http://www.epic.org/privacy/poverty/

EPIC Alerts Public to Homeless Tracking System. Proposed guidelines to
create a homeless tracking database called "Homeless Management
Information Systems" present serious risks to civil liberties. EPIC has
released a new fact sheet detailing the risks, and urging the public to
send comments to the Department of Housing and Urban Development in
opposition to HMIS. (Aug 19) 


HUD Announces Homeless Tracking System. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development announced guidelines (pdf) for "Homeless Management
Information Systems" (HMIS). HMIS is a standard system for tracking
homeless persons and the services rendered to them. Entities that provide
services would collect their names, Social Security Numbers, dates of
birth, race, gender, health status (including HIV, pregnancy, and
domestic violence), veteran status, and income information. Although the
plan does not call for a national, centralized database, the information
collected could easily facilitate the creation of such a database in the
future. Furthermore, law enforcement, Secret Service, and National
Security access to the database would be nearly unlimited. The guidelines
are open to public comment until September 22, 2003. 
Introduction and Background

Poor people have less of everything--less autonomy, less social mobility,
and less privacy. State interests in fraud prevention and the structure
of privacy law itself have worked to the disadvantage of the poor. This
page is gives an overview of these forces and their effects on electronic
privacy.

Fraud Prevention: Welfare Surveillance and EBT

Professor John Gilliom of Ohio University provided an excellent summary
of the changes in welfare surveillance in Overseers of the Poor:
Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy. In that book,
Gilliom explains that state interests in avoiding fraud motivated
increasingly invasive investigations of benefits recipients.
Historically, these methods were limited by technology and social norms.
At one time, this included visits to recipients' homes to determine
whether the residence was clean and orderly. But norms have changed, and
we are less tolerant of fraud or inefficiency, and technology allows much
more invasive surveillance techniques. 

Electronic benefits systems and computer matching systems now are
employed to determine whether fraud is taking place, and whether the
recipient is entitled to the benefits. Such systems do serve important
state interests in fraud prevention, however, the systems are highly
privacy invasive. Over and over again, policymakers choose more invasive
systems in the interests of fraud prevention to the detriment of
individual autonomy.

With increased dependence on the Social Security Number (SSN), the
government has been able to engage in pervasive tracking of aid
recipients. Now, with the requirement that states implement Electronic
Benefits Transfer (EBT) by October 2002, aid recipients are being issued
benefits cards that facilitate government tracking of all purchases.
Gilliom argues that this combined with personal interviews delving into
matters such as romantic relationships, results in a comprehensive
tracking system that subjects the poor "to forms and degrees of scrutiny
matched only by the likes of patients, prisoners, and soldiers."

Strip away the bureaucratic language of fraud control, regulatory
enforcement, consent forms, and the like, and we see a simple pattern in
which a government agency is using broadly targeted and online
surveillance in an effort to force a dependent population to live at an
intolerable level of poverty.

Gilliom's book provides firsthand accounts of the humiliation brought to
bear by individuals watched by the state. Gilliom argues that traditional
notions of privacy do not adequately describe the total surveillance in
which the poor exist. He argues that a new language is needed to describe
surveillance systems: a language that explicitly recognizes it as a tool
of social control. He suggests, as a solution to this humiliation, that
aid recipients themselves have to be involved in defining the goals and
framework of the welfare system.

John Gilliom, Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the
Limits of Privacy (University of Chicago Press 2001). 
Structure of Constitutional Privacy Law: Those Without Private Spaces
Have Less Privacy

Constitutional privacy protections in the United States are conditioned
upon the finding of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." To find such
an expectation, a court examines whether society itself finds privacy in
a certain context (objective test), and also whether the individual
affected thinks that their actions are private (subjective test).
Obviously, this two-pronged test does not provide privacy protections in
areas that are public, the areas in which much of the poor exist as a
result of not having homes, country clubs, or other establishments to
engage in activities. It further does not protect those whose living
spaces are exposed to public areas, for instance, homes or apartments
without fences, heavy curtains, or well-insulated walls.

Professor Christopher Slobogin of the University of Florida has argued
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contains an implicit "poverty
exemption." That is, courts have interpreted the Constitution to the
disadvantage of the poor. He notes that even when a poor person is within
a home, state interests in fraud prevention can trump privacy interests.
For instance, in Wyman v. James, the Supreme Court allowed welfare
workers to conduct a warrantless search of a welfare recipient's home
without a warrant citing interests in fraud prevention. In other cases,
however, the Court has required a warrant to search a business for
investigation of tax fraud.

Police interests in drug interdiction have also played a central role in
the dissolution of privacy for those in poorer neighborhoods.
Consistently, courts have expanded police search and seizure powers over
those in public. There are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement
for police searches, and the so called "Terry Stop," which was first
approved to protect officers from concealed weapons, now has become a
pretense for searching subjects for any type of contraband.

News

Ripped Off, New ATM Card Screws Poor People, The Stranger, November 4,
1999.

Citigroup and the Privatization of Welfare, Citiaction. 
Resources

National Center on Poverty Law. 
NOW LDEF Welfare and Poverty Page. 
John Baggaley, Orwell on Poverty and Inequality, 10 EPIC Alert 13, June
25, 2003. 
Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55
Fla. L. Rev. 391 (January 2003). 
Naomi K. Seiler, Abstinence-Only Education and Privacy, 24 Women's Rights
L. Rep. 27 (Fall/Winter 2002). 
Fabio A. Sciarrino, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, The Doctor Will See
You Now, Be Sure to Bring Your Privacy Rights In With You, 12 Temp. Pol.
& Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 197 (Fall 2002). 
Electronic Benefit Transfer, A new system for distribution of food stamps
and possibly cash benefits, Consumers Union Information Packet, April
2001. 
David Cole, No Equal Justice (New Press 1999). 
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1265 (1999). 
Cases

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). The Court held in
this case that a state hospital cannot perform diagnostic tests to obtain
evidence of criminal conduct without the patient's consent because such a
test would be unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment. In the case,
a state hospital, in cooperation with local law enforcement, began
ordering urine samples for drug testing from maternity patients who were
suspected of using cocaine. If a patient tested positive, the hospital
immediately contacted local law enforcement to arrest the patient. The
petitioners, who were all women arrested under the hospital's policy,
successfully challenged the search as unconstitutional. 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). Known as the "Little bird of the snow
case," where the parents of a child sued to challenge the requirement
that the child be assigned a Social Security Number in order to continue
receiving benefits. The parents objected to the SSN requirement as a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding the SSN requirement Constitutional
as it was a neutral and uniformly applicable requirement that used a
reasonable means to promote public interests in fraud control. 
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 254 (1970). This case established that the
receipt of benefits is a legal entitlement, and that revocation of such
an entitlement requires due process. 
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). This case reversed an Alabama
regulation that denied access to certain benefits if the recipient
co-habitated with an able-bodied man. The Court held that the benefits
were designed to provide economic security for children, and the
suspected impropriety of a parent did not justify the revocation of
benefits. 

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