There's her opinion and then there's this from my other post:
Congressional Reports: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html
Which said she was wrong. :)
On 5/15/06, Dana Tierney wrote:
> well, here is the woman's own version of events:
>
> 4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I answered an
> e-mail message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at the National Security
> Law Unit (NSLU). Of course, with (ever important!) 20-20 hindsight, I now
> wish I had taken more time and care to compose my response. When asked by
> NSLU for my "assessment of (our) chances of getting a criminal warrant to
> search Moussaoui's computer", I answered, "Although I think there's a decent
> chance of being able to get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our
> USAO seems to have an even higher standard much of the time, so rather than
> risk it, I advised that they should try the other route." Leaked news
> accounts which said the Minneapolis Legal Counsel (referring to me) concurred
> with the FBIHQ that probable cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's computer
> are in error. (or possibly the leak was deliberately skewed in this fashion?)
> What I meant by this pithy e-mail response, was that although I thought
> probable cause existed ("probable cause" meaning that the proposition has to
> be more likely than not, or if quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our
> United States Attorney's Office, (for a lot of reasons including just to play
> it safe) in regularly requiring much more than probable cause before
> approving affidavits, (maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability and
> sometimes even higher), and depending on the actual AUSA who would be
> assigned, might turn us down. As a tactical choice, I therefore thought it
> would be better to pursue the "other route" (the FISA search warrant) first,
> the reason being that there is a common perception, which for lack of a
> better term, I'll call the "smell test" which has arisen that if the FBI
> can't do something through straight-up criminal methods, it will then resort
> to using less-demanding intelligence methods. Of course this isn't true, but
> I think the perception still exists. So, by this line of reasoning, I was
> afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal and failed to convince an
> AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in subsequently seeking a FISA. I
> thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the FISA. Both of the
> factors that influenced my thinking are areas arguably in need of
> improvement: requiring an excessively high standard of probable cause in
> terrorism cases and getting rid of the "smell test" perception. It could even
> be argued that FBI agents, especially in terrorism cases where time is of the
> essence, should be allowed to go directly to federal judges to have their
> probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having to gain the
> USAO's approval.4
>
> http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html
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