**stump in on pegleg**
Angry pirate like grog!
**drink grog**
Arrr!
-- Ben Doom
Programmer & General Lackey
Moonbow Software, Inc
: -----Original Message-----
: From: John Stanley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:46 PM
: To: CF-Community
: Subject: RE: Club Joke: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
:
:
: **pounds club on ground**
: grog like funny make
: **screams**
: **runs to waterhole to kill antelope**
:
:
: -----Original Message-----
: From: William Wheatley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:45 PM
: To: CF-Community
: Subject: Club Joke: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
:
:
: Why did cavemen used to pull women by the hair?
: Because if they pulled them by their feet they would fill up with mud.
: Gives a new expression to the term mud pie.
:
:
:
: "When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. Sure, I was good
: with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts people off!"
: Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond"
: ----- Original Message -----
: From: "John Stanley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
: To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
: Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:36 PM
: Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
:
:
: > On my way Dana, can I drag you by the hair too?
: >
: > -----Original Message-----
: > From: Dana Tierney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:32 PM
: > To: CF-Community
: > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
: >
: >
: > Hey John, lend me your club? Or at least come over here with it :)
: >
: > Dana
: >
: > John Stanley writes:
: >
: > > When I'm down,
: > > When I'm blue,
: > > I just do the happy dance
: > > You can too...
: > >
: > > Everybody smile...it's almost the weekend...
: > >
: > > -----Original Message-----
: > > From: Dana Tierney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:22 PM
: > > To: CF-Community
: > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
: > >
: > >
: > > I remember one time saying that I was offended by people making jokes
: abot
: > > France getting hit by a meteor. Started a long thread as I recall. I
: also
: > > remember Ben Braver being offended when I picked up Kevin
: Schmidt's use
: of
: > > the term "car gestapo." I apologized and stopped :) I think
: you need to
: > > take things a little less seriously yourself. And maybe finish reading
: the
: > > thread :)
: > >
: > > Dana
: > >
: > > John Stanley writes:
: > >
: > > > ...spark it up, dude....
: > > >
: > > > -----Original Message-----
: > > > From: Heald, Tim [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:03 PM
: > > > To: CF-Community
: > > > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
: > > >
: > > >
: > > > Come one Dana. There have been bunches of times where
: various people,
: > > > yourself included, have tried to censor the list. Usually you will
: use
: > > the
: > > > "offended" label so prevalent today, but your still
: attempting to stop
: a
: > > > discussion. He didn't even go that far. Just made a comment.
: > > >
: > > > I think everyone needs to get laid, or have a drink or toke or
: whatever
: > > your
: > > > into.
: > > >
: > > > Tim
: > > >
: > > > > -----Original Message-----
: > > > > From: Dana Tierney [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:41 AM
: > > > > To: CF-Community
: > > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
: > > > >
: > > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read them, so
: > > there.
: > > > > Several other people seem interested in the topic. Do I
: tell you not
: > to
: > > > > post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet T-shirt contest?
: > > > >
: > > > > Dana
: > > > >
: > > > > John Stanley writes:
: > > > >
: > > > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's....
: > > > > >
: > > > > > -----Original Message-----
: > > > > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
: > > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM
: > > > > > To: CF-Community
: > > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
: > > > > >
: > > > > >
: > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation
: that
: > I
: > > > > > have read so far.
: > > > > > It explains why the war was never about WMD (which we all now
: know),
: > > the
: > > > > > result of the war is the United States is now the major power in
: the
: > > > > > Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of the true
: strategy of
: > the
: > > > > > Bush Administration in this war was a grave miscalculation:
: > > > > > -----
: > > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
: > > > > > 5 June 2003
: > > > > >
: > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman
: > > > > >
: > > > > > WMD
: > > > > >
: > > > > > Summary
: > > > > >
: > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction
: in Iraq has
: > > > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain.
: > > > > > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal
: > > > > > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in
: > > > > > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to
: > > > > > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing
: > > > > > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a
: > > > > > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > Analysis
: > > > > >
: > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its
: > > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction
: of senior
: > > > > > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD in
: > > > > > Iraq as the primary, public justification for going to war. The
: > > > > > simple fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass
: > > > > > destruction in Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have
: > > > > > been used for biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was
: > > > > > working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority
: > > > > > for U.S. military forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than
: > > > > > a month, the failure to find weapons of mass
: destruction not only
: > > > > > has become an embarrassment, it also has the potential to
: > > > > > mushroom into a major political crisis in the United States and
: > > > > > Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting the
: > > > > > paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are
: using the
: > > > > > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled
: Smoke and
: > > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the
: > > > > > following points:
: > > > > >
: > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was
: strategic
: > > > > > and not about weapons of mass destruction.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to
: > > > > > justify the attack to its coalition partners.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for
: > > > > > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the
: > > > > > nature of the war the United States was fighting.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > As we put it:
: > > > > >
: > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic
: > > > > > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in
: > > > > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect
: > > > > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S.
: > > > > > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military
: > > > > > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass
: > > > > > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor will a coup
: > > > > > in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that will last
: > > > > > for years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is critical. If
: > > > > > that footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of the
: > > > > > war and the requirements of strategic clarity are
: incompatible --
: > > > > > there are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq."
: > > > > >
: > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion
: > > > > > of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has now
: > > > > > come home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the
: > > > > > inability to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the
: credibility of
: > > > > > the United States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy
: > > > > > of finger-pointing.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to start
: > > > > > at the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11
: attacks, al
: > > > > > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global
: > > > > > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to
: > > > > > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more impressive.
: > > > > > This led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda
: possessed or was
: > > > > > in the process of obtaining WMD.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper-
: > sensitive
: > > > > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that
: > > > > > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was
: > > > > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was
: operating in a
: > > > > > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing
: with WMD.
: > > > > > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things
: > > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass
: > > > > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al
: > > > > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along
: > > > > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of evil"
: > > > > > State of the Union speech, which identified three countries as
: > > > > > having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of
: > > > > > these countries.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy,
: > > > > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in
: > > > > > the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq
: > > > > > continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials
: > > > > > believed there was a parallel program in biological weapons, and
: > > > > > also that Iraqi leaders had the ability and the intent
: to restart
: > > > > > their nuclear program, if they had not already done so. Running
: > > > > > on the worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into
: > > > > > U.S. intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD and
: > > > > > likely to pass them on to al Qaeda.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There
: > > > > > are other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of
: > > > > > evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the
: > > > > > fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has
: > > > > > always argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and
: > > > > > strategic purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to
: > > > > > demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity
: > > > > > of the United States; strategically, it was designed to position
: > > > > > the United States to coerce countries such as Saudi
: Arabia, Syria
: > > > > > and Iran into changing their policies toward
: suppressing al Qaeda
: > > > > > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were
: > > > > > achieved.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It
: > > > > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political
: > > > > > justification for the war. It was understood that countries like
: > > > > > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with
: > > > > > Washington in a policy that would make the United States the
: > > > > > arbiter of the Middle East. Washington had to find a
: > > > > > justification for the war that these allies would find
: > > > > > irresistible.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass
: destruction.
: > > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a
: > > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no
: > > > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally
: > > > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush
: > > > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was
: > > > > > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's
: > > > > > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept
: > > > > > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the real
: > > > > > outcome -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public
: > > > > > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or
: > > > > > Russia to endorse military action. They continued to resist
: > > > > > because they fully understood the outcome -- intended or not --
: > > > > > would be U.S. domination of the Middle East, and they did not
: > > > > > want to see that come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the
: > > > > > WMD issue on its head, arguing that if that was the real issue,
: > > > > > then inspections by the United Nations would be the way to solve
: > > > > > the problem. Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD;
: > > > > > what they did deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They
: > > > > > also argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection
: > > > > > process would either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or
: > > > > > justify an invasion at that point. What is important
: here is that
: > > > > > French and Russian leaders shared with the United States the
: > > > > > conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought
: > > > > > weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if they were
: > > > > > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S.
: > > > > > power in the Middle East.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of
: > > > > > assumptions. There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime
: > > > > > probably had WMD. The issue between the United States and its
: > > > > > allies was strategic. After the war, the United States would
: > > > > > become the dominant power in the region, and it would use this
: > > > > > power to force regional governments to strike at al Qaeda.
: > > > > > Germany, France and Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power,
: > > > > > opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in the
: > > > > > alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over
: > > > > > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American
: > > > > > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke
: > > > > > and mirrors -- rather than its private view.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all
: > > > > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military
: > > > > > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification
: > > > > > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved
: and no one
: > > > > > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is
: > > > > > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might
: > > > > > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or destroyed
: > > > > > them so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the
: > > > > > kicker the Bush administration never counted on.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers
: > > > > > could range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD,
: > > > > > being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here
: > > > > > is that the WMD question was not the reason the United States
: > > > > > went to war. The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic
: > > > > > base from which to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran
: and Saudi
: > > > > > Arabia into using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within
: > > > > > their borders. From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be
: > > > > > working.
: > > > > >
: > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United
: > > > > > States walked into a trap. The question of the location
: of WMD is
: > > > > > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense
: > > > > > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's
: > > > > > WMD is also important. But these questions are
: ultimately trivial
: > > > > > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a war in
: > > > > > which Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the problem
: > > > > > is that it created a situation in which the American public had
: > > > > > one perception of the reason for the war while the
: war's planners
: > > > > > had another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that will
: > > > > > last for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have
: > > > > > created.
: > > > > >
: ...................................................................
: > > > > >
: > > > > > ------
: > > > > >
: > > > > > -Gel
: > > > > >
: > > > > >
: > > > > >
: > > > > >
: > > > > >
: > > > >
: > > >
: > > >
: > >
: > >
: >
: >
:
:
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