Quoting "Paul Eggert" <egg...@cs.ucla.edu>:
Hello,
I set the bug report here before I got a response from Paul Moore
https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=147481004710264&w=2
"I don't think we need to fix this for runcon, as it isn't as
sandboxing tool like sandbox, and the loss of job control would likely
be much more noticeable for runcon."
up201407...@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote re <http://bugs.gnu.org/24541>:
When executing a program via the runcon utility, the nonpriv session
can escape to the parent session by using the TIOCSTI ioctl to push
characters into the terminal's input buffer, allowing an attacker to
execute arbitrary commands without the SELinux security context.
Thanks for the bug report. Surely this is a bug in the setexeccon
system call, not in the runcon command that uses the system call.
That being said, perhaps runcon should work around the bug via
something like the attached patch.
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