>From the International Herald Tribune:
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=13553038

Al Qaeda threat has analysts split into 2 opposing camps
By Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt
Sunday, June 8, 2008

WASHINGTON: A bitter personal struggle between two powerful figures in the 
world of terrorism has broken out, forcing their followers to choose sides. 
This battle is not being fought in the rugged no man's land on the 
Pakistani-Afghan border. It is a contest reverberating inside the Beltway 
between two of America's leading theorists on terrorism and how to fight it, 
two men who hold opposing views on the very nature of the threat.

On one side is Bruce Hoffman, a cerebral 53-year-old Georgetown University 
historian and author of the highly respected 1998 book "Inside Terrorism." He 
argues that Al Qaeda is alive, well, resurgent and more dangerous than it has 
been in several years. In his corner, he said, is a battalion of mainstream 
academics and a National Intelligence Estimate issued last summer warning that 
Al Qaeda had reconstituted in Pakistan.

On the other side is Marc Sageman, an iconoclastic 55-year-old Polish-born 
psychiatrist, sociologist, former CIA case officer and scholar-in-residence 
with the New York Police Department. His new book, "Leaderless Jihad," argues 
that the main threat no longer comes from the organization called Al Qaeda, but 
from the bottom up - from radicalized individuals and groups who meet and plot 
in their neighborhoods and on the Internet. In his camp, he said, are agents 
and analysts in highly classified positions at the CIA and FBI.

If Hoffman gets inside organizations - focusing on command structures - Sageman 
gets inside heads, analyzing the terrorist mind-set. But this is more important 
than just a battle of ideas. It is the latest twist in the contest for 
influence and resources in Washington that has been a central feature of the 
struggle against terrorism since Sept. 11, 2001.

Officials from the White House to the CIA acknowledge the importance of the 
debate of the two men as the government assesses the nature of the threat. 
Looking forward, it is certain to be used to win bureaucratic turf wars over 
what programs will be emphasized in the next administration.

If there is no main threat from Al Qaeda - just "bunches of guys," as Sageman 
calls them - then it would be easier for a new U.S. president to think he could 
save money or redirect efforts within the huge counterterrorism machine, which 
costs the United States billions of dollars and has created armies of 
independent security consultants and counterterrorism experts in the last seven 
years.

Preventing attacks planned by small bands of zealots in the garages and 
basements just off Main Street or the alleys behind Islamic madrasas is more a 
job for the local police and the FBI, working with undercover informants and 
with authorities abroad. "If it's a 'leaderless jihad,' then I can find 
something else to do because the threat is over," said Peter Bergen, a senior 
fellow at the nonpartisan New America Foundation, who puts himself in Hoffman's 
camp. "Leaderless things don't produce big outcomes."

On the other hand, if the main task can be seen as thwarting plots or smiting 
Al Qaeda's leaders abroad, then attention and resources should continue to flow 
to the CIA, the State Department, the military and terror-financing sleuths.

"One way to enhance your budget is to frame it in terms of terrorism," said 
Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But the 
problem is that 'Al Qaedatry' is more art than science - and people project 
onto the subject a lot of their own preconceptions."

The divide over the nature of the threat turned nasty, even by the rough 
standards of academia, when Hoffman reviewed Sageman's book this spring for 
Foreign Affairs in an essay, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin 
Laden Still Matters." He accused Sageman of "a fundamental misreading of the Al 
Qaeda threat," adding that his "historical ignorance is surpassed only by his 
cursory treatment of social-networking theory."

In the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, Sageman returns fire, accusing 
Hoffman of "gross misrepresentation." In an interview, Sageman said he could 
not explain his rival's critique: "Maybe he's mad that I'm the go-to guy now."

Some terrorism experts find the argument silly - and dangerous.

"Sometimes it seems like this entire field is stepping into a boys-with-toys 
conversation," said Karen Greenberg, executive director of New York 
University's Center on Law and Security. "Here are two guys, both of them 
respected, saying that there is only one truth and only one occupant of the 
sandbox. That's ridiculous. Both of them are valuable."

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a former director of central intelligence, sees 
merit in both sides, too; he said in Singapore last week that Al Qaeda was 
training European, and possibly American, recruits. But, he added, "You also 
have the development of violent, extremist networks."

One argument for playing down Al Qaeda's importance - Sageman's point - has 
been the public declarations of some prominent Sunni clerics who have 
criticized Al Qaeda for its indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians.

A leading Syrian-born militant theorist believed to be in U.S. custody, known 
by the nom de guerre Abu Musab al-Suri, also has argued in favor of leaderless 
jihad. In his 1,600-page life work, he advises jihadists to create 
decentralized networks bound by belief, instead of hierarchical structures that 
could be targets of attack.

Hoffman's principal argument relies on the re-emergence of Al Qaeda, starting 
in 2005 and 2006, along the Afghan-Pakistan border. There is empirical 
evidence, he says, that from that base, Al Qaeda has been "again actively 
directing and initiating international terrorist operations on a grand scale."

But it has been easy for intelligence agencies to get the analysis wrong when 
faced with piecemeal and contradictory evidence.

One example is the 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people. 
Declarations by several Spanish officials and experts of such a link were 
undermined by evidence that the group was self-motivated, self-trained and 
self-financed, and that the explosives were bought locally.

Other examples are provided by the 2004 plot to attack the London area with 
fertilizer bombs, and the July 7, 2005, transit bombings in London. At first, 
both were thought to support the home-grown terrorist thesis: British citizens, 
most of Pakistani descent, had carried out attacks with homemade bombs. Only 
later did evidence surface that in both cases, at least some had trained in 
Pakistan at military camps suspected of links to Qaeda operatives.

Sageman's critics argue that his more local focus plays to a weak point in 
gauging threats: People tend to feel the threat nearest to home is the most 
urgent. In April, for example, the Kansas City office of the FBI met with state 
and local authorities from Kansas and Missouri to analyze "agroterrorism." The 
discussion was about the possibility of terrorists causing an outbreak of 
diseases that could poison cattle or crops.

Terrorism-weary prosecuting judges and police investigators in Europe listen to 
the debate on the other side of the Atlantic and tend to find it empty. They 
say it is hard to know where radicalization starts - among groups of friends, 
in an imam's sermon in Europe or at home on the Internet - and when operational 
training by Al Qaeda is a factor. They prefer a blended approach.

France, Spain and Italy, for example, pour resources and manpower into 
investigations at home — from studying radicalization and wiretapping 
suspicious individuals to infiltrating mosques and community centers. These 
countries also track movements of suspicious individuals abroad and networks 
with both local and foreign connections. Terrorist-related cases fall under the 
authority of special investigative superjudges who have access to all 
classified intelligence, and can use much of the information in trials.

The Europeans say that for them, the argument is not theoretical. Somewhere in 
Europe, just about every week, a terrorist plot is uncovered and arrests are 
made.

"The danger of this 'either-or' argument could lead us to the mistakes of the 
past," said Baltasar Garzon, Spain's leading anti-terror investigatory 
magistrate. "In the '90s, we saw atomized cells as everything, and then Al 
Qaeda came along. And now we look at Al Qaeda and say it's no longer the 
threat. We're making the same mistake again."


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