Sage Weil <s...@newdream.net> writes: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Last week, Red Hat investigated an intrusion on the sites of both the Ceph > community project (ceph.com) and Inktank (download.inktank.com), which > were hosted on a computer system outside of Red Hat infrastructure. > > Ceph.com provided Ceph community versions downloads signed with a Ceph > signing key (id 7EBFDD5D17ED316D). Download.inktank.comprovided releases > of the Red Hat Ceph product for Ubuntu and CentOS operating systems signed > with an Inktank signing key (id 5438C7019DCEEEAD). While the investigation > into the intrusion is ongoing, our initial focus was on the integrity of > the software and distribution channel for both sites. > > To date, our investigation has not discovered any compromised code or > binaries available for download on these sites. However, we cannot fully > rule out the possibility that some compromised code or binaries were > available for download at some point in the past. Further, we can no > longer trust the integrity of the Ceph signing key, and therefore have > created a new signing key (id E84AC2C0460F3994) for verifying downloads. > This new key is committed to the ceph.git repository and is > also available from > > https://git.ceph.com/release.asc > > The new key should look like: > > pub 4096R/460F3994 2015-09-15 > uid Ceph.com (release key) <secur...@ceph.com> > > All future release git tags will be signed with this new key. > > This intrusion did not affect other Ceph sites such as download.ceph.com > (which contained some older Ceph downloads) or git.ceph.com (which mirrors > various source repositories), and is not known to have affected any other > Ceph community infrastructure. There is no evidence that build system or > the Ceph github source repository were compromised. > > New hosts for ceph.com and download.ceph.com have been created and the > sites have been rebuilt. All content available on download.ceph.com as > been verified, and all ceph.com URLs for package locations now redirect > there. There is still some content missing from download.ceph.com that > will appear later today: source tarballs will be regenerated from git, and > older release packages are being resigned with the new release key DNS > changes are still propogating so you may not see the new versions of the > ceph.com and download.ceph.com sites for another hour or so.
It would be nice to have a way to verify the integrity of tarballs downloaded from http://download.ceph.com/tarballs/. Could you please add individual signatures or an sha256sum file signed with your release key. This is important for people building from source tarballs and distribution packagers baseing their packages from tarballs. Debian and Ubuntu packages are currently built from them. Gaudenz
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