On 4/29/05, JDG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 09:11 AM 4/29/2005 -0700, Nick Arnett wrote:
> >On Thu, 28 Apr 2005 18:51:38 -0400, JDG wrote
> >
> >> On the other hand, seriously considering the opinion of another is
> >> typically an adult-to-adult relationship. It would be rather
nonsensical
> >> to use a child/permission slip metaphor to argue against an adult-to-
> >> adult dynamic of seriously considering the opinions of others.
> >
> >and JDG also wrote:
> >
> >> No, Nick, the metaphor is not nonsensical in relationship to the US
> >> and the UN - and I never said that it was.
> >
> >I see absolute contradiction here.
> >
> >Seriously considering the opinion of other nations is not like asking for
a
> >permission slip.
>
> Nick,
>
> You only see "absolute contradiction here" because you keep deleting the
> parts where I point out that the UN Security Council is not just a
debating
> society for the serious consideration of other nations' opinions, but also
> passes resolutions, which some say should be required to authorize US
> military actions.
>
> Saying that "the US should only act if it has explicit UN Security Council
> approval" is like asking for a permission slip.
>
> That is what Bush was arguing against.
>
> Bush was *not* arguing against seriously considering the opinions of other
> nations. Indeed, using a child/permission slip as a metaphor for
> "seriously considering the opinions of other nations" just wouldn't make
> any sense. A much more logical explanation is that the child/permission
> slip is a metaphor for insisting upon UN Security Council approval of US
> actions.
>
> JDG
I have been staying away from these arguments but since it is now veered to
a debate about framing language...
On reasons for the war Kevin Drum speaks true:
George Bush didn't mention democracy promotion as a rationale for the war
until his AIE speech of February 26, a mere three weeks before the bombing
started. The fact that he went months with barely a mention of freedom and
democracy in the Middle East, and then made such a lame speech when he did
finally mention it, was one of the main reasons that I turned against the
war. I originally supported the war as a way to "promote the values of
tolerance, human rights, and democratic self-government" in the Middle East,
but then switched sides when I finally concluded that my reasons for
supporting the war were not George Bush's ("It's simply become wishful
thinking to believe that Bush is really committed to any kind of serious
effort to promote democracy in Iraq"). In other words, I have a pretty good
memory about this stuff since it had a considerable effect on my own
thinking.
Still not convinced? Here is Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech,
delivered seven weeks before the war started. Read through it. There are
1,200 words about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the danger they
pose. There are exactly zero words about bringing democracy to Iraq and the
greater Middle East. In fact, aside from a passing reference to Palestine,
the word "democracy" is used only once in the entire speech: in reference to
Iran, in a passage that specifically states that "different threats require
different strategies." The United States supports Iranian aspirations, Bush
said, but that's all. It's not a reason to go to war.
I can't look into George Bush's heart, but I can listen to his words and
watch his deeds. And based on that, democracy promotion was not on his
agenda before the war, during the war, or after the war until the Ayatollah
Sistani forced his hand. Let's not demean history by pretending otherwise.
On the CIA report, it stretches to say that under some circumstances under
some definitions of the word threat Iraq could someday in the future might
possibly be considered a threat to U.S. interests. I could say the same
about the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. The chief conclusion of the report -
Saddam wanted weapons to counter Iran. From the conclusion:
• Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi
officials considered Iran to be Iraq's
principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status
and influence in the Arab world
were also considerations, but secondary.
• Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s
shaped Saddam's belief in the
value of WMD. In Saddam's view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple
times. He believed that during
the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and
that ballistic missile attacks
on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm,
Saddam believed WMD had deterred
Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing
Kuwait. WMD had even played a role
in crushing the Shi'a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fi re.
• The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival
of WMD after sanctions. Neither
was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate
from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants
understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam
and his infrequent,
but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.
How anyone could say this report strengthens the case for war indicates they
didn't read it and are clueless about many things.
--
Gary Denton
Easter Lemming Blogs
http://elemming.blogspot.com
http://elemming2.blogspot.com
_______________________________________________
http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
