yeah, I'll give you that :) it just came to mind as something I would not be terribly interested in...though actually we got a pretty decent joke out of it :)
Dana John Stanley writes: > Oh, I don't know....I was just felt a little catty, but I am better > now....and besides, that Dixie Chicks post was only one time.... ;-) > > -----Original Message----- > From: Dana Tierney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:40 AM > To: CF-Community > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read them, so there. > Several other people seem interested in the topic. Do I tell you not to > post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet T-shirt contest? > > Dana > > John Stanley writes: > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > To: CF-Community > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation that I > > have read so far. > > It explains why the war was never about WMD (which we all now know), the > > result of the war is the United States is now the major power in the > > Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of the true strategy of the > > Bush Administration in this war was a grave miscalculation: > > ----- > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > 5 June 2003 > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > WMD > > > > Summary > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. > > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal > > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in > > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to > > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing > > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a > > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here. > > > > Analysis > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of senior > > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD in > > Iraq as the primary, public justification for going to war. The > > simple fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass > > destruction in Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have > > been used for biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was > > working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority > > for U.S. military forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than > > a month, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction not only > > has become an embarrassment, it also has the potential to > > mushroom into a major political crisis in the United States and > > Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting the > > paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are using the > > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess. > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the > > following points: > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was strategic > > and not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to > > justify the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for > > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the > > nature of the war the United States was fighting. > > > > As we put it: > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. > > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military > > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass > > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor will a coup > > in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that will last > > for years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is critical. If > > that footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of the > > war and the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible -- > > there are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion > > of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has now > > come home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the > > inability to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of > > the United States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy > > of finger-pointing. > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to start > > at the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al > > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global > > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to > > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more impressive. > > This led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda possessed or was > > in the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- sensitive > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that > > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was operating in a > > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. > > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of evil" > > State of the Union speech, which identified three countries as > > having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of > > these countries. > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in > > the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq > > continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials > > believed there was a parallel program in biological weapons, and > > also that Iraqi leaders had the ability and the intent to restart > > their nuclear program, if they had not already done so. Running > > on the worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into > > U.S. intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD and > > likely to pass them on to al Qaeda. > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There > > are other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of > > evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the > > fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has > > always argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and > > strategic purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to > > demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity > > of the United States; strategically, it was designed to position > > the United States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria > > and Iran into changing their policies toward suppressing al Qaeda > > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were > > achieved. > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political > > justification for the war. It was understood that countries like > > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with > > Washington in a policy that would make the United States the > > arbiter of the Middle East. Washington had to find a > > justification for the war that these allies would find > > irresistible. > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was > > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's > > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept > > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the real > > outcome -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons. > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public > > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or > > Russia to endorse military action. They continued to resist > > because they fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- > > would be U.S. domination of the Middle East, and they did not > > want to see that come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the > > WMD issue on its head, arguing that if that was the real issue, > > then inspections by the United Nations would be the way to solve > > the problem. Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; > > what they did deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They > > also argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection > > process would either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or > > justify an invasion at that point. What is important here is that > > French and Russian leaders shared with the United States the > > conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought > > weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if they were > > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S. > > power in the Middle East. > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of > > assumptions. There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime > > probably had WMD. The issue between the United States and its > > allies was strategic. After the war, the United States would > > become the dominant power in the region, and it would use this > > power to force regional governments to strike at al Qaeda. > > Germany, France and Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, > > opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in the > > alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over > > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American > > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke > > and mirrors -- rather than its private view. > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military > > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification > > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one > > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is > > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might > > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or destroyed > > them so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the > > kicker the Bush administration never counted on. > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers > > could range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, > > being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here > > is that the WMD question was not the reason the United States > > went to war. The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic > > base from which to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi > > Arabia into using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within > > their borders. From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be > > working. > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United > > States walked into a trap. The question of the location of WMD is > > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense > > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's > > WMD is also important. But these questions are ultimately trivial > > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a war in > > which Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the problem > > is that it created a situation in which the American public had > > one perception of the reason for the war while the war's planners > > had another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that will > > last for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have > > created. > > ................................................................... > > > > ------ > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Host with the leader in ColdFusion hosting. Voted #1 ColdFusion host by CF Developers. Offering shared and dedicated hosting options. www.cfxhosting.com/default.cfm?redirect=10481 Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
