> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Nick Arnett > Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 12:27 AM > To: Killer Bs Discussion > Subject: Re: RFK Jr. interview > > On 8/3/06, Dan Minette <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > Yes, and it rather unambiguously implies that they did not see > evidence > > of > > > WMDs, since Tenet surely would have considered them an imminent > threat. > > > > There are several problems with this assessment. > > 1) The report clearly stated that they had biological agents ready for > > quick > > weaponization, as well as bulk fills for chemical weapons. Indeed, the > > version of saran that they used has the agents combined just before use. > > > You're arguing with Tenet, if you're saying this means that Iraq had WMDs > or posed an immediate threat in some other way. Good luck with that. Is > there some reason we shouldn't believe him or the declassified parts of > the NIE?
No, but there is a very good reason to not go with your interpretation of his remarks. John and I have, repeatedly, quoted from the declassified part of the report. Using the prevalent definition of WMD, these quotes clearly show that the report states that Iraq, in all likelihood, had WMD. I went to Wikipedia to get the common definition. It's not a definitive source for everything, but it is a good reference for common understanding. Quoting: "Today, the term WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) means different things to different people. The most widely used definition is that of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBC)." The same source quotes US civil defense as stating it's: "1) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces [113 g], missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce [7 g], or mine or device similar to the above. (2) Poison gas. (3) Any weapon involving a disease organism. (4) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to human life. This definition derives from US law, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a and the referenced 18 USC 921. Indictments and convictions for possession and use of WMD such as truck bombs, pipe bombs, shoe bombs, cactus needles coated with botulin toxin, etc. have been obtained under 18 USC 2332a." This expands the concept of WMD from the common definition. This is the definition that I saw used in the discussions that led up to war, and in the statements that Hussein did not have WMD. If massive stockpiles of anthrax and sarin were found, most folks would have accepted that as proof that Hussein had WMD. Second, you have tended to focus on the delivery systems much more than the agents of WMD, arguing that they aren't weapons without delivery systems. But, this is at odds with the Civil Defense definition above. > > 2) Not being an imminent threat does not mean a county does not have WMD. > > France doesn't constitute an imminent threat, even though it has a > number > > of > > H-bombs...which are clearly WMD. > > > I'm fairly sure that France, despite its disagreements, has not lately > been > considered an enemy of the United States. Anyway, what is this whole > discussion about if not the justification for the war, which clearly was > the proposal that Iraq posed an imminent, immediate, mortal, etc., threat. But, your specific statement that I questioned was that everyone knew that Iraq had no WMD....not that Iraq didn't pose an imminent threat. Since we've established, with France, that possessing WMD does not equate an imminent threat, let's expand that definition. During October, 1962, the US government determined that there was an imminent threat of attack by the USSR. The US military went to DEFCON 2. The situation defused, and the military later stood down to DEFCON 3. Later, in the '70s and '80s, there was little fear of an immediate attack by the USSR, even though thousands of H-bombs were targeted at the US. The USSR was not thought to pose an imminent threat....otherwise our defense posture would have been heightened. > > > Irrelevant. The point is that it was not a foundation for saying that > there were WMDs or there was an immediate threat. But, it specifically stated that there were WMDs, as commonly defined. > > 5) Later in the report, the likelihood of an immediate unprovoked attack > > by > > Hussein on the US was assessed as low. In that sense, there wasn't an > > imminent threat. > > > Indeed. Why do you think Tenet has bothered to speak out in public > against the idea that this was an intelligence failure? He's defending > > the intelligence community by telling their side of the story... > and leaving it > up to us to decide if the administration's statements in support of > attacking Iraq were justified by the intelligence it received. > What do you think, now that you have read the NIE? Were the "immediate > threat" and so forth statements justified by the NIE? Was the war > justified by the NIE? There was not an imminent threat. But, knowing what I know now about Libya being 1 year away from an A-bomb, and believing that the assessment I read was a mid-point case, then I could see the justification for war. > > The NIE was from October 2002. Reading it, taking it at face value, there was clearly a claim that Hussein had significant WMDs. The hair splitting concerning the WMD agents not specifically referred to as being in the weapons doesn't matter, because the report states that Hussein was able to quickly weaponize them. Quickly, to me, means that he'd be able to do it in a few months....sufficiently short to be ready to meet any hostile forces. Had I read that assessment before the war, I'd probably have exactly the same viewpoint I had before the war. I thought that Hussein had WMD. I thought that the sanctions had weakened his development. I thought that, given the genocide he had perpetrated, and given that he had started two wars, that there was a case for war. I differed with Gautam and John on whether it was sufficient because I thought that the risks inherent in the potential for a blundering US presence in post-war Iraq was greater than the risk waiting to address Iraq until after we succeeded in Afghanistan. Dan M. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
