See attached advisory,

Regards,

Joost Pol
-- 
Service Provider :: Pine Digital Security :: tel XX-XXXXXXXX :: 070-311 10 10 
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Pine Digital Security Advisory 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advisory ID       : PINE-CERT-20030101
Authors           : Joost Pol
Vendor Informed   : 2002-12-30 
Issue date        : 2003-01-06 
Application       : Kernel 
Version(s)        : Various
Platforms         : FreeBSD 
Availability      : http://www.pine.nl/press/pine-cert-20030101.txt 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Synopsis

        While performing an audit for a customer, Pine Digital Security 
        found an integer overflow in the FreeBSD kernel.

Versions

        FreeBSD:

         RELENG_4   (aka -STABLE)       : not vulnerable after 20021111
         RELENG_5_0 (aka -CURRENT)      : vulnerable in lseek(2) (199)
         All current -RELEASE versions  : vulnerable in fpathconf(2) (192)

        OpenBSD/NetBSD: not vulnerable

Impact

        Serious.

        This integer overflow could cause a system panic, resulting in a 
        Denial-of-Service (DoS). Also, this could be used to escalate 
        privileges or cause the system to disclose (sensitive) files.

Description

        Inside the FreeBSD kernel each file (socket, device or regular 
        file) opened is represented by a file structure (sys/file.h).

        Amongst other members this structure holds a reference counter 
        (int f_count). This reference counter is increased by the fhold() 
        function and decreased by the fdrop() function. (both in sys/file.h)

        For example, when a file is open(2)ed or dup(2)ed the reference 
        counter is increased and when the file is close(2)ed again the
        reference counter is decreased. Once the reference counter reaches 
        zero, the file structure itself is deallocated.

        Most system calls which perform (blocking) operations on a file
        will issue a fhold() call to prevent the file from being closed
        in the middle of an operation. Once the operation is finished the 
        (extra) reference will be released again by issuing a fdrop() call.
        
        Inside the fpathconf(2) (192) system call we spotted a condition
        where a call to fdrop() is missing. When issueing a fpathconf(2)
        call on a socket it will return with an error condition but it 
        will not release the extra file reference.

        Due to the missing fdrop() call inside the fpathconf(2) system
        call is it possible to overflow the reference counter of the
        file structure (int f_count).

        FreeBSD -CURRENT suffers from the same problem in another syscall.

Exploitability

        Causing a system panic and privilege escalation have been confirmed.
        
        Exploitation of this bug will take time, depending on machine 
        speed and system limits this could vary between hours and days. 

        1. System Panic
        
        A system panic can be caused by issuing around 2^31 calls to 
        fpathconf(2) with a filedescriptor which references a socket. 
        The reference counter (int f_count) will wrap to a negative
        value and this will cause a panic in close(2).
        
        2. Privilege Escalation
        
        It is also possible (although more difficult) to gain root access
        using this bug. One would open(2) a socket and dup(2) it. One would 
        then issue around 2^32 - 1 calls to fpathconf(2) causing the reference 
        counter to wrap to 1. 

        After closing the original filedescriptor the file structure will 
        be deallocated. At this point the dup(2)ed file descriptor is still 
        hanging around with a file structure pointing to unallocated memory. 
 
        The final step, which is left as an excercise for the reader, is 
        to have a sensitive file (like /etc/skeykeys) opened and 
        allocated at the previously freed location. 

        Once this happens the dup(2)ed file descriptor is still hanging 
        around providing access to this file. This could result in the 
        escalation of user privileges. 

Disclaimer

        Pine Digital Security does not release exploits.

        Although the missing fdrop() call in fpathconf(2) was noticed
        before by Nakamura Takayuki <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> its impact
        was severely underestimated.

Patches

        FreeBSD CVS should be updated.

References 

        http://www.pine.nl/press/pine-cert-20030101.txt
        file://usr/include/sys/file.h
        file://usr/src/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c
        file://usr/src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
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