The Virtual Mosque

By _THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN_
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomaslfriedman/index.html?inline=nyt-per)
Published: June 16, 2009

Watching events unfolding in Tehran raises three intriguing questions for
me:  Is Facebook to Iran’s Moderate Revolution what the mosque was to Iran’s
Islamic  Revolution? Is Twitter to Iranian moderates what muezzins were to
Iranian  mullahs? And, finally, is any of this good for the Jews —
particularly Israel’s  prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu?


Here is why I ask. During the past eight years, in Iraq, Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt, spaces were opened for
more democratic elections. Good news. Unfortunately, the groups that had
the  most grass-roots support and mobilization capabilities — and the most
energized  supporters — to take advantage of this new space were the Islamists.
That is,  Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, the
various Sunni and  Shiite Islamist parties in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. The  centrist mainstream was nowhere.
One of the most important reasons that the Islamists were able to covertly
organize and mobilize, and be prepared when the lids in their societies
were  loosened a bit, was because they had the mosque — a place to gather,
educate and  inspire their followers — outside the total control of the state.
In almost every one of these cases, the Islamists overplayed their hands.
In  Lebanon, Hezbollah took the country into a disastrous and unpopular war.
Ditto  Hamas in Gaza. The Sunni and Shiite Islamists in Iraq tried to impose
a  religious lifestyle on their communities, and the mullahs in Iran
quashed the  reformists. In the last year, though, the hard-liners in all these
countries  have faced a backlash by the centrist majorities, who detest these
Islamist  groups.
Hezbollah was defeated in the Lebanese elections. Hamas is facing an
energized Fatah in the West Bank and is increasingly unpopular in Gaza. Iraqi
Sunnis have ousted the jihadists thanks to the tribal Awakening movement,
while  the biggest pro-Iranian party in Iraq got trounced in the recent
provincial  runoff. And in Iran, millions of Iranians starving for more freedom
rallied to  the presidential candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi, forcing President
Mahmoud  Ahmadinejad to steal the election. (If he really won the Iranian
election, as  Ahmadinejad claims, by a 2-to-1 margin, wouldn’t he invite the
whole world in to  recount the votes? Why hasn’t he?)
What is fascinating to me is the degree to which in Iran today — and in
Lebanon — the more secular forces of moderation have used technologies like
Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, blogging and text-messaging as their virtual
mosque,  as the place they can now gather, mobilize, plan, inform and energize
their  supporters, outside the grip of the state.
For the first time, the moderates, who were always stranded between
authoritarian regimes that had all the powers of the state and Islamists who had
all the powers of the mosque, now have their own place to come together and
project power: the network. The Times _reported that_
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/middleeast/16media.html?scp=17&sq=June+16+2009&st=nyt)
Moussavi’s fan group on Facebook alone  has grown to more than 50,000
members. That’s surely more than any mosque could  hold — which is why the
government is now trying to block these sites.
But while that puts the moderate mainstream on par with the Islamists in
communications terms, we should not get carried away. First, “moderates” is
a  relative term. Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, while more
secular  and nationalist than the extreme Iraqi Islamists, nonetheless wants
to  centralize power and solidify his Dawa group as the ruling party.
Second, even if defeated electorally, the Islamists and their regimes have
a  trump card: guns. Guns trump cellphones. Bang-bang beats tweet-tweet. The
Sunni  Awakening in Iraq succeeded because the moderates there were armed.
I doubt  Ahmadinejad will go peacefully.
And that brings me to Netanyahu. Israel was taken by surprise by events in
Lebanon and Iran. And Israeli officials have been saying they would much
prefer  that Ahmadinejad still wins in Iran — not because Israelis really
prefer him but  because they believe his thuggish, anti-Semitic behavior
reflects the true and  immutable character of the Iranian regime. And Israelis 
fear
that if a moderate  were to take over, it would not herald any real change
in Iran, or its nuclear  ambitions, but simply disguise it better.
But there are signals — still weak — that another trend may be stirring in
 the region. The Iranian regime appears to be splitting at the top. This
could  challenge Netanyahu’s security framework. Israel needs to be neither
seduced by  these signals nor indifferent to them. It has to be open to them
and must  understand that how it relates to Palestinians and settlements can
help these  trends — at the margins. But a lot starts at the margins.
“The rise of these moderate forces, if it is real and sustained, would be
the  most significant long-term contribution to Israeli national security,”
argued  Gidi Grinstein, the president of the Reut Institute, a think tank. “
If some of  these moderate forces started to converge, then the overall
status of Israeli  security would improve radically.” It is still way too early
to know, he said,  “but Israel needs to be alive to this process and not
simply rely on its old  framework.”
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