Warrior Hun Sen stated that Cambodia had nothing to lose...and he could entertain Thailand any time. What if the war happens at sea? ======== ____________________________________ From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Sent: 11/25/2009 10:02:11 A.M. Eastern Standard Time Subj: THAILAND/CAMBODIA: Bilateral tensions are containable
Oxford Analytica THAILAND/CAMBODIA: Bilateral tensions are containable Wednesday, November 25 2009 EVENT: The pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy (UDD) 'red shirts' are planning a protest in Bangkok starting on November 28. SIGNIFICANCE: Turnout could indicate whether former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's new relationship with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has affected adversely his domestic political stature. Bilateral tensions threaten economic relations, with Thai and Cambodian leaders risking economic harm in pursuit of domestic political advantage. Thaksin's move may mark the end of his political relevance, while Hun Sen's needless provocation of a powerful neighbour may signal that his own grip on power is waning.Go to conclusion ANALYSIS: Relations between Thailand and Cambodia rarely have been equal. Historical enmities reaching back to the Khmer conquest of much of modern Thailand and Siamese 'reconquista', which laid the foundations of the nation state, invariably resonate at times of tensions between the neighbours. Thailand's economic strength and links with the West contrast sharply with Cambodia's decades-long experience of conflict, genocide, communism and poverty. Current dispute. The origins of the current dispute lie in an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 1962 that the ancient Preah Vihear temple was largely within Cambodian territory. A point of contention for decades, the dispute re-emerged in early 2008 when Thailand's last directly elected government was being challenged by its opponents over UNESCO's listing of Preah Vihear as a UN World Heritage Site (see THAILAND/CAMBODIA: Causes of conflict set to persist - October 29, 2008). The decision by the pro-Thaksin Shinawatra government to downplay the issue offered its opponents an opportunity to undermine its standing among Thaksin's often highly nationalist supporters. However, its removal in late 2008 and replacement by an unelected coalition administration closer to the conservative elite failed to dampen the issue. The populist People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 'yellow shirts' have continued to emphasis the cause as means of projecting their own patriotic zeal while using the issue as leverage against Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government. The timing of the dispute also suited Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen as it coincided with the country's July 2008 general election. Although there was no doubt Hun Sen would win, anti-Thai sentiment helped secure an overwhelming majority (see CAMBODIA: Opposition quelled as oil drilling advances - August 26, 2009). Drivers. The present phase of the dispute, with serious implications for bilateral relations and perhaps also regional stability, is sustained by several factors: Momentum. Once unleashed, nationalist emotions in Thailand and Cambodia are difficult and politically costly to defuse. While time may erode them, it takes little to reignite them. Expediency. There are few incentives at present for political groups in either country to lower the volume on the dispute. The Thai government will wish to ensure Thaksin's status as an 'adviser' to Hun Sen is emphasised regularly. A late October Abac opinion survey indicated that 25% supported Thaksin as prime minister against 21.6% for Abhisit. An Abac poll released in early November after Thaksin offered his support for Hun Sen indicated that Abhisit's popularity had risen to 68.6% from 23.3% in September. Miscalculation. Thaksin's decision to seek an alliance with Hun Sen may yet not prove a grave political error, but so far there are few advantages evident for him in the relationship. This view may be tested by the level of attendance and conduct of a planned protest by the pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy (UDD) 'red shirts' in Bangkok starting on November 28 (see THAILAND: King's health stokes stability fears - October 15, 2009): High attendance would indicate that support for Thaksin -- or at least opposition to the conservative elite -- remains strong. Low attendance readily could be used by Thaksin's opponents to argue that his influence was waning and emphasise his 'unpatriotic' Cambodian connection. Tensions can be expected to rise ahead of the demonstration, not least because of a grenade attack against a PAD rally in Bangkok on November 15 that bore the hallmarks of a 'hidden hand' attempt to intimidate and warn against such challenges to state authority. Hun Sen's behaviour has also come under close scrutiny since he challenged Abhisit as he hosted the late October Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Hua Hin. Theories over Hun Sen's undiplomatic conduct vary, but he may feel that as the region's last revolutionary leader he should not defer to Abhisit, who he may view as pro-Western, privileged and political naive. It is unlikely Hun Sen believes Thaksin can return to power, but he may calculate that some damage may done to what many Cambodians view as their economically threatening neighbour, with little cost. Resolution prospects. Full reconciliation between Thailand and Cambodia is unlikely, despite the efforts of ASEAN and individual regional states to broker a settlement. Such an outcome would risk the leadership being accused of compromising sovereignty or national dignity: There have already been costs, notably the Abhisit government's cancellation of a memorandum of understanding agreed in 2001 during Thaksin's premiership to develop jointly hydrocarbon reserves in the Gulf of Thailand. Although no work has been undertaken to verify claims that the offshore area contains large gas and oil reserves, the decision is seen by many Thais and outsiders as petulant and legally damaging rather than a reasoned response to Hun Sen's perceived provocations. Conflict risks. A major military confrontation is highly improbable: Thailand and Cambodia are unevenly matched in conventional military terms. Thailand fields modern armour, artillery, air and naval assets against Cambodia's ageing and worn out Soviet-era and Chinese supplied weapon systems. However, Cambodia's guerrilla tradition and large pool of personnel with operational experience would extract a high cost from Thailand's technically superior but largely untested regular army. Any direct armed confrontation is unlikely to go any further than a repeat of skirmishes in 2008. Both countries' senior officers have also emphasised there is minimal tension along the land borders. The Thais could seek to signal their military capability and political displeasure at sea, where the Cambodians are notably weak Outlook. The most likely prospect is one of periodic spikes in tension, usually linked to domestic events where nationalist or xenophobic sentiment may benefit the political leadership, set against an essentially stable relationship based on commercial and economic priorities. Hun Sen's attitude will be key to this outcome: If Thaksin's 'advisory' role is not resumed and Cambodia's seemingly arbitrary moves against Thai businesses in the country are reversed or abandoned, a working relationship can be restored quickly. Thaksin himself may well have reviewed his strategy regarding Cambodia and recognised he stands to gain few benefits while risking alienating many of his supporters. Hun Sen's interest in provoking Thailand may also be overtaken by the need to counter domestic opposition to his relationship with Vietnam, where he remains politically vulnerable. Hun Sen owes his present position to Hanoi after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to remove the Khmer Rouge regime. Cambodians may retain historical grievances against the Thais, but many of them hate and fear the Vietnamese. CONCLUSION: In the absence of any serious incidents, such as an armed clash or riots that target Thai or Cambodian nationals, the dispute is likely to evolve into a sullen but functional relationship that has a minor impact on events and sentiments beyond the two countries. Foreign investment is unlikely to be adversely affected, and the joint development of natural resources will proceed once both countries are clear of the benefits such cooperation will bring them. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Cambodia Discussion (CAMDISC) - www.cambodia.org" group. This is an unmoderated forum. Please refrain from using foul language. Thank you for your understanding. Peace among us and in Cambodia. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/camdisc Learn more - http://www.cambodia.org
