On Fri, May 19, 2006 at 09:36:13PM +0200, Helge Preuss wrote: > > One, can't everybody discover you run freenet by doing a portscan on > your computer? I assume that would be a more efficient way to > mass-detect freenet nodes than smuggling hostile nodes into freenet - > especially if you're a government agency with broad resources.
No. They can't. > > Two, they mentioned that a major aim is to get many people to run > freenet. That is obvious. But how would you achieve this goal if > people are forced to *personally know* other people connected to the > network? What do I do if I'm, say, a dissident with no special > knowledge of computers and no hacker friends either? You're in trouble in any case in that situation, because opennet *will be harvested and blocked*. Last year the chinese blocked freenet 0.5, not by harvesting, but by its protocol signature (that shouldn't be possible with 0.7); they will harvest and block if they have to. > Do I just give up > and sit on my single freenet node? Or do I turn to a centralized > service, thus rendering the web of trust obsolete? The centralized service will be blocked. > > Maybe (probably) I misunderstood something. But I don't see how the > two goals - trusted connections and wide coverage - go together. And > given that you can be detected with a portscan anyway, isn't it > practical just to forget about the web of trust and maximize coverage > instead? No, *you cannot be detected with a portscan*. And if we were *only* interested in numbers, we'd be building Kazaa, not Freenet. > > Regards > > Helge -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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