this interesting situation.
Russert: Mr. Secretary, you met with the International Red Cross on
January 15. In February, they released their report which said that,
amongst the other allegations, male prisoners were forced to wear
women's underwear; prisoners were beaten by coalition forces, in one
case leading to death; coalition forces firing on unarmed prisoners.
And then in May, you and others in the administration said you were
"shocked" by the allegations about U.S. forces' treatment of Iraqi
prisoners. Didn't you have a heads-up on this whole problem?
Powell: In January, when I met with the head of the International
Committee for the Red Cross, Mr. Kellenberger, he said to me that a
report would be coming and it would outline some serious problems with
respect to the treatment of prisoners in Iraq. We were aware of that
within the administration. He also met with Dr. Rice and with Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.
And then in early February, the actual report was presented to our
authorities out in Baghdad, both to Ambassador Bremer's office and to
General Sanchez's office. By then, of course, an investigation was
already under way as a result of a soldier coming forward in the middle
of January and outlining specific cases of abuse, and so an
investigation was well under way by time the report was made available
in February to the command. I first saw the report in March when it was
made available eventually to us in Washington.
Russert: But you're a military man. Do you believe that national
reservists would go to Baghdad with hoods or dog leashes and actually
undertake that kind of activity without it being devised by someone
higher up?
Powell: I wouldn't have believed that any American soldiers would have
done any such thing, either on their own volition or even if someone
higher up had told them. I'm not aware of anybody higher up telling
them. But that's why Secretary Rumsfeld has commissioned all of these
inquiries to get to the bottom of it.
What these individuals did was wrong, was against rules and regulations.
It was against anything they should have learned in their home, in their
community, in their upbringing. So we have a terrible collapse of order
that took place in that prison cell block. Let's not use this to
contaminate the wonderful work being done by tens of thousands of other
young American soldiers in Iraq. We'll get to the bottom of this.
Justice will be served.
The command responded promptly. Court-martials are already scheduled.
And I know that the president wants to make sure that we follow the
chain of accountability up to see if there was anybody above these
soldiers who knew what was going on, or in any way created a command
climate in which such activities might in some bizarre way be found
acceptable. They were not acceptable in any way. And one soldier stood
up and said, "I know this is wrong," reported it to his chain of
command, and the chain of command responded the very next day with the
launching of an investigation that became the General Taguba
investigation.
Russert: Finally, Mr. Secretary, in February of 2003, you placed your
enormous personal credibility before the United Nations and laid out a
case against Saddam Hussein citing...
Powell: Not off.
Emily: No. They can't use it. They're editing it. They
(unintelligible).
Powell: He's still asking me questions. Tim.
Emily: He was not...
Powell: Tim, I'm sorry, I lost you.
Russert: I'm right here, Mr. Secretary. I would hope they would put
you back on camera. I don't know who did that.
Powell: We really...
Russert: I think that was one of your staff, Mr. Secretary. I don't
think that's appropriate.
Powell: Emily, get out of the way.
Emily: OK.
Powell: Bring the camera back, please. I think we're back on, Tim. Go
ahead with your last question.
Russert: Thank you very much, sir. In February of 2003, you put your
enormous personal reputation on the line before the United Nations and
said that you had solid sources for the case against Saddam Hussein. It
now appears that an agent called Curveball had misled the CIA by
suggesting that Saddam had trucks and trains that were delivering
biological and chemical weapons. How concerned are you that some of the
information you shared with the world is now inaccurate and discredited?
Powell: I'm very concerned. When I made that presentation in February
2003, it was based on the best information that the Central Intelligence
Agency made available to me. We studied it carefully; we looked at the
sourcing in the case of the mobile trucks and trains. There was
multiple sourcing for that. Unfortunately, that multiple sourcing over
time has turned out to be not accurate. And so I'm deeply disappointed.
But I'm also comfortable that at the time that I made the presentation,
it reflected the collective judgment, the sound judgment of the
intelligence community. But it turned out that the sourcing was
inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading. And
for that, I am disappointed and I regret it.
Russert: Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for joining us again and
sharing your views with us today.
Powell: Thanks, Tim.
Russert: And that was an unedited interview with the secretary of state
taped earlier this morning from Jordan. We appreciate Secretary
Powell's willingness to overrule his press aide's attempt to abruptly
cut off our discussion as I began to ask my final question.
--
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American Contractors Insurance Group
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