You'll need to file it with the Official Beaureaaoauao of Complaints and since you're not a paying subscriber to the Horticulture and Polyps Weekly, you're complaint only counts for 1/23 of a subscriber's complaint (which counts for 23/27). Your complaint will be considered when there is a full complaint regarding the topic. Of course, each subscriber's complaint is subtracted from the number of non-subscriber complaints. As editor of the Horticulture and Polyps Weekly I get a full 1 17/27 of a complaint, and I'm constantly complaining about all these complaints we get.
-Kevin > -----Original Message----- > From: Larry C. Lyons [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:24 AM > To: CF-Community > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > I want to complain about that. > > larry > > At 11:28 AM 6/6/2003 -0400, William Wheatley wrote: > >its ok i figured i'd top it all by complaining about your complaing > >about his complaining about everyones complaining about wmd :) > > > > > >"When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. Sure, I was > >good with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts > >people off!" Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" > >----- Original Message ----- > >From: "Dana Tierney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:18 AM > >Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > I'm just complainng about his complaining :) We settled :) > > > > > > Dana > > > > > > William Wheatley writes: > > > > > > > He never said not to post about them. And we're all > about to rant > > > > lol. > > > > > > > > Soon there will be a call to setup cf-WMD :) > > > > > > > > > > > > "When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no > skills. Sure, I > > > > was > >good > > > > with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts > > > > people > >off!" > > > > Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > > From: "Dana Tierney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:40 AM > > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I > read them, > > > > > so > >there. > > > > > Several other people seem interested in the topic. Do > I tell you > > > > > not > >to > > > > > post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet T-shirt contest? > > > > > > > > > > Dana > > > > > > > > > > John Stanley writes: > > > > > > > > > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > > > > > To: CF-Community > > > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the > > > > > > situation that > >I > > > > > > have read so far. > > > > > > It explains why the war was never about WMD (which > we all now > > > > > > know), > >the > > > > > > result of the war is the United States is now the > major power > > > > > > in the Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of > the true > > > > > > strategy of > >the > > > > > > Bush Administration in this war was a grave miscalculation: > > > > > > ----- > > > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > > > > > 5 June 2003 > > > > > > > > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > > > > > > > > > WMD > > > > > > > > > > > > Summary > > > > > > > > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass > destruction in Iraq > > > > > > has created a political crisis in the United States and > > > > > > Britain. Within the two governments, there are > recriminations > > > > > > and brutal political infighting over > responsibility. Stratfor > > > > > > warned in February that the unwillingness of the U.S. > > > > > > government to articulate its real, strategic > reasons for the > > > > > > war -- choosing instead to lean on WMD as the > justification -- > > > > > > would lead to a deep crisis at some point. That > moment seems > > > > > > to be here. > > > > > > > > > > > > Analysis > > > > > > > > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of > > > > > > senior British and American officials who used > concerns about > > > > > > WMD in Iraq as the primary, public justification > for going to > > > > > > war. The simple fact is that no one has found any > weapons of > > > > > > mass destruction in Iraq and -- except for some > vans which may > > > > > > have been used for biological weapons -- no > evidence that Iraq > > > > > > was working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a > > > > > > priority for U.S. military forces, which have occupied Iraq > > > > > > for more than a month, the failure to find weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction not only has become an embarrassment, > it also has > > > > > > the potential to mushroom into a major political > crisis in the > > > > > > United States and Britain. Not only is the political > > > > > > opposition exploiting the paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the > > > > > > various bureaucracies are using the issue to try to > discredit > > > > > > each other. It's a mess. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis > titled Smoke > > > > > > and > > > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, > which made the > > > > > > following points: > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was > > > > > > strategic and not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument > primarily to > > > > > > justify the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > > > > > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification > > > > > > for the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to > > > > > > the nature of the war the United States was fighting. > > > > > > > > > > > > As we put it: > > > > > > > > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > > > > > interests as the justification for war has created > a crisis in > > > > > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect > > > > > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of > > > > > > U.S. grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in > > > > > > military strategy have collided. The discovery of > weapons of > > > > > > mass destruction in Iraq will not solve the > problem, nor will > > > > > > a coup in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic > extremists] that > > > > > > will last for years, maintaining one's conceptual > footing is > > > > > > critical. If that footing cannot be maintained -- if the > > > > > > requirements of the war and the requirements of strategic > > > > > > clarity are incompatible -- there are more serious issues > > > > > > involved than the future of Iraq." > > > > > > > > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the > > > > > > invasion of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous > > > > > > justification--has now come home to roost. Having > used WMD as > > > > > > the justification, the inability to locate WMD in Iraq has > > > > > > undermined the credibility of the United States and > is tearing > > > > > > the government apart in an orgy of finger-pointing. > > > > > > > > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to > > > > > > start at the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 > > > > > > attacks, al Qaeda was regarded as an > extraordinarily competent > > > > > > global organization. Sheer logic argued that the > network would > > > > > > want to top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more > > > > > > impressive. This led to a very reasonable fear that > al Qaeda > > > > > > possessed or was in the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > > > > > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- > >sensitive > > > > > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence > that tended > > > > > > to show that what appeared to be logical actually was > > > > > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was > operating > > > > > > in a worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable > when dealing > > > > > > with WMD. Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as > > > > > > significant. Two things > > > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities > assigned to al > > > > > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public > outcome -- along > > > > > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of evil" > > > > > > State of the Union speech, which identified three > countries as > > > > > > having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq > was one of > > > > > > these countries. > > > > > > > > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been > U.S. policy, > > > > > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it > used them in > > > > > > the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq > > > > > > continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence > > > > > > officials believed there was a parallel program in > biological > > > > > > weapons, and also that Iraqi leaders had the > ability and the > > > > > > intent to restart their nuclear program, if they had not > > > > > > already done so. Running on the worst-case basis > that was now > > > > > > hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. intelligence, Iraq was > > > > > > identified as a country with WMD and likely to pass > them on to > > > > > > al Qaeda. > > > > > > > > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this > class. There > > > > > > are other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond > the "axis > > > > > > of evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would not > solve the > > > > > > fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As > Stratfor > > > > > > has always argued, the invasion of Iraq served a > psychological > > > > > > and strategic purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to > > > > > > demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power and > > > > > > ferocity of the United States; strategically, it > was designed > > > > > > to position the United States to coerce countries such as > > > > > > Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran into changing their policies > > > > > > toward suppressing al Qaeda operations in their countries. > > > > > > Both of these missions were achieved. > > > > > > > > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic > planning. It > > > > > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and > > > > > > political justification for the war. It was understood that > > > > > > countries like France and Russia had no interest in > > > > > > collaborating with Washington in a policy that > would make the > > > > > > United States the arbiter of the Middle East. > Washington had > > > > > > to find a justification for the war that these allies would > > > > > > find irresistible. > > > > > > > > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction. > > > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this > belief became > > > > > > >a > > > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical > weapons, and > > > > > > no reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had > > > > > > unilaterally destroyed them. So it appeared to > planners within > > > > > > the Bush administration that they were on safe ground. > > > > > > Moreover, it was assumed that other major powers > would regard > > > > > > WMD in Hussein's hands as unacceptable and that therefore, > > > > > > everyone would accept the idea of a war in which the stated > > > > > > goal -- and the real outcome -- would be the destruction of > > > > > > Iraq's weapons. > > > > > > > > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The > > > > > > public justification for the war did not compel France, > > > > > > Germany or Russia to endorse military action. They > continued > > > > > > to resist because they fully understood the outcome -- > > > > > > intended or not -- would be U.S. domination of the Middle > > > > > > East, and they did not want to see that come about. Paris, > > > > > > Berlin and Moscow turned the WMD issue on its head, arguing > > > > > > that if that was the real issue, then inspections by the > > > > > > United Nations would be the way to solve the problem. > > > > > > Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; > what they > > > > > > did deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They also > > > > > > argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection > > > > > > process would either force the Iraqis to destroy > their WMD or > > > > > > justify an invasion at that point. What is > important here is > > > > > > that French and Russian leaders shared with the > United States > > > > > > the conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they > > > > > > thought weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if they > > > > > > were primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue > > > > > > was U.S. power in the Middle East. > > > > > > > > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of > > > > > > assumptions. There was not much dispute that the Baathist > > > > > > regime probably had WMD. The issue between the > United States > > > > > > and its allies was strategic. After the war, the > United States > > > > > > would become the dominant power in the region, and it would > > > > > > use this power to force regional governments to > strike at al > > > > > > Qaeda. Germany, France and Russia, fearing the > growth of U.S. > > > > > > power, opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in > > > > > > the alliance, the Bush administration permitted the > arguments > > > > > > over WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the > > > > > > American public believing the administration's public > > > > > > statements -- smoke and mirrors -- rather than its private > > > > > > view. > > > > > > > > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that > matter -- all > > > > > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. > > > > > > military got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public > > > > > > justification would be vindicated, the secret goal would be > > > > > > achieved and no one would be the wiser. What they did not > > > > > > count on -- what is difficult to believe even now > -- is that > > > > > > Hussein actually might not have WMD or, weirder > still, that he > > > > > > hid them or destroyed them so efficiently that no one could > > > > > > find them. That was the kicker the Bush > administration never > > > > > > counted on. > > > > > > > > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still > open. Answers > > > > > > could range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has > > > > > > WMD, being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the > > > > > > point here is that the WMD question was not the reason the > > > > > > United States went to war. The war was waged in order to > > > > > > obtain a strategic base from which to coerce > countries such as > > > > > > Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into using their resources to > > > > > > destroy al Qaeda within their borders. From that > standpoint, > > > > > > the strategy seems to be working. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, > the United > > > > > > States walked into a trap. The question of the > location of WMD > > > > > > is important. The question of whether it was the CIA or > > > > > > Defense Department that skewed its reports about > the location > > > > > > of Iraq's WMD is also important. But these questions are > > > > > > ultimately trivial compared to the use of smoke and > mirrors to > > > > > > justify a war in which Iraq was simply a single campaign. > > > > > > Ultimately, the problem is that it created a situation in > > > > > > which the American public had one perception of the > reason for > > > > > > the war while the war's planners had another. In a > democratic > > > > > > society engaged in a war that will last for many > years, this > > > > > > is a dangerous situation to have created. > > > > > > > .............................................................. > > > > > > ..... > > > > > > > > > > > > ------ > > > > > > > > > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Signup for the Fusion Authority news alert and keep up with the latest news in ColdFusion and related topics. http://www.fusionauthority.com/signup.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
