On Mon, 16 Dec 2002 21:39:32 +0100, Stefan Esser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: > > Hello, > > > Due to the way requests are logged the only way to exploit this > > vulnerability is through setting the DNS name of the fingering host to the > > attacker supplied format string. > > I really wonder how you want to exploit this... Last time I checked > all tested resolvers (Linux/BSD/Solaris) did not allow % within domain > names and so your format string vulnerability is not exploitable at all...
Gotta read them RFC's carefully. ;)
*ON THE WIRE*, all 256 byte codes are legal, since DNS uses a length-data
encoding. Currently, there's restrictions on what chars are legal *for use*,
but there's no reason to suppose that with i18n and UTF-8 possibly appearing in
domain names, this will change.
Now ponder the fun you can have with a PTR entry - as that is what needs to
be returned for "setting the DNS name of the fingering host". What? You can't
get that into a BIND 9 zone file? Try grepping through the source
for "check-names" and ponder the possibilities. You don't even need to
hack the source code for this one....
--
Valdis Kletnieks
Computer Systems Senior Engineer
Virginia Tech
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