OK, apparently Infra doesn't want to discuss this in a JIRA issue so I will try 
to continue it here and bug people with emails if the thread stagnates like it 
did last time.

I'm unclear what questions and problems are of concern here specific to this 
ask.  IMO:
1) ASF Release Policy currently allows artifacts to be packaged on other 
hardware.  It just has to be verified on RM/PMC-controlled hardware
2) There is no packaging specific security risk.  Rogue executions via Jenkins 
are either possible or not possible and there are plenty of other juicy targets 
for rogue executions besides release artifacts that are verifiable.

Infra, please list questions and problems.

Thanks,
-Alex

On 1/3/19, 2:19 PM, "Alex Harui" <[email protected]> wrote:

    FWIW, I created this JIRA issue to track the decision.
    
    
https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fissues.apache.org%2Fjira%2Fbrowse%2FINFRA-17540&amp;data=02%7C01%7Caharui%40adobe.com%7C9bb10afdd1a9466f890d08d671c97555%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0%7C0%7C636821507409358402&amp;sdata=Qj9VZ8zG%2BnMbZ%2F9%2B%2B9DKh%2B4hpEoKpc%2FJ5JLiksgPABw%3D&amp;reserved=0
    
    Thanks,
    -Alex
    
    On 12/13/18, 12:22 PM, "Zoran Regvart" <[email protected]> wrote:
    
        Hi Allen, Alex and Builders,
        I must say that I also think like Alex, who's to say that the builds
        done on a CI server are any worse than those done locally by PMC's.
        
        I understand that CI server is far from a clean room environment, but
        take a look at all the software you have installed on your machine and
        call that cleaner with a straight face. If signing is done locally by
        PMC's who very the build, in a yet to be determined fashion, what's
        the real risk here?
        
        I would very much like to have as little friction to releases for
        Apache Camel as possible.
        
        zoran
        
        On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 7:58 PM Alex Harui <[email protected]> 
wrote:
        >
        > IMO, we wouldn't publish releases signed by buildbot without being 
also signed by a PMC RM.  If there is a way to skip buildbot PGP signing that 
would be even better.  And we don't have to build from clean if we have a way 
to verify the binaries.  There are new efforts going on towards creating 
reproducible binaries that allow for such verification.
        >
        > My suggestion is rather simple:
        >
        > 1) Find a way to skip signing before pushing to Nexus release staging 
or have buildbot sign
        > 2) Have a buildbot account that can push to Git and SVN
        >
        > If we can do that, the PMC's can take care of the rest.
        
        
        
        --
        Zoran Regvart
        
    
    

Reply via email to