Eelco Dolstra <[email protected]> skribis: > On 22/05/13 16:16, Ludovic Courtès wrote: > >> I think it’s enough to sign nars. What do you think it would add to >> sign narinfos as well? > > I think it's enough to sign the narinfo, since it contains the hash of the NAR > (which Nix already verifies).
Right. > Also, rather than having a separate .sig file, the signature could be stored > in > the narinfo file itself. That would halve the number of HTTP requests. Well, the .sig only needs to be downloaded when the user actually substitutes something; this is not a situation where it would really make a difference. Also, how would the signature be formatted, then? > On 22/05/13 15:19, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote: > >>> How about: rather than relying on nix-cache-info, nix.conf should specify a >>> list >>> of fingerprints of trusted OpenPGP signing keys. Then when we fetch a >>> .narinfo, >>> we check whether it is signed by a trusted key. This way you don't have the >>> problem Lluís described. >> >> Well, if we use gpg, gpg has its own system of trust, too. Or it's about not >> using gpg? > > Now that you mention it, it would probably be better to use OpenSSL than > GnuPG, > given that we already have a (optional) dependency on OpenSSL, while GnuPG > would > be a fairly big new dependency. I was mentioning OpenPGP (the spec), not GnuPG (an implementation). What format and model do you have in mind? The ideal may be SPKI/SDSI here, but OpenPGP is what people are used to, and it’s readily available. Ludo’.
