<<http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2006/02/yes_trusted_
com.html>>
Yes, Trusted Computing is used for DRM
Ever since the Trusted Computing Group went public about its plan to
put a security chip inside every PC, its members have been denying
accusations that the group is really a thinly-disguised conspiracy to
embed DRM everywhere. IBM and Microsoft have instead stressed genuinely
useful applications, like signing programs to be certain they dont
contain a rootkit. But at this weeks RSA show, Lenovo showed off a
system that does use the chips for DRM after all.
The system is particularly frightening because it looks so simple.
Theres no 20-digit software key to type in, no dongle to attach to the
printer port, no XP-style activation. (Is this what Bill Gates was
thinking of when he said in his keynote that security needs to be
easier to use?) The user interface is just a Thinkpad, albeit one of
the new models with an integrated fingerprint sensor.
When someone tries to open a DRM-restricted document (in this case, a
PDF file: break that DRM and go to jail), Lenovo software asks the user
to swipe a finger across the sensor. My finger results in an access
denied message; the Lenovo security guys finger opens the document.
If youve ever had a laptop stolen, this might sound useful. It is. In
fact, encrypting hard disks or individual files is the main use that
most vendors are promoting for the chip. Thinkpads have been able to do
that since their IBM days, and now most other laptops can too. You can
probably try it out by downloading software from your laptop
manufacturers site, and Microsoft is building similar functionality
into Vista as Palladium NGSCB Secure Startup BitLocker.
The fingerprint sensor is also a good thing, if its just used for
encryption. Its even good for privacy: It means that network servers
can authenticate you based on your fingerprint, without sending any
fingerprint data over the network. (How? You authenticate to the chip
in your laptop with your fingerprint, then the chip authenticates to
the server with a digital certificate.)
But DRM goes beyond encryption. In the system that Lenovo demonstrated,
the decision about who can do what with the file is made by whoever
generates the PDF, not by the person or organization that owns the
laptop. According to Lenovo, the system is also aimed at tracking who
reads a document and when, because the chip can report back every
access attempt. If you access the file, your fingerprint is recorded.
That might also sound useful, provided of course that youre the one
doing the recording and restricting. (Id love to be Big Brother!
Wouldnt we all?) The problem is that you wont be. Even if we forget
about media companies for the moment, and assume that DRM is just for
businesses that need to protect their sensitive documents from
disclosure by employees or outsourcing partners, its still a bad
tradeoff.
A DRM system may seem to empower whoever is setting the restrictions
(in this case, the PDF creator), but thats just power by proxy. The
real control lies with the hardware and software companies. Theyre the
ones who actually enforce the DRM and have the encryption keys, so they
can hold your data to ransom.
DRM customers are already locked into a single vendor: A DRM-restricted
Word document can only be read by Word (not OO.org, WordPerfect or
Writely), just as a DRM-restricted iTunes download can only be played
on an iPod. Present versions of Word and iTunes still let customers
escape by using the Windows clipboard or a CD burner, but that
capability can be removed at any time.
Relying on DRM means trusting all the vendors involved (in this case,
Microsoft, Adobe, Lenovo and its component suppliers) more than you
trust the users of the system. You need to trust the vendors both
morally and practically: Can Microsoft be trusted not to abuse its
power? And can Microsoft be trusted to develop a system that isnt full
of security holes?
If youre a movie studio or a record label, the users are your
customers. You probably do trust Microsoft and the TCG more than your
customers, so DRM might make sense. But if youre an organization
seeking to protect sensitive data, the users are your own employees and
business partners. Are they really less trustworthy than Microsoft, its
employees and its business partners?
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