You are right; Greece was one of Il Duce's mistakes. He was jealous of Hitler's successes and wanted one of his own. Hitler was not a happy camper when he heard about it.
What is being neglected is that Yugoslavia had also gone pro-Ally. Hitler could not have invaded Russia with that flank open. He had to take out Yugoslavia and Greece to clear that flank. And did so in fairly short order. Which did help to delay him too long on the inital blitzkieg - though there were other factors at work also. The British did not cover themselves with glory in Greece. One point that I remember was that, imbued with classical education, the British figured to stop the Germans at Thermopylae, not realizing the terrain had changed just a bit since the days of Leonidas. Thermopylae was no longer a narrow pass, but a reasonably wide plain and the Germans roared on through. There was a fair amount of classical nostalgia with the decision to go into Greece and it certainly did prevent the British from cleaning out North Africa before Rommel could set up shop. But it did pay dividends later on. I would put forward the thesis that the British effort then was what caused Stalin to cede control of Greece to the British at the end of the war. Certainly it was against Stalin's geopolitical interests. There was a very strong Communist movement in Greece and control of Greece would have put the squeeze on the Bosporus for the warm-water ports which have always been a Russian objective. Greece was also a jumping-off point for the Germans for a pincer on Egypt through Syria. The Germans did use Vichy airfields in Syria to supply Arab insurgents. It's sometimes fashionable to pooh-pooh British military abilities, but their negation of the Syrian/Iraqi/Palestinian threat to their rear with totally inadequate forces speaks very well of their high command abilities. Monday-morning quarterbacking is all very well, but we must remember that decisions are always made on the spot with very imperfect information. It's a miltary truism that victory goes to the general who makes the fewest mistakes. And in playing "what if?" you can't just change one parameter. That's dirty pool. If, on the second day at Gettysburg, Dan Sickles hadn't put forward his salient into the Peach Orchard and Wheat Field, the Round Tops might well have been occupied by the Federals sooner and in greater strength, negating any potential Rebel flanking maneuver. Studying military history is very valuable but only if one realizes the limitations the players were operating under. Given the particular circumstances and with the information available, was this the right decision? Would it have been possible to obtain further information in a timely manner and would that have changed the decision? Churchill and his generals were always operating under heavy pressure. They made mistakes. At the end of the day, however, the Germans made more. Jonathan Hayes -------------- Original message from Stirling Newberry <[email protected]>: -------------- The military factors in Greece included the reality that the Greeks had just defeated the Italian Army, and control of the Aegean Islands would be helpful to the German ability to resupply AfrikaCorps and further expansion, and the possibility of creating, however small a new front to the war. Hitler too, had to take time and resources away from a more important goal: Operation Barbarossa, as well as having to reduce attacks on the United Kingdom itself because of limits to availability of air power. Part of the result is that Greece was a continuous sore for the Germans and had one of the most dangerous resistance movements in Greece. Even at this distance, judgment on Greece varies widely from a blunder to the turning point in the war, it makes it hard to regard this as unequivocally Churchill's greatest mistake. >From the long stand point, the Battle of Greece gave valuable insight into >fighting the Wehrmacht, including occasions where the components of the >blitzkrieg were thwarted or thrown into confusion. While, given the military >facts, these were far short of being able to stop the invasion in Greece, they >were important later on. For the first time a Panzer attack was blunted, the >German airborne forces took heavy casualties, leading Hitler to forbid further >airborne actions in Crete, heavy use of the German air capacity to support the >invasion and contest the evacuation, took materiel away from the German air >attacks on Britain, then still on going, and for potential counter attacks by >the RAF against Germany. There is also no assurance that the additional forces would have, in fact, turned the tide in North Africa. This is leaving aside the obvious reason to want to support an country that had just bloodied the axis nose, and was ready to fight the invasion. In this case, both Hitler and Churchill were acting on instinct. Hitler's to never let anyone stand who had been pushed down, and Churchill's of thwarting anything that the enemy wanted badly to do, as well as to create chances to go on the attack. In the end, the Germans got the worse of the deal, Greece gained them little to nothing in the course of the war, and cost them the resources to take and hold it, where as the Commonwealth's commitment was largely completed by 1941, other than the Naval Blockade, which would have been required anyway as the German's had access to Bulgaria. What one might better say is that invading Greece was one of Il Duce's mistakes, leaving Hitler to clean up the mess, and Churchill a stab at exploiting it. On May 1, 2010, at 3:46 PM, richard geschke wrote: The whole intent of the British strategy at this time in Africa and the whole of the Mediterranean was to keep the Nazis occupied in the so-called soft underbelly. Along with America's supplying Russia and with strategic bombing of Germany, the grand strategy was to make Germany use more of its assets against the Western Allies and less of their assets in fighting on the Eastern front. In this scenario with Greece, Churchill had finally a chance to keep a promise. Although militarily this proved to be a disaster, in the long run it contributed to the ultimate defeat of Germany. It's like a football coach spreading the opposition's defense and although the play doesn't work, down the road it proves fatal to that defense. Churchill knew from WWI that attrition would come into play and like a grand chess player certain pieces are sacrificed to obtain the ultimate victory. Churchill never dwelled on the defeats his eyes were always focused ahead, and like a great chess player his mind was racing many moves ahead of his adversaries. Richard C. Geschke Date: Sat, 1 May 2010 08:27:16 -0500 Subject: Re: [ChurchillChat] Churchill's "worst" decision may have been among his best. From: [email protected] To: [email protected] On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:29 AM, Jonathan Sandys <[email protected]> wrote: History, Churchill's greatest weapon and Hitler's greatest downfall. Hitler knew his country's history, but his own arrogance and anger forced him to choose campaigns mostly fought and lost during the First World War, using his own belief in the correct strategy, which in many cases was right and successful, but eventually led to his defeat when he became over confident and instead of focusing on the end result, lite his victory cigar long before the 'fat lady', or in my great- grandfather's case, 'the portly man' sang. Churchill knew British and ancient history and he based many campaigns of wars within the Roman and British Empires, using victories by worthy adversaries and allies such as Spartacus, Julius Ceaser, even Napoleon and certainly Nelson. My great-grandfather saw the big picture and focused his thoughts on the 'end-game' while recognising, like Elizabeth I, and the early plot against her life that victory was not guaranteed and the only thing that was assured was that the determined victory would be a result that history would always recognise was a very close thing. Though I doubt it was an intentional sacrifice for a parallel reason, the discussion made me wonder whether Churchill knew about one point of controversy in the history of the U.S. Civil War -- on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, when the Union commander on the left wing pushed forward rather recklessly into the Peach Orchard to meet Hood's advancing troops. The Union forces could not hold it, and were pushed back with heavy casualties, and I believe their commanding officer who'd ordered and led it was killed. But there is a serious argument that the fighting there held up the Confederate advance long enough for the 20th Maine and a couple other regiments to reach and form up along Little Round Top, and that without the time the Peach Orchard bought, the Union might not have been able to hold off the Confederates trying to sweep around their flank and into Meade's rear. It was uncomfortably close as it was, that day. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ChurchillChat" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat?hl=en. Hotmail has tools for the New Busy. Search, chat and e-mail from your inbox. Learn more. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ChurchillChat" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ChurchillChat" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ChurchillChat" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat?hl=en.
