from the site:
The American Conservative
 
 
 
Third World  War        
The real showdown between Christians  and Muslims isn’t in the Mideast.
By _Philip  Jenkins_ 
(http://amconmag.com/searchr.php?m=3&start=0&end=25&v&author=Philip+Jenkins)   

 
Nobody is sure how it started.  Perhaps Christian activists sent text 
messages warning that Muslims were trying  to poison them. Maybe Muslims tried 
to 
storm a church. Whatever the cause, the  consequence this past January was 
mayhem for the Nigerian city of Jos.  Muslim-Christian rioting killed up to 
500 people before the government  intervened with its customary heavy hand.  
The most striking point about these battles was  that nobody found them 
striking. In Jos, as in countless other regions across  Africa and Asia, 
violence between Christians and Muslims can erupt at any time,  with the 
potential 
to detonate riots, civil wars, and persecutions. While these  events are 
poorly reported in the West, they matter profoundly. All the  attention in the 
Global War on Terror focuses on regions in which the U.S. is  engaged 
militarily, but another war is raging across whole continents, one that  will 
ultimately shape the strategic future. Uncomfortably for American  
policymakers, it is a war of religions and beliefs—a battle not for hearts and  
minds 
but for souls.  
This is not to argue for an irreconcilable Clash  of Civilizations, still 
less a struggle between Christian good and Muslim evil.  In any African 
country divided between the two faiths—and that includes most  lands south of 
the 
Sahara—day-to-day interfaith relations are remarkably good.  Many families 
are amicably divided between Christians and Muslims and take great  care to 
avoid sources of conflict. Business or political meetings commonly begin  
with prayers, and it is no great matter whether a pastor or a mullah  leads 
them.  
Yet over the past century, the spread of new  religious forms worldwide has 
created the potential for violence wherever a  surging Christianity meets 
an unyielding Islam. Riots such as those in Jos are  one result; terrorism is 
another. Generally, Muslims have been the aggressors in  recent conflicts, 
but Christians have their own sectarian mobs and  militias.  
However blame is apportioned, the two faiths have  been at daggers drawn, 
often literally, for decades. As Eliza Griswold discusses  in her forthcoming 
book, The Tenth Parallel, you can trace the fault by  following the 
latitude line of ten degrees North. (Jos, conveniently, stands  almost exactly 
at 
ten degrees.) A tectonic plate of religious and cultural  confrontation runs 
across West and Northwest Africa, through Southeast Asia,  Indonesia, and 
the Philippines. A decade ago, Indonesia witnessed some of the  worst 
fighting, as Muslim militias launched bloody assaults on that nation’s  
Christian 
minority, some 25 million strong. For decades, the overwhelmingly  Christian 
Philippines has suffered constant insurgency from a ruthless armed  movement 
concentrated in the Muslim south. Mob attacks and pogroms have raged in  
Malaysia. In Africa, the Sudan is probably the best-known theater of mass  
martyrdom, while Nigeria remains deeply polarized. And that is not to mention  
ongoing killings in countries like Uganda and Kenya.  
Humanitarian concerns apart, there are plenty of  reasons for the West to 
be deeply worried about these conflicts. Nigeria has  almost 160 million 
people and by 2050 is expected to have 300 million, making it  one of the world’
s most populous nations. If it ever escapes from its present  political 
horrors, it will be the obvious leader of sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria  also 
matters enormously in terms of natural resources. It is the third largest  
source of U.S. crude-oil imports, ahead of Saudi Arabia. Other up-and-coming 
oil  
suppliers in West and Central Africa are also among the religiously divided 
 nations. Meanwhile Indonesia, with 240 million people, is already a 
population  giant, and unlike Nigeria, it seems set for serious economic 
development in the  coming decade.  
If such massive countries ever became  monolithically Muslim, that would be 
significant enough for the West, especially  because these states wield 
such cultural influence over their neighbors. But if  they fell into the hands 
of a radical form of Wahhabi or Salafist Islam, that  would be an epochal 
catastrophe. Conversely, imagine a world in which Christians  predominated in 
these influential Global South nations. That would decisively  shift the 
world’s balance of forces in pro-Western directions.  
The relationship between Christianity and Islam  poses a challenge for at 
least half of the 20 nations expected to have the  world’s largest 
populations by 2050. By present projections, three of these  future mega-states—
Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tanzania—will be almost equally  divided between the two 
faiths. In several others, like the Congo, the  Philippines, Russia, and 
Uganda, predominantly Christian nations will have  Muslim minorities of 10 
percent or more. Mainly Muslim states will coexist with  comparable Christian 
sub-populations in Indonesia, Egypt, and the Sudan. In all  of these places, if 
relations between the faiths do not improve over the next 40  years, 
prospects for civil order are terrifying. The world’s roster of failed  states 
would have several new members.  
Why the hostility? What are Christians and  Muslims fighting about in 
Nigeria and Malaysia, Uganda and the Philippines?  Western readers will think 
back to Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, a  richly provocative idea. 
But the notion of a world divided among vast  religious-cultural blocs 
assumes that these units remain fairly constant, so  that tension occurs only 
along their periphery. Yet cultural blocs change  dramatically within their 
borders as well, and we are presently living through a  dizzying era of 
shifting boundaries.  
Look at those rapidly growing countries and think  of how these burgeoning 
Christian heartlands might have struck an observer in  1914. Why are 
Christians so numerous in Africa and Asia? Did the past century  witness a 
global 
religious revolution? The answer, of course, is yes, however  dimly 
Westerners may be aware of it. Muslims have certainly seen the trend. One  
factor 
driving Islamic militancy in many nations is the sense that Christianity  is 
growing. Outside of the West, evangelism and conversion are two of the most  
sensitive issues in the modern world.  
Christianity, which a century ago was  overwhelmingly the religion of 
Europe and the Americas, has undertaken a  historic advance into Africa and 
Asia. 
In 1900, Africa had just 10 million  Christians, representing around 10 
percent of the continental population. By  2000, that figure had swollen to 
over 360 million, or 46 percent of the  population. Over the course of the 20th 
century, millions of Africans  transferred their allegiance from 
traditional primal faiths to one of the two  great world religions, 
Christianity or 
Islam—but they demonstrated an  overwhelming preference for the former. Around 
40 percent of Africa’s population  became Christian, compared to just 10 
percent who chose Islam. As Muslims had  earlier far outnumbered Christians, 
the result was to transform a massive Muslim  majority into a reasonably 
equal confessional balance. Africa today is about 47  percent Christian, 45 
percent Muslim, and some 8 percent followers of primal  religions.  
To appreciate this transformation, consider  Nigeria. In 1900, the lands 
that would become that nation were about 28 percent  Muslim and 1 percent 
Christian. Confident in their numbers, Muslims did not need  even to think 
about 
Christians as rivals. For Muslims, the pagan population  represented an 
inferior state of being, peoples to be ruled and, often,  enslaved. One day in 
the future, the heathens might join the modern religious  world, but it 
would be the world of Islam. But then things went wrong. By 1970,  Muslims had 
increased their share of the population to 45 percent. But that 1  percent 
Christian minority had expanded incredibly, also to 45 percent. A land  that 
seemed firmly under Muslim hegemony was suddenly split down the middle.  
The question now was just how much further  Christian numbers could grow. 
If you extrapolate recent Christian growth into  the near future, no Muslim 
majority seems safe, even in a place like Nigeria,  where some polls in 
recent years have suggested an outright Christian majority.  (More conservative 
estimates register around 46 percent.) Even nonpolitical  Muslims worry: 
might their grandchildren be kaffirs? Worse, these newer  Christians are not 
like the minority communities familiar in a Middle Eastern  context, groups 
like the Egyptian Copts, who of necessity were politically  quietist: the new 
African believers are dynamic and expansionist. The most  successful follow 
energetic Pentecostal and evangelical forms of faith rather  than the sober 
liturgical habits of older groupings.  
The new believers draw on Western, and  specifically American, forms of 
evangelism, marketing their faith through videos  and DVDs. They organize 
crusades and mass meetings for prayer and healing that  can draw 2 million 
believers together in a single venue. For nervous Muslims,  the Christian 
threat 
was epitomized by the legendary “Jesus” video, originally a  British film 
biography produced in 1979, but subsequently promoted around the  world. As a 
weapon of mass instruction, it has few equals. Christians in Jos or  Jakarta 
would approach Muslims and offer to show them a really interesting film  
about the prophet Jesus. Many accepted the invitation, and some then decided 
to  follow the Christian way rather than the path of Islam.  
Christianity also attracted independent-minded  women. In traditional 
societies, conversion occurred when the head of a clan or  family accepted a 
new 
religion and brought his kin with him. Now, when a  patriarch accepted 
Islam, youngsters demurred, preferring to seek personal  salvation in 
Christianity. And inconceivably, women even refused to accept  arranged 
marriages to 
suitable Muslim men. Religious splits became family feuds,  escalating the 
potential for malice and retaliation.  
Few Asian countries have seen anything like the  Christian growth that 
characterizes Africa, but here, too, religious change  generates social 
tensions. In lands like Indonesia and Malaysia, Christianity  has been 
associated 
above all with minority communities, especially the Chinese,  whom majority 
Muslim groups hate and fear for being rich, clannish, and  arrogant. Economic 
crises, such as the Asian financial crash of 1997-98, bring  ethnic 
conflicts, which bear a religious coloring.  
In different societies, then, booming  Christianity came to be associated 
with a variety of perils: the breakup of  traditional communities, 
individualism, women’s independence, and everything  associated with “the West”—
libertarianism, sexual explicitness, and cultural  aggression. When the 
Pentecostal movement reached full force, all these trends  began to look like a 
juggernaut that might overwhelm familiar cultures. From an  Islamic viewpoint, 
these things might be troubling enough if they were happening  on the 
traditional Muslim-Christian frontier—say in the Mediterranean—but  suddenly 
Christian expansion was accelerating in what should have been  dependable 
Muslim 
territory.  
This was the package of nightmares that faced  Muslim communities from the 
1970s onward, at exactly the time that a new  countermovement, quite as 
radical in its own way, emerged from the Middle East.  The key date was 1979, 
the year of the Iranian Revolution, but also of the  radical coup against the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca. The Saudi regime survived that  assault but in a 
chastened mood. Anxious to prevent a repeat performance, the  Saudis made their 
devil’s bargain with the Islamists: go and do what you like  around the 
world, and we will bankroll you, but stay out of our own beloved  kingdom. That 
was the point at which Gulf oil money began rolling around the  Muslim 
world, funding mosques and madrassas following the hardest of Islamist  lines. 
By 
the end of 1979, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, sparking a  war 
that would become a vehicle for training jihadis worldwide.  
The outcome was a new and highly militant form of  Islam, impatient with 
old-style moderate forms of faith and fanatically opposed  to Christian 
incursions into continents seen as Muslim realms. For these  militants, the 
growth 
of Christianity was proof of the failure of the old Muslim  regimes. In the 
words of radical theorist Sayyid Qutb, these regimes had shown  themselves 
infidels at heart, and it was up to true Muslims to condemn them as  such 
(takfir) and remove themselves spiritually (make hijra)  to a new and purer 
activism. In 1989, a revolutionary Islamist regime took power  in the Sudan. 
The same year, at Abuja in Nigeria, a conference on Islam in  Africa outlined 
a program for successful Islamization. That event entered  Christian 
folklore, and one does not have to travel far on the continent to hear  claims 
of 
all manner of secret plans to destroy Christianity across Africa and  create 
a caliphate. If Islamists denounce the Christians as tools of America,  
Christians everywhere see the hand of Riyadh.  
In many countries, Islamist sects formed  militias, some affiliated with 
the nascent al-Qaeda. In 1993, for instance,  Indonesian extremists formed the 
terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, which  would be responsible for 
the 2002 bombings that killed 200 in Bali. One of the  deadliest 
anti-Christian groups in West Africa has been the al-Qaeda-linked  “Nigerian 
Taliban,” 
known to themselves as the muhajiroun—those who  make hijra.  
When we see interfaith battles in Africa or Asia,  we are generally not 
witnessing activism by al-Qaeda militants directed from  some secret terrorist 
mission control, but we do find movements driven by  exactly the same 
grievances that motivate bin Laden’s associates—above all, we  see the same 
central fear of Christian expansion. For Muslims, whether political  dissidents 
or actual Islamists, the world is evidently engaged in a culture war,  a war 
of faiths, and groups like al-Qaeda are only one small and sensationalized  
portion of that. Christians likewise know the stakes. Educated African 
believers  look back with trepidation at the great Christian churches that 
flourished in  the northern regions of the continent 1,500 years ago, churches 
that would be  snuffed out under Islamic rule. They are determined not to let 
that disaster be  repeated.  
This culture clash, so crucial to the fate of  whole continents, has not 
impinged on the American consciousness. Stunningly,  the crying need for 
interfaith peace in Africa and Asia featured not at all in  Barack Obama’s 
much-touted speech in Cairo last June. Of course, American  options are 
limited. 
The more that Western nations try to interfere directly in  defense of 
Christians, the easier it is for Muslims to portray their enemies as  
imperialist 
agents. That is not a counsel of despair. American administrations  can 
achieve something by pressuring allegedly friendly regimes like the Saudis  to 
stop sponsoring anti-Christian propaganda across the Global South. But  
ultimately, resolving this conflict will depend on Africans and Asians  
themselves
—if only Washington and Riyadh can refrain from pouring fuel on the  
hostilities. 
__________________________________________  
Philip Jenkins is Edwin Erle Sparks Professor  of History and Religious 
Studies at Pennsylvania State  University.
_______________________________________________
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