WSJ
 
April 20, 2010
 
An Economy of Liars 
When government and business collude, it's called crony  capitalism. Expect 
more of this from the financial reforms contemplated in  Washington.
 
 
 
 
 
    *   


 
 
By _GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL JR._ 
(http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=GERALD+P.+O'DRISCOLL+JR.&bylinesearch=true)
  
Free markets depend on truth telling. Prices must reflect the valuations of 
 consumers; interest rates must be reliable guides to entrepreneurs 
allocating  capital across time; and a firm's accounts must reflect the true 
value 
of the  business. Rather than truth telling, we are becoming an economy of 
liars. The  cause is straightforward: crony capitalism. 
Thomas Carlyle, the 19th century Victorian essayist, unflatteringly 
described  classical liberalism as "anarchy plus a constable." As a 
romanticist, 
Carlyle  hated the system—but described it accurately.  
Classical liberals, whose modern counterparts are libertarians and  
small-government conservatives, believed that the state's duties should be  
limited 
(1) to provide for the national defense; (2) to protect persons and  
property against force and fraud; and (3) to provide public goods that markets  
cannot. That conception of government and its duties was articulated by the  
Declaration of Independence and embodied in the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 






Modern liberals have greatly expanded the list of government functions, 
but,  aside from totalitarian regimes, I know of no modern political movement 
that has  shortened it. While protecting citizens against force, both at home 
and abroad,  is the government's most basic function, protecting them 
against fraud is  closely allied. By the use of force, a thief takes by arms 
what 
is not  rightfully his; he who commits fraud takes secretly what is not 
rightfully his.  It is the difference between a robber stealing brazenly on the 
street and a  burglar stealing by stealth at night. The result is the same: 
the loss of  property by its owner and the disordering of civil society. 
And government has  failed miserably to perform this basic function. 
Why has this happened? Financial services regulators failed to enforce laws 
 and regulations against fraud. Bernie Madoff is the paradigmatic case and 
the  Securities and Exchange Commission the paradigmatic failed regulator. 
Fraud is  famously difficult to uncover, but as we now know, not Madoff's. 
The SEC chose  to ignore the evidence brought to its attention. Banking 
regulators allowed a  kind of mortgage dubbed "liar loans" to flourish. And so 
on. 
We have now learned of the creative way Lehman Brothers hid its leverage 
(how  much money it was borrowing) by the use of a Repo 105. The Repo 105 
meant Lehman  temporarily swapped assets (such as bonds) for cash. A Repo, or 
repurchasing  agreement, is a way to borrow money. But an accounting rule 
allowed Lehman to  book the transaction as a sale and reduce its reported 
borrowings, according to  a report by the court-appointed Lehman bankruptcy 
examiner, a former federal  prosecutor, last month.  
Are we to believe that regulators were unaware? Last week Goldman Sachs was 
 accused in a civil fraud suit of deceiving many clients for the benefit of 
 another, hedge-fund operator John Paulson. 
The idea that multiplying rules and statutes can protect consumers and  
investors is surely one of the great intellectual failures of the 20th century. 
 Any static rule will be circumvented or manipulated to evade its 
application.  Better than multiplying rules, financial accounting should be 
governed 
by the  traditional principle that one has an affirmative duty to present 
the true  condition fairly and accurately—not withstanding what any rule might 
otherwise  allow. And financial institutions should have a duty of care to 
their customers.  Lawyers tell me that would get us closer to the common law 
approach to fraud and  bad dealing. 
Public choice theory has identified the root causes of regulatory failure 
as  the capture of regulators by the industry being regulated. Regulatory 
agencies  begin to identify with the interests of the regulated rather than the 
public  they are charged to protect. In a paper for the Federal Reserve's 
Jackson Hole  Conference in 2008, economist Willem Buiter described 
"cognitive capture," by  which regulators become incapable of thinking in terms 
other 
than that of the  industry. On April 5 of this year, The Wall Street 
Journal chronicled the  revolving door between industry and regulator in 
"Staffer 
One Day, Opponent the  Next." 
Congressional committees overseeing industries succumb to the allure of  
campaign contributions, the solicitations of industry lobbyists, and the siren 
 song of experts whose livelihood is beholden to the industry. The 
interests of  industry and government become intertwined and it is regulation 
that 
binds those  interests together. Business succeeds by getting along with 
politicians and  regulators. And vice-versa through the revolving door.  
We call that system not the free-market, but crony capitalism. It owes more 
 to Benito Mussolini than to Adam Smith. 
Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek described the price system as an  
information-transmission mechanism. The interplay of producers and consumers  
establishes prices that reflect relative valuations of goods and services.  
Subsidies distort prices and lead to misallocation of resources (judged by the  
preferences of consumers and the opportunity costs of producers). Prices no  
longer convey true values but distorted ones.  
Hayek's mentor, Ludwig von Mises, predicted in the 1930s that communism 
would  eventually fail because it did not rely on prices to allocate resources. 
He  predicted that the wrong goods would be produced: too many of some, too 
few of  others. He was proven correct. 
In the U.S today, we are moving away from reliance on honest pricing. The  
federal government controls 90% of housing finance. Policies to encourage 
home  ownership remain on the books, and more have been added. Fed policies of 
low  interest rates result in capital being misallocated across time. Low 
interest  rates particularly impact housing because a home is a pre-eminent 
long-lived  asset whose value is enhanced by low interest rates. 
Distorted prices and interest rates no longer serve as accurate indicators 
of  the relative importance of goods. Crony capitalism ensures the special 
access of  protected firms and industries to capital. Businesses that stumble 
in the  process of doing what is politically favored are bailed out. That 
leads to moral  hazard and more bailouts in the future. And those losing 
money may be enabled to  hide it by accounting chicanery. 
If we want to restore our economic freedom and recover the wonderfully  
productive free market, we must restore truth-telling on markets. That means 
the  end to price-distorting subsidies, which include artificially low 
interest  rates. No one admits to preferring crony capitalism, but an expansive 
regulatory  state undergirds it in practice.  
Piling on more rules and statutes will not produce something different than 
 it has in the past. Reliance on affirmative principles of truth-telling in 
 accounting statements and a duty of care would be preferable. Deregulation 
is  not some kind of libertarian mantra but an absolute necessity if we are 
to exit  crony capitalism.  
Mr. O'Driscoll is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He has been a  
vice president at Citigroup and a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
 Dallas. 



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