Dan wrote:
Well, McClellan was the first one to come to mind to me.
McClellen was not a political appointment. He may have remained in his
position too long due to political considerations, but he was a West Point
graduate, was successful early in the war and was recommended by Winfield
Scott. Furthermore, his army was well trained and organized and his men
were dedicated to him.
But, there are also a number of generals who had little or no military
experience before
being appointed. Among them are Butler, Banks, McClernand, Fremont, and
Sigel. I obtained the latter list from
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/21.1/simpson.html
which argued that the latter were the real political generals.
By 1864, generals who could win were selected more often. As the essay
points out as a counter to the political general argument, > these
victorious generals influenced the election...even though the direct
political motivation for appointing them was not > significant.
But, I think this actually proves the point...Lincoln saw the bigger
picture and did what was needed to kept the > Union.
What I got out of the article was that those political appointments were
mistakes both politically and strategically; that Lincoln's reelection
efforts would have profited from military victories and that the
appointment of incompetent leadership was instrumental in denying those
victories.
A better illustration of Lincoln's understanding of the inherent political
nature of the problem would be how he handled the emancipation question.
Another would be the handling of a volatile cabinet that, while it
included some of the most competent men in the country, it was composed of
intense political rivals three of whom (Bates, Chase and Seward) actually
opposed Lincoln in his bid for the Republican nomination.
--
Doug
Currently reading Goodwin's "Team of Rivals"
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