, and to make matters even more difficult, his comrades regarded the sergeant's action as an unwarranted reflection upon their social life. A massive brawl ensued... (From "The Thin Yellow Line" p149, William Moore) The troops regarded time out of the line, especially after the day's training had been done, as being their own. Strange thing was, in general their officers agreed with them. Oh, and they bloody well never saluted. In fact, a doorman or bus driver was more likely to be given a salute than a British officer. Unless the officer wore the VC. Even King George was met with a stony silence when reviewing one Australian Battalion. 3. Australian privates were paid 6 shillings per day ($0.60) compared to the one shilling per day paid to a British private. Similar to the Oversexed, over paid, over here comments about WW2 GIs. British officers in particular did not like sharing the best restaurants or theatre seats with Australian privates and their female friends. BTW, Australian officers were drastically underpaid compared with their British colleagues. 4. For most of the war the only way into the Australian Army was as a private. Rank was gained on merit, not connection. This frequently meant that you'd have school teachers and lawyers in the other ranks and farmers and labourers being commissioned. British officers were almost entirely from the middle and upper classes, having gone through the private schools. By the end of the war, in particular, the Brits were basically commissioning kids straight out of school, whereas Australian officers had almost all been tried in battle beforehand. 5. There was very little segregation between the ranks. Because of the way the men got promoted it was common to see a group of privates, NCOs and an officer or two all walking along together chatting away when on leave. That just didn't happen in the British Army. If a British noncom ever got commissioned, he'd be sent to a different unit because it was thought he'd not be properly respected by his peer or subordinates. In the Australian army a newly commissioned officer would almost certainly end up in his old unit, at Battalion level if not Company or platoon. Actually, the RAF in WW2 was very similar in that respect to the AIF in WW1. Bomber crews would spend their leaves together, regardless of rank, in much the same way. >I'll have to do some digging to improve my knowledge of > >these two men. Monash seems to be one of that rare breed of general: the > >person who can adapt to changing circumstances. Thanks for > bringing him to > >my attention. One thing said about Monash was that he got better as a general the higher he was promoted. At Gallipoli, where he was a brigadier he was not tremendously effective. Later he was given the Third Division to train and deploy, and was then in a position to do much more. The Third took a lot of casualties, as did all the Aust Divisions, but were very effective. He built a real esprit de corps within the Third that can still be seen in the last of its survivors. By early 1918 he became a Corps Commander and really showed initiative and flair. He was an excellent civil engineer. He made his fortune before the war by using the just invented ferro-concrete process to build bridges and pipes, etc. His first bridge, built in 1898, is still used in Melbourne. It's quite a pretty little bridge too. After the war he built the State Electricity Commission, that supplied power from eastern Victoria's coal fields to the whole state. He was offered the post of Governor-General but declined and died soon after in the early 1930s. His funeral was one of the largest ever held in Australia. One of Australia's top universities is named after him. BTW, Chauvel had the misfortune of being involved in a real sideshow war, the Middle East. Allenby was his commander, but bloody TE Lawrence and his Arabs seem to have got most of the glory. Frex, Lawrence got the credit for capturing Damascus from the Turks in 1918. The mere fact the Australian Light Horse took the city the day previously somehow got missed. David Lean's fault, I think. Even in the 1920s the Light Horse looked upon themselves as the quiet achievers. > > > >(The fact that Monash and Chauvel are not mentioned in general histories > >of the war [at least the ones I own], kinda confirms a suspicion of mine > >that Australian troops and their generals receive short shrift in > >non-Australian histories. For example, in the WWII Pacific Theatre, > >General Sir Thomas Blaney performed outstanding work organizing, > training > >and leading his country's troops. Yet he is barely mentioned in the > >general histories.) > > One word for this: MacArthur. Up until late 1943, in New Guinea any actions were described as Allied actions. Afterwards they were solely American. It was not until late 1943 that very many GIs were involved on the ground. Almost all had previously been done by Australian troops. In the air, there was a lot more US involvement. It was almost 50% Australian and 50% American right up until the Philippines campaign, not that the 5th Air Force's General Kenney would ever admit. The RAAF gets barely a mention in his autobiography. Blamey was the Commander, Allied Land Force, MacArthur's deputy but was hardly ever mentioned. In fact, Blamey retained that position, theoretically commanding both Australian and American land forces in New Guinea, only up to the point where Americans would have come under his control in battle. MacArthur then set up a "task force" structure that effectively meant he alone controlled US troops. I'd guess quite a few Americans lost their lives unnecessarily because the experience the Australian generals had gained in Egypt, Greece and New Guinea was ignored. The US generals ended up all learning the hard way. MacArthur and his group of ex-Bataan flunkies completely controlled the media. Any glory to be gained would go to and through MacArthur. It took months before even Eichelberger got a mention, let alone Vasey, Herring, Lavarack and Morshead. If you want a quick example, check out the photos or footage of the Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri. The cameras were placed so that the only officers seen closely and face on were MacArthur and the Americans. Off to camera right (against the superstructure) was a line of Australians (including Blamey), British, French, Russians and Dutch. At best they sometimes briefly were photoed from the back. It was MacArthur's show. > >john > > Now this is weird. Less than an hour after posting the above, I > was digging > through my pile of "to be read" stuff and came across the Winter 2002 > edition of Military History Quarterly. It has an article about General > Monash. Guess I have to get through the pile a lot quicker. > Lemme know what you think. I can scan some articles for you if you really want. (Scholarly use only, of course) Cheers, Brett
