3.2. Indexicals and demonstratives

While for many philosophers names are the paradigms of directly referential
expressions, others bestow this status upon indexicals and demonstratives.
This holds, in particular, for Kaplan (1989, circulated since 1977), whose
theory is the most influential account of indexicals and demonstratives.
Whereas the classical Fregean theory is based upon the sense/reference
dichotomy, Kaplan introduces a threefold distinction between character,
content, and extension. The character of an expression A is a function that
determines a content relative to a given context c, and the content of A in
c is an intension, i.e. a function from worlds (or, more generally, indices)
to extensions. The character of a common noun, say, is constant, in that it
yields the same content in all contexts (though see Haas-Spohn 1995 for a
different stance on this point). The character of an indexical like 'I', in
contrast, is variable but its content, in any given context c, is fixed: the
content of 'I' in c as uttered by a speaker s is a function that yields s at
all worlds. Which is to say that, in any given context, the content of'I' is
rigid.

In our opinion, Kaplan's case for direct reference is stronger than
Kripke's: whereas it can be shown that names have uses on which they behave
as non-referential definite descriptions or even as variables, it seems that
some indexicals, at least, don't permit of such uses. In particular,
indexicals like 'I' and 'today' appear to have only the type of use that is
so elegantly captured by Kaplan's analysis (though see Nunberg 1993, who
shows that even these indexicals have uses that present problems for
Kaplan's account). Therefore, it seems unlikely that a presuppositional
analysis analogous to the one for names (see above) will be able to claim
empirical superiority in so far as these indexicals are concerned. However,
most of the expressions which, according to Kaplan and his followers, are
directly referential actually behave like proper names in that they also
have non-rigid uses, which are not accounted for by Kaplan's theory, and
seem to call rather for an analysis in anaphorical/presuppositional terms.
For example, demonstratives generally have anaphoric as well as deictic
uses, as illustrated by the following examples.


I was doing some research on names and came across this.

I need a drink now.

Erika
(with a *K*)

"I love deadlines. I like the whooshing sound they make as they fly by." -
Douglas Adams (1952 - 2001)
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