I' ve tested it on Slackware 7.0 with kernel 2.4.5 :
twisterz:~# uname -r
2.4.5
twisterz:~#
I' ve noticed that , while /var/run/utmp *is* world writable :
twisterz:~# ls -l /var/run/utmp
-rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 4608 Jul 17 02:27 /var/run/utmp
twisterz:~#
and also /var/run/gpm.pid is -rw-rw-rw-, *but* modules.dep isn' t writable
twisterz:~# ls -l /lib/modules/`uname -r`/modules.dep
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2688 Jul 16 19:36
/lib/modules/2.4.5/modules.dep
twisterz:~#
So it can't be edited, and the exploit can' t work 'cause you can't
add/change lines to modules.dep.
I'm going to download Slackware 8.0 and test on it, btw on slak 7.0 keep
good the possibility of, as you said :
>
> And of course with /var/run/utmp writeable, users can delete or
in
> other ways manipulate their logins as they appear in
> w/who/finger/getlogin(), etc.
>
twiz - [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ./twlc
