https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48204
--- Comment #5 from Eric Covener <[email protected]> 2009-11-16 05:07:03 UTC --- (In reply to comment #4) > (In reply to comment #3) > > (In reply to comment #2) > > > (In reply to comment #1) > > > > > A simple countermeasure is to reset the buffer 'cbuf' of the > > > > > decrypted data > > > > > in case of a server initiated renegotiation. See the following patch > > > > > of the > > > > > method 'bio_filter_in_read(..) in ssl_engine_io.c > > > > > > > > How does this not discard a legitimate clients request line? > > > > > > No. If mod_ssl is initiated a SSL renegotiation, the request header is > > > already > > > parsed/consumed. > > > > Sorry to be obtuse, but then how does this help in the attack scenario? > > The second, incomplete request in cbuff will be discarded, and request > splicing > is no longer working Sorry, I see now -- this is not a measure to allow the non-attack scenario, it's just the other half of the nuclear option for admins who haven't removed their per-dir renegotiation stuff. -- Configure bugmail: https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/userprefs.cgi?tab=email ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug. --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
