Some years ago a friend researched the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack
against the US. He said
Other historical events that I have researched got more
interesting the more I looked at them. This was not like that.
It got less interesting. As far as I can see, there was not any
plot by Roosevelt to bring the US into the war, or anything like
that. The Americans were simply incompetent and racist.
[Racist in that they did not think the Japanese navy could carry out a
successful surprise attack.]
Regarding 9/11, "Dan Minette" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote
...
2) Bush knew enough so that any reasonable person would have
expected him to be able to have stopped the attacks, but he was
asleep at the switch.
...
...
gradations responsibility that can be assigned in a plus-delta review.
.....
.....
3) There was no way that even the very best people could have
forseen the attacks.
... 2 is not treason, but incompetence. The worst you can call it
is dereliction of duty.
Since Bush is trying to keep what happened before as secret as
possible, even from people who have the security clearance to look
at the material, it raises the possibility that the answer is
closer to 2 than 3.
[Dan thinks that what happened is closer to 3 but open to debate]
....
Speaking for myself, I can tell you that I was surprised by the
attacks, even though I had seen a book cover depicting a highjacked
airliner flying into a skyscraper, and knew that suicide attacks are
common in some cultures.
However, I did not receive any briefings about this from professionals
who should have been more military and less culture-biased than I.
Since President Bush and others did receive briefings, either the
briefers were not competent or they failed to convey the risk well or
the President and his collegues did not see the risk as sufficient to
merit their spending much more of their time dealing with the US civil
service and military on this issue.
To me, the third option is most likely.
However, it has been argued that the Bush Administration was dependant
on an intelligence organization created by its predecessor, and
therefore could not give its briefing much credence.
Thus, to decide whether or not to hold the Bush Administration
responsible, we must look at other administrative actions.
There is no doubt to me that President Bush and his collegues are
politically shrewd. That is not the question here. The question is
whether they are running a competent Administration.
It goes without saying that everyone makes mistakes. However, good
measures of an administration are whether it makes fewer than an
alternative administration and whether it learns from the mistakes it
does make, and makes corrections.
Here are military issues:
* Afganistan: after the then government refused to extradite Osama
bin Laden, the US invaded the country and changed the government.
This part was successful.
However, more than two years on, has the follow up been as
successful? That is to say, have potential sanctuaries for US
enemies in Afganistan and neighboring countries been removed? Are
young men finding it better to get jobs on US and other funded
development projects than joining the armies of local warlords or
farming opium?
It looks to me that so far, the follow up has failed. Indeed, the
US is talking of engaging in another `Spring offensive', which is
a sign that the US has not defeated its enemies in Afganistan and
neighboring countries.
* Justification for invasion of Iraq: the Bush Administration
publically argued for the invasion of Iraq on three grounds:
1. To support UN Chapter 7 resolutions.
The justification for supporting the UN is that
international laws and resolutions are a liberal,
democratic, and contemporary European ideal; they provide a
mechanism for restraining the actions of a super power.
[I read various Blix inspection reports, which told me that
the Iraqi was not abiding by the mandatory Chapter 7
resolution at issue.]
2. To help the people of Iraq free themselves from a cruel
dictatorship.
Salmon Rushdie made this argument. Eventually, the US
government also made this argument, but not before 2003 Feb
17, when I mentioned it, with the note that
No government that I know of has said that this is a
prime reason to go to war, although all claim it would
be a nice side effect.
3. To find and destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons.
Without a doubt, this was the major public justification
for the invasion.
The Bush Administration convinced its political supporters
and some others that not only was the Iraqi government
funding development projects but that it possessed some
weapons in contradiction of mandatory UN resolutions.
The publically known reasons for believing that Iraq
had chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons are
three fold:
Firstly, the Iraqi government used chemical weapons in
the 1980s and inspectors in the early 1990s found it
closer to deploying nuclear bombs than Western
intelligence agencies had thought.
Secondly, in the 1990s, the Iraqi government expelled
the disarmament inspectors it had bound itself to
accept as a term of surrender in the Gulf War.
Thirdly, in 2002 and 2003, the Iraqi government did not
disclose all its prohibited weapon activity to Hans
Blix and his inspectors.
In my opinion, the US government was persuaded to invade Iraq by a
fourth, unstated, reason, namely,
4. To intimidate the other Arab dictatorships and to
intimidate Iran. This reason was never stated and may not
be the prime reason.
The question at hand is how competent has the US administration shown
itself for each of these reasons?
1. Support UN Chapter 7 resolutions.
Is the US now more willing than before to abide by
mandatory UN resolutions, as well as asking others to abide
by them? Or is the UN less a check on a super power?
It seems to me that initially at least the US
administration failed. The diplomatic actions of the US in
January, February, and March of 2003 did not lead either
the people of the US or others to think better of the UN,
to be more likely to abide by mandatory UN resolutions, or
to provide an international check on unilateral power.
Nor did the US administration suggest a detailed new form
form an international organizagtion that would check member
states power.
(For example, the US administration did not suggest a three
chamber organization, one based on population, like the US
House of Representatives, one based on history, like the
current UN or the US Senate (although perhaps with some
agglomeration of very small countries), and one based on
taxes or payments made if you dislike the word `tax' (this
is an indicator of GDP, but one that reflect power only if
paid). I mention a three chamber organization because that
is the only way I can see simultaneously to overcome rich
countries worry about poor populous countries, like India,
give populous countries power, and gain support from the
very small.)
However, it is notable that the President Bush has recently
called upon the Secretary of the UN to take more of a role
in Iraq. Secretary Annan, speaking with French President
Chirac at his side, accepted the task. Also, the US
recently accepted a proposal by Libya that the UN inspect
the country.
So it may well be that the Bush Administration, over time,
increasingly favors the UN. This is not an outcome I
expected from this Administration.
2. To help the people of Iraq free themselves from a cruel
dictatorship.
Is the former Iraqi secret police less of a danger now than
before? Are the current secret operations of the various
Shi'ite and Sunni groups less dangerous than before?
It seems to me that the US has succeeded here, at least to
a considerable extent. However, it is not yet clear the
degree to which Iraqis will enjoy human rights and
political freedoms in the next decade.
3. To find and destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons. (Note that this does not apply to weapons'
programs: at issue are weapons themselves. Weapons'
programs are vitally important -- that is why UN inspection
of Libya is so important -- but that is not the issue
here.)
Immediately after the fall of Bagdad, the US failed to
expend a huge effort searching for chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons. As many as 6 weeks later, the
Pentagon said it still had over 700 `known' possible sites
to investigate. (This list did not count unknown sites.)
The former head of the Bush Administration inspection team
says that perhaps some weapons, if they existed, were
stolen or hidden away at that time.
In any event, the Bush Administration inspection team has
not found significant chemical, biological, and/or nuclear
weapons in Iraq, either because the weapons were hidden
away, perhaps in Syria, or stolen, or because the programs
were discontinued in the 1990s.
Certainly, the Bush administration should have used the
Army to search `known' possible sites immediately after
the fall of Bagdad in April 2003. The searchers could
have done little, except to tell all concerned that most
sites are harmless. This latter action would have been
extremely useful.
As it is, we still do not know whether some weapons were
hidden or stolen during this time period, or whether they
were never manufactured.
This is a major failure of the administration.
Since the public argument for the war depended so strongly
on either finding weapons or on proving that the US
government was wrong and that they did not exist, this
failing is all the more striking.
4. To intimidate the other governments.
As I said, the Bush Administration did not advance this as
a reason for invading Iraq, although I personally think
this was very important. In particular, this connects the
invasion of Iraq with the concurrent US war against
non-state terrorists.
To some extent the US has succeeded in intimidating others.
In particular, the US and Britian have managed to persuade
Libya accept UN disarmament inspections. This action both
helps disarmament and helps the UN as an institution.
However, the results appear delayed. Libya agreed to the US
only recently.
On the other hand, the US gives the appearance of having
made a deal with Iran in November of 2003 to accept Iran
influence over the country's Shi'ite majority. This
implies that the Iran succeeded in intimidating the US
rather than vice-versa.
This deal results from a major failure by the US
Administration, namely to fail to foresee that the Iraqi
government would engage in an asymmetrical guerilla war
after the fall of Bagdad. Currently, the US appears to
winning the war in Iraq, but it has taken a long time,
rather than just a couple of months.
The US military could have acted to police Iraq by the
beginning of May, shortly after searching for banned
weapons. The US would not have won a guerilla war as soon
as it captured Bagdad. But if there had been no
expectation that the US would win quickly, the US would
have been more able to intimidate others in the July
through November period of 2003, simply by showing that it
was fighting successfully and dreadfully.
In these circumstances, it is likely that Libya would have
agreed to accept UN inspections sooner, shortly after the
US and Britain first started negotiating. Syria might well
have decided to attempt to placate the US sooner. Instead,
the Syrian government erroneously gambled that that the US
would get bogged down in an Iraqi asymmetrical war.
Moreover, the US would have been in a stronger position to
intimidate the Iran government and would have been less
concerned that some of the Shi'ites in Iraq would wage an
asymmetrical war against the US. The US would have been
less subject to pressure to turn the Iraqi government over
to Iraqis -- mostly likely to Shi'ites and Kurds seeking
justified, but unpleasant revenge -- and more able to
change the culture of bribery and corruption that exits in
Iraq and other parts of the Middle East.
Similarly, the US could have intimidated other governments
sooner, and gained their aid, willy-nilly, against anti-US
terrorists earlier on.
But none of this happened, because the US did not act early
enough against the Iraqi guerilla war. This was the result
of either a major intelligence failure or the result of not
acting on intelligence.
Either way, this failure is the responsibility of the Bush
Administration since, by early 2003, it had been in office
more than a year.
Those are military related issues having to do with Administrative
competence.
Two other issues are the tax cut and the weakening of the US currency.
* Tax cuts
In the short run the Bush and his collegues were politically
shrewd to propose and pass their tax cut. Their supporters were
pleased.
In the long run, however, the tax cut weakens the US, by
shifting money from private investment to government spending.
(Some have said that the tax cuts are designed to impose
spending cuts; but the Bush administration is increasing
government spending, not cutting it; so this argument is
invalid.)
While the long run is politically irrelevant, it is a duty of an
Administration. The mark of a great administration is to handle
both simultaneously: to act shrewdly in the short run, while
also preparing a good long run for its successors.
* Weaken US dollar
In the short run the Bush and his collegues were politically
shrewd to weaken the US dollar. Hitherto, few jobs have come
from the recovery from the post-bubble recession, although
profits have risen. With the devaluation, US exports to Europe
should rise and this extra manufacturing should lead to more
jobs before the 2004 US election.
In the long run, however, a weakened dollar may lead people in
the US and elsewhere, and the central banks of countries such as
China and Japan, to invest more money in countries with
strengthening currencies, even if the countries' economies are
not intrinsically dynamic. Such a shift away from the US dollar
would hurt long term US economic growth.
Putting together both these military actions and these economic
actions, I gain the impression that Bush and his collegues are
politically shrewd, at least in the short run, but that they are not
very competent as an Administration, particularly when considering
long term or follow up actions.
--
Robert J. Chassell Rattlesnake Enterprises
http://www.rattlesnake.com GnuPG Key ID: 004B4AC8
http://www.teak.cc [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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