Here's an interesting perspective on the actual results of a pretty heated list discussion from back in the day.
JDG > Missile Defense in a New Strategic Environment: Policy, Architecture, and > International Industrial Cooperation after the ABM Treaty > > John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security > Remarks to the Fourth RUSI Missile Defense Conference > London, England > November 18, 2002 > > I m very pleased to be here this morning to deliver the keynote address to the > Royal United Services Institute s [RUSI] conference on missile defense. I know > that RUSI s program of lectures, conferences, and seminars provides a valuable > forum for the discussion of a wide range of topics related to national and > international defense and security with a very broad audience. I hope that I > can contribute today to the dialogue on what I believe is a very important > issue. > > The debate about missile defense is certainly not a new one. Nevertheless, the > terms of the debate, as it has played out over the last decade, certainly have > changed. As the reference to "a new strategic environment" in the title of this > conference suggests, there have been a number of watershed events since October > of last year that have radically altered the environment in which we are now > discussing questions of missile defense policy, architecture, and international > cooperation. The most significant of those events, of course, are the United > States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which became effective on June 13 of > this year, and the not coincidental, simultaneous development of a new > strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. Several major > building blocks of this relationship were put in place at the May Summit > meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow, namely the Moscow Treaty > and the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United > State of America and the Russian Federation. > > In the context of our new strategic relationship with Russia, the demise of the > ABM Treaty has not brought about the dire consequences predicted by many > pundits; quite the contrary. The Treaty s demise instead has been liberating. > It has freed us to explore the full range of technologies and architectures to > defend against an increasing ballistic missile threat. For example, the > successful October 14 missile intercept test conducted by the Missile Defense > Agency involved for the first time a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer using its SPY-1 > radar system to track the flight of the target missile. The participation of a > sea-based, mobile radar tracking a strategic ballistic missile in this test > would have been banned under the ABM Treaty. > > The demise of the ABM Treaty has also been liberating in terms of our broader > relationship with Russia. The ABM Treaty codified a doctrine of mutual assured > destruction that no longer made sense given the changed international security > environment and the end of the Cold War rivalry. On May 1 of last year, even > before his first meeting with President Putin, President Bush laid out his > vision of a new strategic framework with Russia. He declared that we should > work together with Russia to replace the ABM Treaty with a new cooperative > relationship that would leave behind the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. A > year and a half later, the elements of a new strategic relationship outlined by > the President have largely been put in place. And as the U.S.-Russia > relationship has broadened and deepened, the significance of the ABM Treaty has > diminished. > > This was evident in President Putin s dispassionate response to the U.S. > withdrawal decision. Although Russia did not agree with our decision to > withdraw from the Treaty, President Putin stated quite explicitly that the U.S. > decision presented no threat to the national security of the Russian > Federation. > > Our withdrawal has not spurred an arms race or undermined strategic stability. > (I like to say that, in foreign ministries and editorial boards for many years, > whenever anyone typed "the 1972 ABM Treaty" there was a key that automatically > added, "the cornerstone of international strategic stability." That key no > longer works.) It is significant that President Putin used his December 13 > response to the U.S. withdrawal announcement to call for further, > legally-binding reductions in strategic offensive weapons to below the 2200 > level, thus responding positively to President Bush s statement at the > Washington/Crawford Summit that the U.S. would reduce its operationally > deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1700-2200 over the next > decade. These reductions have now been codified in the Moscow Treaty, which we > hope will be approved by the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma without delay. > > The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship that was also signed at > the May Summit in Moscow put in place a number of building blocks for > cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on missile defense. In the Declaration, > the two sides agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening > confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, > including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests, > reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and visits to observe and > familiarize each side with the other s missile defense systems. We also agreed > to study possible areas of missile defense cooperation. > > Earlier this month, the U.S.-Russian working group on missile defense met to > continue its work on both transparency and cooperation. The U.S. has invited > the Russians to observe the Missile Defense Agency s next mid-course > interceptor flight test (IFT-10), which is tentatively scheduled for next > month; and, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, to attend an exhibition of the > Patriot PAC-3 system at Ft. Bliss, Texas and to visit missile defense-related > facilities at Ft. Greeley, Alaska. > > There are also a number of other prospective areas of cooperation with Russia > that have real potential. > > * The Joint Declaration reaffirmed the two Presidents determination to > overcome the remaining obstacles to bringing the Joint Data Exchange Center > into operation. > > * Both sides have now expressed a desire to conclude an intergovernmental > agreement on the implementation of the Russian-American Observation > Satellite (RAMOS) program. > > * There is general agreement on developing a joint modeling and simulation > capability to examine missile defense system scenarios of mutual interest. > > * Similarly, there is general agreement on expanding the breadth and > sophistication of our ongoing bilateral TMD exercise program. > > * We also want to encourage American and Russian industries to propose > mutually beneficial joint projects in the area of missile defense, and we > have proposed to the Russian side a number of projects for joint technology > cooperation. > > The United States, along with the rest of NATO, is also engaged with Russia on > missile defense cooperation under the auspices of the new NATO-Russia Council. > The working group that has been established will focus initially on missile > defense terminology, concepts, and system capabilities in order to develop > procedures that could facilitate protection of forces in a joint, non-Article V > crisis response operation. This is a positive and practical first step in > developing a future joint NATO-Russia missile defense capability to protect > deployed forces and critical assets. As work progresses, the Alliance will > evaluate next steps and the potential for deeper cooperation with Russia in > this area. > > Turning the page on the ABM Treaty has also been liberating in another respect. > The Treaty prohibited cooperation on defenses against longer-range ballistic > missile threats with third countries. Now that we are no longer bound by the > Treaty, we can identify opportunities and options for increased cooperation > with friends and allies. In July, U.S. teams went to NATO headquarters and > fanned out to European capitals to begin a dialogue on issues associated with > missile defense. We have also begun missile defense dialogues with our allies > in Asia. > > The United States has developed a dual-track approach with regard to missile > defense cooperation with friends and Allies. We see these tracks as separate > but reinforcing. The first track is the NATO or collective track. > > Over the past several years, NATO has made progress in responding to theater > missile threats to its deployed forces. The Alliance is currently completing a > Theater Missile Defense Feasibility Study which is examining options for > providing missile defenses to defend deployed Alliance forces against missiles > with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers. Once NATO completes the study, we believe > that Allies should move forward and acquire these needed capabilities. > > We must also, however, take into account the need to defend Alliance territory > and populations against missile threats of all ranges. In their June 6, 2002, > "Statement of Capabilities," NATO Defense Ministers concluded that "Alliance > territory and population centers may also face an increasing missile threat. > Therefore, the Alliance needs to examine options for addressing this increasing > threat in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of > political and defense efforts." Without the ability to protect Allied territory > and population centers from missile attack, NATO s vulnerability to political > coercion and blackmail will only increase. As a follow-on to the Ministers > statement, on November 13, the North Atlantic Council directed the initiation > of a new missile defense feasibility study to examine options for protecting > Alliance territory and population centers against a full range of missile > threats. > > In just a few days, NATO Heads of State and government will hold a summit in > Prague. We expect that the summit s final declaration will express the need to > examine options to protect Allied forces, territory, and population centers > against the full range of missile threats. This will establish the framework > within which NATO allies can work cooperatively toward fielding the required > capabilities. > > The second track is the bilateral track, in which the United States can work > with individual Allies and friends -- both in Europe and Asia -- to develop > missile defense capabilities. In this track, we have a proposed framework for > participation in the U.S. missile defense program. This framework would allow > individual nations and their industries to participate at various levels > depending on their interest, resources, and overall contributions. > > We have conducted our initial consultations with friends and allies without a > predetermined missile defense architecture in mind or complete answers to all > of the relevant questions. We understand that friends and allies have different > motivations in approaching the issue of cooperation -- some are interested in > the benefits of industrial cooperation and technology transfer; some believe > more strongly than others in the merits of missile defense both politically and > militarily; others approach this from the perspective of building a closer > bilateral relationship with the United States. The consultations have also > raised a number of complex issues, including the budgetary implications and > where missile defense should fit as a priority among other defense needs, as > well as command and control of a potential European missile defense system. > These are all important questions that need to be addressed. > > These questions also lead me to the main point that I want to leave with you. > The time for lamenting the passing of the ABM Treaty and questioning whether > ballistic missile defense is an appropriate response to the spread of weapons > of mass destruction and missile proliferation has passed. The Administration s > policy is to develop and deploy missile defenses as soon as possible that are > capable of protecting the United States, our deployed forces, as well as > friends and allies against the growing missile threats we face. The Treaty no > longer impedes our ability to develop, test, and deploy the most effective > defenses against the full range of missile threats, and we are moving forward > with a broad-based development and testing program designed to take advantage > of new technologies and basing modes. > > It is no longer a question of whether missile defenses will be deployed. Rather > the relevant questions are now "what," "how," and "when." The train is about to > pull out of the station. We invite our friends, allies, and the Russian > Federation to climb on board. > > [End] > >************************************************************ >See http://www.state.gov for Senior State Department >Official's statements and testimonies >************************************************************ >To change your subscription, go to http://www.state.gov/www/listservs_cms.html > _______________________________________________________ John D. Giorgis - [EMAIL PROTECTED] People everywhere want to say what they think; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children -- male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society -- and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. -US National Security Policy, 2002 _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
