Girish Moodalbail writes: > "solaris.network.interface.read" > > Allows viewing of interface configurations (verified in library, > libipadm.so.1)
Anyone with the ability to issue the proper ioctls (which includes all ordinary users, even those without that new authorization) can already read the interface configuration ... so is the new 'read' authorization necessary? (I think it'd make sense to have this authorization if you had a separate daemon that was managing the configuration -- the daemon could check necessary authorizations when granting access -- but since you're doing this all without a daemon, I'm not seeing where the point of enforcement is supposed to be. It's not as though libraries have privileges on their own ...) > ipadm(1M) would need 'sys_ip_config' privilege to configure system's IP > interfaces and to configure network parameters/tunables. Further, > ipadm(1M) would also need 'file_dac_write' to write to ipadm repository, > maintained at '/etc/ipadm/ipadm.conf', via library libipadm.so.1. file_dac_write seems a little heavy ... though I guess the only alternative is creating a daemon in the same manner as dlmgmtd. Does the new library somehow help the application to bracket the use of that privilege so that the use is "safe enough"? -- James Carlson, Solaris Networking <james.d.carlson at sun.com> Sun Microsystems / 35 Network Drive 71.232W Vox +1 781 442 2084 MS UBUR02-212 / Burlington MA 01803-2757 42.496N Fax +1 781 442 1677
