>From: Andreas Metzler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >I do not think that is the case, because it would break _lots_ >of stuff, the problem seems to be that cdrecord drops privileges it >needs to access the hardware.
Wrong: cdrtools handle privilleges the way you get highest security. For this reason, cdrecord drops all privilleges as soon as possible if possible. If Linux suddenly changes known behavior, this is a Linux kernel bug. >> However, in case that they tried to implement similar security >> enhancements as Sun did starting with Solaris 9, then libscg would >> need the same modification as it needed on Solaris (switching >> to/from root bracheting each SCSI command). >That sounds much more probable. If this is the case, then it is a fault of the Linux kernel designers. They should have written a mail to the most important 'users'. If they did, then cdrtools would have integrated a smooth migration path. As they did not, it needs to be called a Linux kernel bu that should _immeduiately_ fixed. If they then inform the important users, they may retry this change in 2-4 months. >>> Cdrecord needs to keep CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > >> Could you explain this? It is not mentioned in the list if mails you send. >Linux(iirc since 2.2) supports a finer grained permission model than >switching UID, POSIX capabilities[1]. Instead of "switching to/from >root bracketing each SCSI command" you'd simply retain the necessary >capability, CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > cu andreas If Linux has this, why is there no documentation? Why is there no man pages for the Linux Kernel at all? I spend a lot of my time documenting what I did. If the Linux Kernel people would start to document their hacks, they would get a chance to understand what they did and could even understand what interfaces are. Knowing what an interface is helps to design interfaces in a way that keeps them stable. >[1] It is not part of IEEE Std 1003.1. I gather from >http://wt.xpilot.org/publications/posix.1e/ that the gremium has given >up on standardizing it. I don't see anything but ACLs here. Solaris 10 has a clean documentation for getppriv(2)/setppriv(2) http://docs.sun.com/db/doc/816-5167/6mbb2jaeu?a=expand Fine grained privs make sense as they allow e.g. star on Solaris 10 to run backups without the need to be root. There are privs to mount a fs, to read all local files and to keep the atime. J�rg -- EMail:[EMAIL PROTECTED] (home) J�rg Schilling D-13353 Berlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] (uni) If you don't have iso-8859-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (work) chars I am J"org Schilling URL: http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/usr/schilling ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
