Had to make a small change to the patch, it turns out it couldn't build the source for glibc@2.21, so I changed the source to inherit from glibc@2.22 and not just from glibc. It doesn't change anything for the actual glibc@2.25.
-- Efraim Flashner <efr...@flashner.co.il> אפרים פלשנר GPG key = A28B F40C 3E55 1372 662D 14F7 41AA E7DC CA3D 8351 Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed on emails sent or received unencrypted
From ef14fa6db5eaedabbaa092cbed2b6f8ee903837c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Efraim Flashner <efr...@flashner.co.il>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 23:13:53 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] gnu: glibc: Patch CVE-2017-1000366.
* gnu/packages/base.scm (glibc/linux)[replacement]: New field.
(glibc-2.25-fixed): New variable.
(glibc@2.24, glibc@2.23, glibc@2.22, glibc@2.21)[source]: Add patches.
[replacement]: New field.
(glibc-locales)[replacement]: New field.
* gnu/packages/commencement.scm (cross-gcc-wrapper)[replacement]: New field.
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
---
gnu/local.mk | 5 +-
gnu/packages/base.scm | 49 ++++-
gnu/packages/commencement.scm | 6 +-
gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch | 36 ++++
.../patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch | 124 +++++++++++++
6 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index f0eed694d..d4d6c1c25 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -631,11 +631,14 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/ghostscript-runpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-networking-ssl-cert-file.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-tests-timer.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-bootstrap-system.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-locales.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-memchr-overflow-i686.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-o-largefile.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-versioned-locpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glog-gcc-5-demangling.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/gmp-arm-asm-nothumb.patch \
@@ -657,7 +660,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/guile-present-coding.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/guile-relocatable.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/guile-rsvg-pkgconfig.patch \
- gnu/packages/patches/guile-ssh-channel-finalization.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/guile-ssh-channel-finalization.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/guile-ssh-double-free.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/guile-ssh-rexec-bug.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/gtk2-respect-GUIX_GTK2_PATH.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/base.scm b/gnu/packages/base.scm
index d135a18bf..70f57b9ff 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/base.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/base.scm
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
;;; Copyright © 2014, 2015, 2016 Mark H Weaver <m...@netris.org>
;;; Copyright © 2014 Alex Kost <alez...@gmail.com>
;;; Copyright © 2014, 2015 Manolis Fragkiskos Ragkousis <manolis...@gmail.com>
-;;; Copyright © 2016 Efraim Flashner <efr...@flashner.co.il>
+;;; Copyright © 2016, 2017 Efraim Flashner <efr...@flashner.co.il>
;;; Copyright © 2016 Jan Nieuwenhuizen <jann...@gnu.org>
;;; Copyright © 2017 Marius Bakke <mba...@fastmail.com>
;;;
@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ store.")
(package
(name "glibc")
(version "2.25")
+ (replacement glibc-2.25-patched)
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-"
@@ -904,34 +905,62 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
+(define glibc-2.25-patched
+ (package
+ (inherit glibc)
+ (replacement #f)
+ (source (origin
+ (inherit (package-source glibc))
+ (patches (search-patches "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch"
+ "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+ "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
+ "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch"
+
"glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch"))))))
+
(define-public glibc-2.24
(package
(inherit glibc)
(version "2.24")
+ (replacement #f)
(source (origin
(inherit (package-source glibc))
(uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-"
version ".tar.xz"))
(sha256
(base32
- "1lxmprg9gm73gvafxd503x70z32phwjzcy74i0adfi6ixzla7m4r"))))))
+ "1lxmprg9gm73gvafxd503x70z32phwjzcy74i0adfi6ixzla7m4r"))
+ (patches (search-patches "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch"
+ "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+ "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
+ "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch"
+
"glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch"))))))
(define-public glibc-2.23
(package
(inherit glibc)
(version "2.23")
+ (replacement #f)
(source (origin
(inherit (package-source glibc))
(uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-"
version ".tar.xz"))
(sha256
(base32
- "1s8krs3y2n6pzav7ic59dz41alqalphv7vww4138ag30wh0fpvwl"))))))
+ "1s8krs3y2n6pzav7ic59dz41alqalphv7vww4138ag30wh0fpvwl"))
+ (patches (search-patches "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch"
+ "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+ "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
+ "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch"
+
"glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch"))))))
(define-public glibc-2.22
(package
(inherit glibc)
(version "2.22")
+ (replacement #f)
(source (origin
(inherit (package-source glibc))
(uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-"
@@ -939,7 +968,10 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(sha256
(base32
"0j49682pm2nh4qbdw35bas82p1pgfnz4d2l7iwfyzvrvj0318wzb"))
- (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"))))
+ (patches (search-patches "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch"
+ "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+ "glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch"
+ "glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch"))))
(arguments
(substitute-keyword-arguments (package-arguments glibc)
((#:phases phases)
@@ -948,25 +980,26 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(lambda _
;; Use `pwd' instead of `/bin/pwd' for glibc-2.21
(substitute* "configure"
- (("/bin/pwd") "pwd"))))))))))
+ (("/bin/pwd") "pwd"))
+ #t))))))))
(define-public glibc-2.21
(package
(inherit glibc-2.22)
(version "2.21")
(source (origin
- (inherit (package-source glibc))
+ (inherit (package-source glibc-2.22))
(uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-"
version ".tar.xz"))
(sha256
(base32
- "1f135546j34s9bfkydmx2nhh9vwxlx60jldi80zmsnln6wj3dsxf"))
- (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"))))))
+ "1f135546j34s9bfkydmx2nhh9vwxlx60jldi80zmsnln6wj3dsxf"))))))
(define-public glibc-locales
(package
(inherit glibc)
(name "glibc-locales")
+ (replacement #f)
(source (origin (inherit (package-source glibc))
(patches (cons (search-patch "glibc-locales.patch")
(origin-patches (package-source glibc))))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/commencement.scm b/gnu/packages/commencement.scm
index 1b41feac1..eea246756 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/commencement.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/commencement.scm
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
;;; Copyright © 2014 Andreas Enge <andr...@enge.fr>
;;; Copyright © 2012 Nikita Karetnikov <nik...@karetnikov.org>
;;; Copyright © 2014, 2015 Mark H Weaver <m...@netris.org>
+;;; Copyright © 2017 Efraim Flashner <efr...@flashner.co.il>
;;;
;;; This file is part of GNU Guix.
;;;
@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ the bootstrap environment."
;; built just below; the only difference is that this one uses the
;; bootstrap Bash.
(package-with-bootstrap-guile
- (package (inherit glibc)
+ (package/inherit glibc
(name "glibc-intermediate")
(arguments
`(#:guile ,%bootstrap-guile
@@ -540,6 +541,7 @@ the bootstrap environment."
that makes it available under the native tool names."
(package (inherit gcc)
(name (string-append (package-name gcc) "-wrapped"))
+ (replacement #f)
(source #f)
(build-system trivial-build-system)
(outputs '("out"))
@@ -640,7 +642,7 @@ exec ~a/bin/~a-~a -B~a/lib -Wl,-dynamic-linker -Wl,~a/~a
\"$@\"~%"
(define glibc-final
;; The final glibc, which embeds the statically-linked Bash built above.
- (package (inherit glibc-final-with-bootstrap-bash)
+ (package/inherit glibc-final-with-bootstrap-bash
(name "glibc")
(inputs `(("static-bash" ,static-bash-for-glibc)
,@(alist-delete
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71e80968b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From f6110a8fee2ca36f8e2d2abecf3cba9fa7b8ea7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:09:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-1000366: Ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs [BZ #21624]
+
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which
+is not useful functionality.
+
+This makes an exploitable unbounded alloca in _dl_init_paths unreachable
+for AT_SECURE=1 programs.
+
+patch from:
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=f6110a8fee2ca36f8e2d2abecf3cba9fa7b8ea7d
+---
+ ChangeLog | 7 +++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 2446a87..2269dbe 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -2422,7 +2422,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+
+ case 12:
+ /* The library search path. */
+- if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
++ if (!__libc_enable_secure
++ && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
+ {
+ library_path = &envline[13];
+ break;
+--
+2.9.3
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d8f6d2bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-AUDIT.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+
+patch from:
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
+
+---
+ ChangeLog | 11 +++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+ return *p != '\0';
+ }
+
+-/* List of auditing DSOs. */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
++ audit_list below. */
++const char *audit_list_string;
++
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
++ element. */
+ static struct audit_list
+ {
+ const char *name;
+ struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
+
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
++ const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
++ the first element. */
++ struct audit_list *previous;
++
++ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++ audit_list_string. */
++ char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++ iter->previous = NULL;
++}
++
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++ {
++ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
++ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split audit list at colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
++ {
++ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
++ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++ return iter->fname;
++ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
++ }
++ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
++ }
++
++ if (iter->previous == NULL)
++ {
++ if (audit_list == NULL)
++ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
++ return NULL;
++ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
++ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
++ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++ }
++ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
++ return NULL;
++ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
++}
++
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+ libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
+@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+
+ /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
+- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++ bool need_security_init = true;
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+ {
+- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
+ struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+
+ /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+ initialize the data structures now. */
+@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+ fail later on. */
+ security_init ();
++ need_security_init = false;
+
+- do
++ while (true)
+ {
++ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++ if (name == NULL)
++ break;
++
+ int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+
+ /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
+ glibc will use the static model. */
+ struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++ dlmargs.fname = name;
+ dlmargs.map = NULL;
+
+ const char *objname;
+@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
+ not_loaded:
+ _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s;
ignored.\n",
+- al->name, err_str);
++ name, err_str);
+ if (malloced)
+ free ((char *) err_str);
+ }
+@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ goto not_loaded;
+ }
+ }
+-
+- al = al->next;
+ }
+- while (al != audit_list->next);
+
+ /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+ have two objects loaded. */
+@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ if (tcbp == NULL)
+ tcbp = init_tls ();
+
+- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+ /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
+ earlier. */
+ security_init ();
+@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+ char *p;
+
+ while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+ {
+ /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
+ memory can never be freed. */
+@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+ break;
+
+ case 7:
+--
+2.9.3
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b859c4bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-reject-long-LD-PRELOAD.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+
+patch from:
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
+
+---
+ ChangeLog | 7 ++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
+index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
+--- a/elf/rtld.c
++++ b/elf/rtld.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
+
++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
++ particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */
++#ifdef NAME_MAX
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
++#endif
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
++#endif
++
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
++ unconditionally. */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++ {
++ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
++ size_t len = strlen (p);
++ if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++ return false;
++ }
++ return *p != '\0';
++}
+
+ /* List of auditing DSOs. */
+ static struct audit_list
+@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
+
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
++ performed. */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++{
++ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++ const char *p = preloadlist;
++ char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
++
++ while (*p != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
++ {
++ memcpy (fname, p, len);
++ fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ p += len;
++ if (*p != '\0')
++ ++p;
++
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++ }
++ return npreloads;
++}
++
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+ ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+ {
+- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
+- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
+- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+- char *p;
+-
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
+- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+ HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+ HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+--
+2.9.3
+
--
2.13.1
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
