http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030303-425797,00.html
"I'd Like to Go On" More of TIME's exclusive interview with chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix (on Iraqi credibility, the downside to defectors, and whether inspections can really solve the problem of Saddam) TIME: How much longer should inspections take before you'd decide whether Iraq is cooperating or not? Dr Hans Blix: If they were to cooperate as required under (Resolution) 1441, actively and without qualifications and immediately, it should not take a very long time. Now in 1991, one expected that that would be a couple of months at the most. And thereafter the period of monitoring would ensue. Much has been destroyed since then, so it should still be possible within a number of months, I think, to be sure that at least the major part had been eradicated. There will always be - and I'm being careful to say that - a residue of uncertainty. We used to take the examples of computer programs, even a prototype of a centrifuge, these are small pieces and you cannot be sure that you catch those. But larger things, industrial-scale activities, yes, I think within a number of months. (During my February 14 report back to the Security Council), I did not, again, plead for more time as I did the first time... If I had pleaded for more time, it would be predicated upon an assumption that within that period of time I would be able to do something. And I wasn't sure whether the cooperation was that great. However, if you ask me, "would you welcome it," I said yes, I would welcome it because I think that we'd been there for eleven weeks. Eight years of inspections, four years no inspections, and then eleven weeks, and then call it a day? It's a little short. TIME: Don't Iraq's al-Samoud rockets, which exceed the proscribed range, constitute a material breach of Resolution 1441? Blix: The decision whether something is a material breach is for the Security Council to make. We conclude that these modified missiles are a proscribed category because they have the capability of going over 150 kilometers. One short note, however, is that they were not produced clandestinely. They did declare them already in the backlog of the semi-annual declarations, and they have been very forthcoming in explaining to us the various parameters. Nevertheless, if they are outside the lines laid down by the Security Council, then of course they are proscribed and must be destroyed. TIME: You told the Security Council on Feb. 14 that the period of disarmament can still be short with immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation. But is there immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation, or isn't there? Blix: Well, when you read the rest of the speech... I described the degree of cooperation and the degree of uncertainty. If (Iraq's recently appointed) commission (to seek documents demanded by the inspectors) comes up with a lot of documents that we've been looking for, and if they are authentic, if they are from the time, well, that is interesting. That could help us to resolve a lot of things. If they don't, if they say "sorry, we have chased all around the country and confirmed there aren't any." Well, it may be true or it may not be true. I would have thought that having such detailed information about who took part in the transportation and destruction of particular types of biological weapons . . . I would be surprised if they haven't kept some records also of quantities, etc. TIME: You did say that many proscribed weapons and items, including 13 tons of chemical agent, were unaccounted for. You said there were significant outstanding issues of substance from previous inspection regimes, including the whereabouts of previously identified anthrax, VX, and long-range missiles. That seems to suggest they're not cooperating. Blix: Well, is non-delivery of documents which they deny having noncooperation? Is that too semantic for you? They deny they have these documents, and you say you are not giving the documents. There is no cooperation. Well, I don't have the evidence that they have them. TIME: So when you say to them, what happened to the anthrax, they say, well, there was a hole in the ground in the desert we put it in. Is that what they say? Blix: Yes. That's right. Exactly. That's what they say. It was not a hole in the ground, they poured it in the ground. They did the same thing with the VX. TIME: Do you believe them? Blix: Well, I'd like to see evidence of it. See, I don't work by gut feelings. I have to be the lawyer. Some people say, jump at this. It's unaccounted for, so where is it? I say, where is it? It's unaccounted for. I'd like to see evidence. Where did it go? I'd like to interview the people. If they are scripted, we might learn something from it. If they have contemporary documents, we can read from that and establish whether the documents are authentic. TIME: If in the end you don't get that evidence? Blix: In that event, I would not say they are guilty. I do not say they have them. I say that I will not recommend the Security Council to have any confidence. If I have evidence, then I can give them confidence. But if I don't have evidence, then there's no confidence. TIME: Has the Iraqi regime in the past been an efficient keeper of records? Blix: Well, they've been one of the best organized regimes in the Arab world. I would say yes. But then if they destroyed their documents with that efficiency, there might be relatively little left. But I think they've been good in certain parts. And when they've had need of something to show, then they have been able to do so. TIME: There are also questions as to whether or not the quantity which Iraq declared originally represent the full amount anyway. Blix: You're hinting at their lack of credibility. Of course they have no credibility. If they had any, they certainly lost it in 1991. I don't see that they have acquired any credibility. We attribute absolutely no credibility. There has to be solid evidence of everything, and if there is not evidence or you can't find it, I simply say sorry, I don't find any evidence and I cannot guarantee or recommend any confidence. It might be there, it might not be there. TIME: And then it would be for the Security Council to take your lack of confidence . . . Blix: That's right. In the last resort, this is a political decision. TIME: If Saddam Hussein had intentions to use weapons of mass destruction, could those intentions be neutralized by inspections and monitoring? Blix: Well, I think it's difficult for them to establish an infrastructure, an industrial infrastructure that is of any great size. Nuclear is the best example of it. You had a fairly big one in 1991... Then they were building enrichment plants. These were fairly big things and they were destroyed altogether. Exploded with dynamite. In the bacteriological field, that can be the smallest miniature, and that's where you're most worried. On the other hand, perhaps it is the least likely thing to have for an expansionist policy. For a terrorist policy, yes. But for an expansionist policy, I don't suppose that you go and take Saudi Arabia out with bacteriological weapons. Chemical weapons are also not something that you would really win a war with probably. They had a greater use of it in the war with Iran. That's true. Nuclear is what I think concerns everybody, including the U.S., most. Now, I think in the U.S. assessment, it would also take a number of years before they could mount a capacity of their own to enrich uranium. Getting the yellow cake, the raw materials, is not so difficult. But to enrich uranium requires much more. If they were able to import plutonium or 30 kilograms of enriched uranium on the black market, that would be a different story. I think this worries the U.S. But if you take the larger installations, I think one could spot that through the monitoring. But monitoring requires patience, and I think what worries the U.S. is that right now there are 150,000 troops out there, but if this goes into monitoring and everyone is tired, then maybe Saddam will begin to squeeze out the inspectors there. TIME: So, the credible threat of force is necessary to get even minimal compliance from Iraq? Blix: Just as Kofi Annan says, diplomacy may need to be backed up by force. Inspections may need to be backed up by pressure. Yes. I don't think there would have been any inspection but for outside pressure, including (the buildup of) U.S. forces. TIME: How much more time should be allowed for continued inspections? Do you think another three months is reasonable? That six months is too long? Blix: Well, we again assume that they would cooperate. If they cooperate fully and spontaneously, then I say the time should be short. If it's a moderate amount of cooperation, well, we are edging forward. ... And provided that you have the pressure on all the time. We see changes inch by inch by inch here. If you want to verify . . . suppose there are lots of places that they would like to take us to, lots of things, people to interview, the documents that are obscure, etc., well the very verification itself will take some time. Yes. We would be able to do that by the middle of March or even the first of April? No, (assuming they cooperate) it would take longer than that... It's a question of months. TIME: When do you next report to the Security Council? Blix:A written report (is due) on the first of March. (And I will discuss it with the Council) the following week... TIME: I guess one of the things that puzzles people is the very careful, nonjudgmental way that you write these reports. You say that the Iraqi government has set up two commissions, and you write that down. And the Iraqi Parliament has passed a decree, and you write that down. And no judgment is made about Iraqi government commissions and Iraqi government decrees. But the rest of us say, well, this is a totalitarian regime. A commission? Legislation through Parliament? This is a joke. Blix: You say it's completely without judgement. Well, I said on the commissions there is an innuendo in saying, "if they are serious." The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Will they come up with more warheads? At the present stage, there was a very guarded hopefulness. In Baghdad, when we came from them someone said, this is a breakthrough. I said, no, no, it's not a breakthrough. TIME: Those skeptical of inspections say that only defectors produced breakthroughs in the past. Blix:That's nonsense. Some people say that the early discoveries in the nuclear field were due to defectors. There were defectors in this sphere, but my recollection is that a major part of it was satellite information at that time. Much of the VX suspicions comes from sampling. The first suspicions about Iraq enriching uranium is a nice story which you may not have heard. But do you remember before the Gulf War, the Iraqis took hostages. Then the hostages were released, and the U.S. took their clothes and on the clothes there was dust. They analyzed it at their laboratories and they said, ah, there's the enrichment. Defectors are valuable, but you have to be very cautious with defectors. Defectors have a natural wish to make themselves interesting and provide things that are sensational. It increases their chances of asylum. And the CIA and everybody knows that. And a lot of it comes in as nonsense. TIME: What about the interviews with scientists? It would take a man of incredible courage or insanity to say something that might get back to the regime that is incriminating. Have you learned anything from interviews with scientists that, in fact, is incriminating? Blix: Yes. It's not quite as black and white as that. Of course, I'm conscious of their bugging and the recorder in the pocket and the fear if you have it recorded and they would go back, and they'd say, oh, you said the wrong thing here. You shouldn't have done that. You go and be hanged the next day. Because even interviews with minders present in the past have often given a lot of information. You see, when managers are producers of mustard, or you have researchers on biological evidence talk to each other, our people are scientists. They are capable in their own field. There is a limit to how much you can lie between two people who are competent in the field. So in the past, a great deal of useful information has come out even when there are minders present. The reason why this business about private interviews has come up is that the Iraqis certainly misused this. They had many minders present. There was one person interviewed, and perhaps a number, half a dozen of minders. Most questions they answered and then the minders would interrupt them. They'd say, no, you're wrong. You remember wrong there. Yes, of course, you are right. This is the way it was. So then it was sort of patent, and that's why we say it should be private interviews. But it's very hard to get to that under conditions that give full credibility. TIME: Doesn't that mean they are not cooperating, then? Blix: Suspicion arises that the authorities would not like to cooperate. What they should say is, go there. Be a patriot. There is nothing to hide. So speak your mind. We don't need to be there. TIME: But they don't say that. Blix: No. What they say is, our experience with UNSCOM was very bad - if you didn't have an interpreter from our side, there were misunderstandings, and sometimes the interrogators were giving leading questions, etc. And they say, if you are seized by the police in the United States, if you're lucky you may have your Consul present. It's a general rule that you should be able to have an official from the country. Well, it's a different thing if it's a totalitarian country. We all know that. But I agree with you. I think it is an element that throws doubt upon their sincerity in that we do not get people coming forth and speaking without fear. TIME: What will it take for you to say enough? Enough. You're dribbling this out. Blix: Well, we've only been dribbling now for twelve weeks. TIME: So you'd like to dribble twelve more? Blix: I'd like to go on, yes. TIME: You've said the bottom line is the extent of cooperation. Should we be satisfied too much longer? Blix: Well, that's for the Council to decide. I'm saying that we've only been at this for twelve weeks. If the Council asked me point-blank, "Do you think it's meaningful to continue" . . . they could ask me that. They haven't asked me that, but they could do that. TIME: What would you say? Blix: Well, I would say what I did on the 14th of February. If it were a month later, I would register what has happened since then. I don't know what will happen in that period. If they go back, if it turns out that every witness is scripted, if they don't find any documents and we're just sort of swimming in the same spot, that would presumably be a negative. TIME: What's the best possible outcome of all this? Blix: President Bush has said it two ways. Either you change the regime, or it changes its attitude. There would be a change any way. Fine with me. You have to compare your options. I think that 9/11 is the watershed between the Europeans and the Americans. The Europeans are not as worried about a sudden attack with any of these weapons as you are in this country. Here it's a trauma still, and it's understandable that political organs want to take every step that is prudent to prevent it happening in the future. But when you look at the options you have, then, one being inspection which I am instructed to do the best possibly that I can, what does it require? Well, it requires perhaps 350 to 400 people, and it requires $80 million a year, and there are a number of shortcomings. If we may find that we don't advance an inch, well in that case I think it would be over. But if there is progress on this and there is a measure of a fairly high level of assurance that there isn't anything left and that you can monitor, then you have the uncertainty about caves and things like that. They could throw out the inspectors one year. Then you look at the other option that we're considering, the use of force which will require 250,000 men? And it will require $100 billion or more a year? and it also has some negative sides. Blood, destruction, and the political effects in the Middle East. I'm not criticizing those who advocate this. I'm put here in order to do the best possible job of the other option. And I do that. I try to do that. TIME: Would it be useful if the United States its allies said Iraq must provide specific information by a specific date, or else face invasion? Blix:Maybe so. That's a timeline. That's a sort of ultimatum, yes. Many people are advocating that at the moment. I would say that an ultimatum or a timeline is a way of exerting a very strong pressure. Such a thing without an outside pressure of force is not very useful. That doesn't help. But with the maintenance of what you have, yes, I think that shows that they cannot drag it on forever. As I interpret Villepin and others and see what the Europeans said, I do not see that they are fundamentally opposed to that. It's a question of timing. xponent Wardawn Maru rob wait a minute something's wrong he's a man with a plan his finger is pointed at Brin-L now we must sacrifice ourselves that many others may live ok we've got a lot to give _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
