> > 2. If ChildBrowser is present, it should include code to > intercept target._blank and polyfil window.open to its own API. (JS POC > needed) > 3. ChildBrowser should get an additional API to specifically target the > system default browser. ( API details TBD )
Can we consider using the other anchor frame types? [1] To me, _blank should still exit the app and open the default browser. Perhaps _self, _parent, or _top can be intercepted to invoke the Child Browser (name change pending)? - _blank: The user agent should load the designated document in a new, unnamed window. - _self: The user agent should load the document in the same frame as the element that refers to this target. - _parent: The user agent should load the document into the immediate FRAMESET parent of the current frame. This value is equivalent to _self if the current frame has no parent. - _top: The user agent should load the document into the full, original window (thus canceling all other frames). This value is equivalent to _self if the current frame has no parent. [1] http://www.w3.org/TR/html401/types.html#type-frame-target Michael On Tue, Aug 7, 2012 at 4:58 PM, Jesse <[email protected]> wrote: > Brian, > The ChildBrowser does NOT allow bridge access, it is a dumb view. > The only way that it can communicate with the host app is via url changes ( > a'la OAuth, NOT a'la PhoneGap gap:// commands. ) > > Michael, > When you install a plugin, you should be aware of what the plugin does. > This is a developer decision and not a framework responsibility IMHO. > > ChildBrowser name suggestions? Separate thread? > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2012 at 4:44 PM, Michael Brooks <[email protected] > >wrote: > > > Great writeup Jesse. > > > > I agree with your reasoning and I like that Child Browser is not ruled by > > the domain whitelist. > > > > One concern that I have is around other plugins. Consider the scenario of > > an asset downloader that may download an archive (tar, gzip, etc), > extract > > it, and inject the assets into the application's DOM. Off the top of my > > head, this sort of plugin should be restricted by the domain whitelist. > > > > Michael > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2012 at 4:30 PM, Jesse <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Brion: > > > Yes, this should be considered part of the API, the 'how' is yet to be > > > defined, but apps need the ability to specifically target both the > > default > > > system browser AND the ChildBrowser. > > > > > > === > > > > > > Re: My Proposal, ( I have officially flipped ... ) > > > > > > After writing/sending my proposal, I thought back to the origins of the > > > ChildBrowser plugin. Back when Shaz and I wrote it some 2+ years ago, > > the > > > goal was to allow non-secure content to be loaded into the application > > > without offering any chance of the app/dom being hijacked. At the > time, > > > there was no whitelist, and all was fine. > > > > > > Now that we have a whitelist, I think we need to re-evaluate it's > > purpose. > > > IMHO the ChildBrowser should NOT be restricted to domains in the > > > whitelist. If you imagine attempting to develop a twitter clone, it > > would > > > be impossible to display links in tweets unless you either, jumped out > to > > > the system browser, or had an allow * in the whitelist. IMO this is a > > > perfectly valid use case for building a phonegap app. > > > > > > Displaying content from ANY domain should be a perfectly acceptable > > > practice. > > > Running JS code inside the ChildBrowser from ANY domain should be > > > acceptable as well. ( XHR cross-domain requests should continue to be > > > governed by the security already present in the browser control itself > ) > > > Mixing code/content from the internet domain with the app domain SHOULD > > be > > > governed by the whitelist. > > > > > > The ChildBrowser already shields the app from unsafe internet code, in > > that > > > it does NOT allow any of the APIs that phonegap does. This is in > harmony > > > with the initial intent of the plugin, to safely display some content > ... > > > and not lose the app context. > > > > > > My adjusted proposal follows : > > > > > > 1. The security/whitelist checking should be adjusted to only apply to > > > access attempts by the CDVViewController, and not the entire > > application. ( > > > not easy, I know Shaz, I can help ) > > > 2. If ChildBrowser is present, it should include code to intercept > > > target._blank and polyfil window.open to its own API. (JS POC needed) > > > 3. ChildBrowser should get an additional API to specifically target > > > the system default browser. ( API details TBD ) > > > > > > Cheers, > > > Jesse > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 4:55 PM, Brion Vibber <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 3:52 PM, Jesse MacFadyen < > > [email protected] > > > > >wrote: > > > > > > > > > [PROPOSAL] > > > > > > > > > > 1. If a URL is not in the whitelist, it will be passed to the > default > > > > > system browser regardless of any other rule. ( this will be handled > > on > > > > > the native side, by the framework and the JS side may not even know > > it > > > > > has happened. ) > > > > > > > > > > > > > If the URL *is* in the whitelist, can we send it to the default > system > > > > browser too when calling window.open? > > > > > > > > For lots of our usage at Wikimedia, we need to whitelist Wikipedia > > sites > > > in > > > > order to do API calls via XHR (at least on iOS), but also want to be > > able > > > > to open specific pages in the system browser. > > > > > > > > 2. If ChildBrowser is present, it should include code to intercept > > > > > target._blank and polyfil window.open to its own API. > > > > > 3. ChildBrowser should get an additional API to specifically target > > > > > the system default browser. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- brion vibber (brion @ pobox.com / brion @ wikimedia.org) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > @purplecabbage > > > risingj.com > > > > > > > > > -- > @purplecabbage > risingj.com >
