On Mon, Aug 23, 2004 at 12:32:10PM +0200, Joerg Schilling wrote: > Jacob Meuser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 20, 2004 at 03:49:28PM +0200, Joerg Schilling wrote: > > > > > How do you believe that you may run cdrecord without root privs without > > > compromising the security of the whole system? > > > > On OpenBSD, members of the operator group are allowed to reboot the > > system, change tapes ... normal things that someone trusted to operate > > .... > > > But having suid binaries gives _anyone_ the possibility of escalating > > to root. This has already happened to the very software we are > > talking about. > > > > Using the suid bit takes away all the fine grained "access control". > > It looks like OpenBSD does not have fine grrained access control but did rather > add unwanted spacial group behavior into the kernel.
There's nothing "special" added to the kernel. It's just the same old group "access control" that's been with UNIX-like operating systems since long ago. > On Solaris 10, you may use RBAC together with getppriv()/setppriv() to really > have fine grained role based rights. > > On a non "trusted" Variant, there is /usr/bin/pfexec that calls the programs > with just the rights they need. > > J�rg > > -- > EMail:[EMAIL PROTECTED] (home) J�rg Schilling D-13353 Berlin > [EMAIL PROTECTED] (uni) If you don't have iso-8859-1 > [EMAIL PROTECTED] (work) chars I am J"org Schilling > URL: http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/usr/schilling ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily -- <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
