--- In [email protected], "LeaNder" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > --- In [email protected], Bob <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
correction: "The only really odd thing I remember on Saeed Sheikh is that wrote a diary, and the diary is the basis of what we know about him. If I watch a thriller and the diary helps solve the case - I am immediately take a skeptical look at the larger theme park of the screenwriter." ... is that he wrote a jail diary and that this diary is the main basis of our knowledge about him. Wrong? -b > > mark urban wrote: > > > A little background on Bojinka is in order. This is a WAashington > > > Post Article on Bojinka by none other than Zbig's nephewL > > In Bojinka, WTCbomb, and several raids in Pakistan, > > 911 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 911 > > moneyman Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh always escaped, > > while in Bojinka KSM's nephew-in-law[?] Ramzi Yousef > > escaped, but was later sacrificed in favor of KSM > > escaping again. When KSM was arrested in Pakistan, > > 911 moneyman Saeed Sheikh was present but not > > arrested, and KSM was released. KSM and Saeed > > Sheikh worked together to kidnap and murder > > Wall St Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, > > which served the interests of Porter Goss, who had > > travelled to Pakistan to meet with KSM and Saeed > > Sheikh's boss, Pak ISI General Mahmud Amad, and > > again Goss met with Amad in DC the morning of > > September 11, 2001. > > Not much time, but quite possibly in this topic our tastes converge. > > Still haven't read the French philosopher's book on Daniel Pearl. > These characters are interesting, Saeed Sheikh definitely is. > But somehow I think the evidence on them involved was much dependant > on witnesses. Witnesses come in all shades. > > Aside: Not long ago I met a very, very old friend, he told me he had > read Bowles lately and that Paul described perfectly the recruiting of > the aspiring male young in Marocco. The recruiters used Islam as one > of the general parameters. > > Wouldn't it be really interesting to look into the recruiting process? > > > > Saeed Sheikh also escaped from prison in India. Pak > > ISI POW Saeed Sheikh was released by India because > > Pak ISI hijacked an Indian jet and held its passengers > > hostage until India released Saeed Sheikh. > > He escaped? That I don't seem to remember?! The net is not "too" rich > and deep on these issues. Quite possibly since we can't follow the > links to the domains where our confusion with their names is the big > joke of the day! > > The only really odd thing I remember on Saeed Sheikh is that wrote a > diary, and the diary is the basis of what we know about him. If I > watch a thriller and the diary helps solve the case - I am immediately > take a skeptical look at the larger theme park of the screenwriter. > > > > Pak ISI hijacked jets again on 911. Saudi royals and > > Saudi intel and Pak ISI were the contracting layer > > between CIA and the hijackers. Current CIA director > > Porter Goss earned that office by meeting with Pak > > ISI boss of 911 mastermind KSM and 911 moneyman > > Saeed Sheikh in Pakistan in August 2001 and again > > in DC the morning of September 11, 2001. > > ... hmmm ... the "accidental" meeting does not give us enough footing > to base a strong case on. ... It's something that could have easily > been avoided. And "plotlike" (I am a aware that life is much less > profound) this could contradict the involvement theory, if we follow > our leads to the very end. Somehow it mirrors Atta's visit in Prague. > > > > Bojinka means KSM and Ramzi Yousef getting away > > again, either bombing or hijacking another plane, > > more teflon arrest records suggesting CIA and MI6 > > get out of jail free card. Moussaoui said that Saeed > > Sheikh was an FBI and MI6 informant. > > > > -Bob > > Via what channels did Moussaoui speak? His lawyer? I am not too > familiar with his case, but very familiar with the problems > surrounding the German trials. The central problem was that Moussaoui > couldn't be heard on the trials over here. > > -b > > > > > > > > Bust and Boom > > > Six years before the September 11 attacks, Philippine police took > > > down an al Qaeda cell that had been plotting, among other things, to > > > fly explosives-laden planes into the Pentagon > > > In 1995, Aida Fariscal, a senior inspector for the Philippine > > > police, took down an al Qaeda cell that had been plotting to fly > > > explosives-laden planes into the Pentagon -- and possibly some > > > skyscrapers. (Photo Illustration by Amy Guip) > > > > > > By Matthew Brzezinski > > > Sunday, December 30, 2001; Page W09 > > > > > > > > > It was already evening, here on the other side of the international > > > date line, when the first plane struck the North Tower of the World > > > Trade Center. Aida Fariscal had gone to bed early on September 11, > > > only to be awakened by a frantic colleague. "Quick," he > > > instructed, "turn on your television." > > > > > > The footage of the hijacked airliner bursting into flame made > > > Fariscal bolt upright. "Oh my God," she gasped. "Bojinka." > > > > > > For the retired Philippine policewoman, that word and the nightmare > > > scenario it evoked had receded into distant memory these past six > > > years. Sometimes weeks went by without her even thinking about the > > > terrorist plot she had foiled so long ago. But there it was, after > > > all this time, unfolding live on her small-screen television. "I > > > thought, at first," she tells me, "that I was having a bad dream, or > > > that I was watching a movie." But as the burning towers came > > > crashing down under their own weight, disbelief turned to anger. "I > > > still don't understand," she says over a club sandwich, "how it > > > could have been allowed to happen." > > > > > > We are having lunch at a chicken rotisserie in a busy Manila > > > shopping center, not far from the Dona Josefa Apartments, where it > > > all started, where she -- and the CIA and the FBI -- first heard the > > > words "Operation Bojinka." Fariscal has insisted on a corner table, > > > so she can keep an eye on the other patrons and the shoppers beyond > > > the restaurant's greasy glass partition. Old habits, she explains, > > > die hard, and, after a life of fighting crime, she always takes > > > security precautions, especially now that she is off the force, a > > > widowed grandmother living off a police pension in a small one- > > > bedroom apartment. Her brother, in fact, is supposed to swing by the > > > rotisserie -- just to make sure I am who I say I am. > > > > > > As we speak, she seems bitter, and surprisingly fragile in her hoop > > > earrings and bright pink lipstick. She is bitter that the generals > > > in the Philippine high command hogged all the credit for Bojinka, > > > while all she received was $700 and a free trip to Taiwan. She is > > > bitter that the Americans apparently didn't take the foiled plot > > > seriously enough. But most of all, she is angry that, in the end, > > > her hunch didn't save thousands of lives after all. "I can't get > > > those images," she says of the World Trade Center wreckage, "out of > > > my mind." > > > > > > The call came in shortly after 11 on a Friday night back in January > > > 1995: a routine fire alarm, some smoke spotted on the top floor of a > > > six-story building just down the street from Manila Police Station > > > No. 9. Fariscal, the watch commander, peered out of the precinct > > > house window, but couldn't see any sign of a blaze on Quirino > > > Avenue. Still, she dispatched Patrolman Ariel Fernandez to check it > > > out. "Nothing to worry about," he reported when he returned a few > > > minutes later. "Just some Pakistanis playing with firecrackers." > > > > > > Fariscal wasn't so sure. She hadn't earned her senior inspector > > > stripes by sitting down on the job, and had risen in the male- > > > dominated ranks of the Manila police force by trusting her "female > > > intuition." And her instinct that night told her something was wrong. > > > > > > "The pope was coming to the Philippines, we were worried about > > > security, and on top of that we had just had a big typhoon," she > > > recalls. The senior inspector decided to walk the 500 yards to the > > > Dona Josefa Apartments to see for herself. She barely had time to > > > change out of her civilian clothes, a flower-patterned dress and > > > sandals, and she didn't think she needed her gun. But just in case, > > > she ordered Patrolman Fernandez and another officer to tag along as > > > backup while she picked her way past the uprooted trunks of palm > > > trees. > > > > > > The Dona Josefa apartment building was a well-kept but not luxurious > > > residence, with an open lobby and an airy feel. It was often used > > > for short-term rentals by Middle Eastern tourists, who came to > > > Manila's neon-lit Malate nightclub district to get away from the > > > strict mores back home. It was also a block away from the papal > > > nunciature, where John Paul II would be staying. > > > > > > "What's happening here, boss?" Fariscal asked the Dona Josefa > > > doorman in Tagalog, a native tongue of the Philippines. Two men, he > > > said, had fled their sixth-floor apartment, pulling on their pants > > > as they ran in the smoky corridor. "They told me everything was > > > under control, just some fireworks that accidentally went off." > > > > > > Fariscal faced a quandary. She couldn't legally enter the apartment > > > without a search warrant, now that there was no longer an imminent > > > danger of fire. But she couldn't simply walk away, either. She was > > > stubborn that way. It was one reason why in 1977, after 17 years as > > > a homemaker raising four children, she had decided to enroll in the > > > police academy. "Open it up," she instructed. > > > > > > Suite 603 was a cluttered one-bedroom bachelor pad. The first thing > > > Fariscal noticed was four hot plates, still in their packing crates. > > > Bundles of cotton lay scattered around the room, soaked in some sort > > > of pungent beige solution, next to clear plastic containers of > > > various sizes and shapes bearing the stamp of German and Pakistani > > > chemical manufacturers. And loops of electrical wiring: green, > > > yellow, blue and red. > > > > > > Just then, the phone rang, causing Fariscal to jump with > > > fright. "I'd just seen a movie with Sylvester Stallone where the > > > telephone was booby-trapped," she recalls now. "Everybody out," she > > > ordered. They scrambled back downstairs, where the doorman appeared > > > to be in a high state of agitation. "That's one of them," he > > > whispered. "He's coming back." > > > > > > Patrolman Fernandez grabbed the suspect. He was young, in his mid-to- > > > late twenties, Fariscal guessed, and handsome in a rakish sort of > > > way. He said his name was Ahmed Saeed, that he was a commercial > > > pilot, and that he was just on his way to the precinct house to > > > explain any misunderstanding over the firecracker smoke. > > > > > > "There's the other one," interrupted the doorman, pointing to a > > > thin, bearded individual standing outside. Fariscal set off in his > > > direction. He was calmly talking on his cell phone, smoking a pipe > > > and watching her. For a brief instant their eyes met. Fariscal had > > > no idea she was looking at Ramzi Yousef, the man who had tried to > > > bring down the World Trade Center in 1993. > > > > > > The sound of gunfire froze Fariscal in her tracks. She had been > > > wounded a few years back when a bullet ripped through her left arm > > > and torso to lodge four centimeters from her spine, and the memory > > > left her skittish. But she whirled around just in time to see > > > Patrolman Fernandez aiming his service revolver at Saeed's fleeing > > > back. As the cops gave chase, the fugitive suddenly lurched forward, > > > sprawling on the pavement; he had tripped over the exposed roots of > > > a tree toppled by the typhoon. Saeed was back in custody. But his > > > accomplice had taken advantage of the confusion to melt into the > > > gathering crowd of street peddlers and gawkers. > > > > > > Neither Fariscal nor the two officers with her had any handcuffs, so > > > they improvised with rope from a clothesline and hauled Saeed to his > > > feet. "I'll give you $2,000 to let me go," he pleaded. Most Manila > > > police officers don't make that in a year. But Fariscal refused. > > > Concerned that the suspect would try to bolt again, she radioed the > > > precinct for a squad car. As usual, none was available. One of the > > > cops tried to hail down a passing "jeepney," the converted World War > > > II-vintage U.S. Army Jeeps pressed into service as cheap -- if not > > > always reliable -- public transportation in Manila. Finally, > > > Fariscal commandeered a minivan taxi and conscripted two burly > > > pedestrians to help watch Saeed during the short ride to the > > > precinct station. > > > > > > By now, the senior inspector had an inkling that she had stumbled > > > onto something big. She couldn't know, however, just how big her > > > discovery would turn out to be; that amid the clutter of the > > > chemicals and cotton at the Dona Josefa apartment, investigators > > > would unearth a plan that, with the benefit of hindsight, career CIA > > > officers today admit looks alarmingly like an early blueprint for > > > the September 11 attack on America. > > > > > > All Fariscal knew for the moment was that she had just nabbed some > > > sort of a terrorist -- and, in the Philippines, that could mean > > > anything. > > > > > > At the precinct Saeed signed a handwritten statement, in which -- > > > according to police records -- he again proclaimed his innocence and > > > claimed to be a simple tourist visiting a friend in the chemicals > > > import-export business. But, perhaps sensing that the game was up, > > > he complained to Fariscal that there are "two Satans that must be > > > destroyed: the pope and America." > > > > > > The senior inspector had already surmised that Pope John Paul II was > > > a target of assassination, a suspicion that was borne out when she > > > returned with the bomb squad to Suite 603 at 2:30 a.m. and found a > > > photograph of the pontiff tucked into the corner of a bedside > > > mirror, near a new crucifix, rosary and Bible. There were street > > > maps of Manila, plotting the papal motorcade's route; two remote- > > > control brass pipe bombs; and a phone message from a tailor saying > > > that the cassock Saeed had ordered was ready for a final fitting. > > > > > > By 4 in the morning the situation was deemed serious enough that the > > > first generals had started showing up on the scene, and a judge was > > > soon rousted out of bed to sign a belated search warrant. > > > > > > "It was obvious they had planned to dress someone up as a priest, > > > and smuggle the bomb past the Holy Father's security detail," > > > Fariscal recalls. But the sheer magnitude of the chemical arsenal > > > Fariscal found in Suite 603 also made it clear that the conspirators > > > had other, possibly even more ambitious, targets. The four new hot > > > plates needed to cook the concoctions made it clear the extremists > > > were gearing up for mass production. > > > > > > It took days for the bomb squad to draw up a complete inventory of > > > the apartment's contents, which included a cornucopia of explosive > > > ingredients -- sulfuric, picric and nitric acid, pure glycerin, > > > acetone, sodium trichlorate, nitrobenzoyl, ammonia, silver nitrates, > > > methanamine and ANFO binary explosive, among others. Funnels, > > > thermometers, graduated cylinders and beakers, mortars and pestles, > > > various electronic fusing systems, timers, circuit breakers, > > > batteries and a box of Rough Rider lubricated condoms rounded out > > > the home laboratory, which included chemistry reference manuals and > > > a recipe written in Arabic on how to build powerful liquid bombs. > > > > > > The formula, part of more than 200 pages of classified Philippine > > > and U.S. intelligence documents obtained by The Washington Post > > > Magazine, was chilling in its simplicity. Step One: "Put 0.5g of > > > sodium hydroxide with 30 ml of warm water. Add to them 3g of picric > > > acid . . ." Step Six: "By using an eye dropper, very slowly add > > > sulfuric acid to the liquid until its color is changed to orange, > > > then to brown . . ." Step Eleven: "Leave the mixture for 12 to 14 > > > hours to allow the acetone peroxide to precipitate, then wash on > > > filter paper until PH level=7 . . ." Final Step: "Put them in a dark > > > place to dry." > > > > > > That dark place turned out to be the cupboard under the apartment's > > > kitchen sink, where technicians found a foot-long finished bomb with > > > a Casio wristwatch timer. > > > > > > "The guys in the bomb squad had never seen an explosive like this > > > before," says Fariscal. Neither had many U.S. investigators. "The > > > particularly evil genius of this device was that it was virtually > > > undetectable by airport security measures," says Vincent > > > Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA's counterterrorism center. > > > > > > But what were the targets? And who were the conspirators? A clue to > > > the identity of the suspects emerged when Fariscal found dozens of > > > passports in different names hidden in a wall divider. Saeed, > > > apparently, had many aliases, including Abdul Hakim, student, age > > > 26, Pakistani passport No. C665334, issued in Kuwait. His real name, > > > investigators would eventually discover, was Abdul Hakim Murad. > > > According to transcripts from his interrogation, he was the > > > Pakistani-born son of a crane operator for a Kuwait petroleum > > > company. He had graduated from high school in Al-Jery, Kuwait, > > > before attending the Emirates Flying School in Dubai and moving on > > > to flight schools in Texas, Upstate New York and North Carolina, > > > where after completing the required 275 hours of flight time, he > > > received a commercial pilot's license from Coastal Aviation Inc. on > > > June 8, 1992. > > > > > > Philippine investigators called in their American counterparts for > > > help. This was standard operating procedure. According to U.S. and > > > Philippine officials interviewed for this article, both the CIA > > > Manila station chief and the resident FBI legal attache were > > > notified. A team of intelligence agents flew in from Washington. > > > > > > Murad, as Senior Inspector Fariscal now thought of Saeed, was a > > > suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. So, it turned out, > > > was his accomplice at the Dona Josefa Apartments, the thin, bearded > > > man who had given Fariscal the slip. He had registered under the > > > name Najy Awaita Haddad, purporting to be a Moroccan national. But > > > the United States already had a thick file on him, and that was just > > > one of his 21 known aliases. Sometimes he passed himself off as Paul > > > Vijay, or Adam Sali or even Dr. Richard Smith. He was in fact Ramzi > > > Ahmed Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a > > > fugitive with a $2 million bounty placed on his head by the U.S. > > > government. > > > > > > Fingerprints lifted at the apartment helped give Yousef away; a life > > > spent assembling bombs had left his fingers burnt and distinctively > > > deformed from mishaps mixing tricky chemical concoctions. He had > > > learned his deadly skills, Philippine officials said, in > > > Afghanistan, at a training camp for Osama bin Laden's followers, and > > > in turn had taught Murad the art of bomb making in Lahore, Pakistan. > > > > > > Apparently Murad had not learned his lessons well, for it was his > > > mistake that set off the fire in the kitchen sink that alerted > > > Manila police. In his haste to flee Suite 603, Yousef had left > > > behind many clues. Some, like contact lens solution and a receipt > > > from a pharmacy, seemed innocuous. But others would give the FBI and > > > the CIA a chilling preview of what the terrorists had in store for > > > the United States. > > > > > > The most damning information was gleaned from Yousef's notebook > > > computer, and four accompanying diskettes. The data were encrypted > > > and in Arabic, but Philippine technicians eventually deciphered the > > > code and translated the texts. One of Yousef's translated documents - > > > - stamped SECRET by Philippine intelligence -- spells out the > > > terrorist cell's broad objectives. "All people who support the U.S. > > > government are our targets in our future plans and that is because > > > all those people are responsible for their government's actions and > > > they support the U.S. foreign policy and are satisfied with it," it > > > declared. > > > > > > "We will hit all U.S. nuclear targets," the manifesto continued. "If > > > the U.S. government keeps supporting Israel, then we will continue > > > to carry out operations inside and outside the United States to > > > include -- " Here the text terminates ominously. > > > > > > Already, intelligence officials had gleaned an almost unparalleled > > > treasure-trove of information on the inner workings of bin Laden's > > > international terrorist network. Cell members did not appear to even > > > know one another's real names. Duties were divided and > > > compartmentalized, and none of the conspirators stayed in the same > > > place for any length of time. But there were still more frightening > > > revelations to come. > > > > > > Another file found on Yousef's computer consisted of a printout of > > > U.S. airline schedules, which initially baffled investigators. The > > > file, named Bojinka, listed the travel itineraries of 11 long-haul > > > flights between Asia and the United States, mostly on United and > > > American airlines. All the flights had several legs, and were > > > grouped under five headings bearing code names of accomplices such > > > as Zyed, Majbos or Obaid. Each accomplice would leave the bombs on > > > the first leg of the flight, and then eventually return to locations > > > like Lahore, Pakistan. Obaid, for instance, would fly from Singapore > > > to Hong Kong on United Flight 80, which continued as United Flight > > > 806 to San Francisco. Under the flight plan, Yousef had > > > written: "SETTING: 9:30 PM to 10:30 PM. TIMER: 23HR. BOJINKA: 20:30- > > > 21:30 NRT Date 5." > > > > > > Zyed, on the other hand, would take Northwest Airlines Flight 30 > > > from Manila to Seoul, with continued service to Los > > > Angeles. "SETTING: 8:30-9:00. TIMER: 10HR. BOJINKA: 19:30-20:00 NRT > > > Date 4," the accompanying instruction read. > > > > > > The repeated use of the word "TIMER" concerned investigators, who by > > > then had made the connection between the dozens of Casio > > > wristwatches found in Suite 603 and one discovered a few weeks > > > earlier on a Philippine Airlines flight from the Philippine town of > > > Cebu to Tokyo's Narita International Airport. The watch had served > > > to detonate a blast that ripped through the Boeing 747, killing a > > > Japanese passenger and forcing the plane to make an emergency > > > landing. > > > > > > Philippine intelligence put the screws to Murad. In Camp Crame, a > > > military installation on the outskirts of Manila, he was subjected > > > for 67 days to what Philippine intelligence reports delicately refer > > > to as TI, or tactical interrogation. By the time he was handed over > > > to the Americans, interrogators had extracted everything they > > > thought they needed to know. > > > > > > Yousef, Murad confessed, had indeed been responsible for the blast > > > aboard the Philippine airliner, which was actually a dry run to test > > > the terrorists' new generation of nitroglycerin explosive, known as > > > a "Mark II" bomb. Yousef had deposited his device -- lethal liquid > > > concealed in a contact lens solution bottle with cotton-ball > > > stabilizing agents and a harmless-looking wristwatch wrapped around > > > it -- under seat 27F on the Manila-to-Cebu leg of the flight to > > > Tokyo. He had gotten off in Cebu after setting the watch's timer for > > > four hours later. The same plan, code-named Operation Bojinka (which > > > is pronounced Bo-GIN-ka and means "loud bang" in Serbo-Croatian), > > > was to be repeated on the 11 American commercial jetliners, with the > > > timing devices synchronized to go off as the planes reached mid- > > > ocean. U.S. federal prosecutors later estimated that 4,000 > > > passengers would have died had the plot been successful. The > > > enormity of Bojinka also frightened U.S. officials. "We had never > > > seen anything that complicated or ambitious before. It was > > > unparalleled," recalls Vincent Cannistraro, the former CIA > > > counterterrorism head. > > > > > > But, Philippine and U.S intelligence officials said, the Bojinka > > > operation called for a second, perhaps even more ambitious phase, as > > > interrogators discovered when they pressed Murad about his pilot's > > > license. All those years in flight school, he confessed, had been in > > > preparation for a suicide mission. He was to buy, rent, or steal -- > > > that part of the plan had not yet been worked out -- a small plane, > > > preferably a Cessna, fill it with explosives and crash it into CIA > > > headquarters. > > > > > > There were secondary targets the terrorist cell wanted hit: > > > Congress, the White House, the Pentagon and possibly some > > > skyscrapers. The only problem, Murad complained, was that they > > > needed more trained pilots to carry out the plot. > > > > > > "It's so chilling," says Fariscal, as our meal at the chicken > > > rotisserie winds down. "Those kamikaze pilots trained in America, > > > just like Murad." We have talked for four hours and the food has > > > long grown cold. As she speaks, Fariscal often grows emotional, and > > > at times when her frustration reaches a fever pitch she lapses into > > > Tagalog, and I ask her to slow down and translate. > > > > > > "The FBI knew all about Yousef's plans," she says. "They'd seen the > > > files, been inside 603. The CIA had access to everything, too. > > > Look," she adds, fishing in a plastic shopping bag for one of her > > > most prized possessions, a laminated certificate of merit bearing > > > the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency. "Awarded to Senior > > > Inspector Aida D. Fariscal," it reads. "In recognition of your > > > personal outstanding efforts and cooperation." > > > > > > "This should have never, ever been allowed to happen," she repeats > > > angrily. "All those poor people dead." > > > > > > In her outrage at the biggest U.S. intelligence failure since Pearl > > > Harbor, Fariscal is not alone in the Manila law enforcement > > > community. Gen. Avelino "Sonny" Razon, one of the lead investigators > > > in the Bojinka case, was so shocked at what he saw on September 11 > > > that he jumped on a plane in Cebu, where he was now police chief, > > > and flew to Manila to convene a hasty press conference. "We told the > > > Americans about the plans to turn planes into flying bombs as far > > > back as 1995," he complained to reporters. "Why didn't they pay > > > attention?" > > > > > > U.S. officials counter that they did pay attention. FBI spokesman > > > John E. Collingwood denies that the bureau had advance knowledge of > > > a plot to turn airliners into flying bombs. "The FBI had no warnings > > > about any hijack plots. There was a widely publicized 1995 > > > conspiracy in Manila to remotely blow up 11 U.S. airliners over the > > > Pacific," Collingwood said in a letter to the editor to The Post in > > > October, "but that was disrupted. And, as is the practice, what was > > > learned in that investigation was widely disseminated, even > > > internationally, and thoroughly analyzed by multiple agencies. It > > > does not connect to the current case." > > > > > > Not everyone in the American intelligence community, however, is of > > > the same mind. "There certainly were enough precursors that should > > > have led analysts to suspect that the U.S could come under domestic > > > attack," says Cannistraro, the 27-year intelligence veteran who ran > > > the CIA's counterterrorism division until 1990. "There's no question > > > about it. We knew about the pilots and suicide plots. Just didn't > > > put two and two together." > > > > > > That failure to connect the dots -- or at the very least, monitor > > > Middle Eastern students at U.S. flight schools -- lies at the heart > > > of the intelligence breakdown, says Cannistraro. (One indication of > > > just how politically sensitive this issue has become occurred the > > > day after Gen. Razon's impromptu Manila press conference. His candid > > > remarks earned him an official rebuke from President Gloria > > > Macapagal Arroyo, who has been anxious not to embarrass Washington, > > > the Philippines' staunchest ally and patron. "I'm sorry," Razon > > > says, when I call him in Cebu. "I would like to talk to you, and > > > there is much to say. But the president has forbidden me to speak > > > publicly on the subject of Bojinka.") > > > > > > To be fair, it's a big leap from stealing a Cessna to commandeering > > > a Boeing 767. "It's the imagination that failed us," says a former > > > senior CIA agent, "not the system." He dismissed the connection to > > > Bojinka as a "hindsight is cheap" theory. > > > > > > Yet it is precisely the responsibility of the agency's thousands of > > > planners and analysts to dream up what may appear as crazy scenarios > > > in order to find ways to thwart them. And it is unclear what became > > > of the information gleaned from Operation Bojinka. > > > > > > "We didn't file it and forget about it," a CIA spokeswoman assures > > > me. Indeed, shortly after Yousef's liquid bombs were discovered, the > > > Federal Aviation Administration did begin installing "sniffer" > > > devices, which can detect explosive chemicals, at major airports > > > throughout America. But beyond that, there is no evidence of any > > > other clear response by the intelligence community to the > > > information gleaned from the foiled plot in the Philippines. > > > > > > The terrorists, on the other hand, appear to have drawn a number of > > > invaluable conclusions from their 1995 setback. "Under interrogation > > > Murad told us several things that should have been of interest to > > > analysts on the deterrence side," recalls retired Gen. Renato De > > > Villa, who served as Philippines defense minister at the time of the > > > raid on Suite 603. First, the extremists saw the 1993 World Trade > > > Center bombing as a failure and still considered the twin towers a > > > viable target. And more importantly, the cell seemed to be growing > > > frustrated with explosives. They were too expensive, unstable and > > > could give them away. > > > > > > Though nothing in Murad's confession gave investigators any warning > > > of hijackings, somewhere along the line, his brothers at arms in al > > > Qaeda did make the intellectual leap from explosives to jet fuel and > > > box cutters. > > > > > > One reason U.S counterterrorism officials may not have been able to > > > outwit the terrorists, critics charged, is because the entire > > > intelligence community has become too reliant on technology rather > > > than human resources. "Where the system breaks down," says a former > > > staff member of President Clinton's National Security Council who > > > regularly attended briefings on bin Laden at Langley, "is not at the > > > hunting and gathering stage" -- the ability to electronically > > > intercept information. "We are probably tapped into every hotel room > > > in Pakistan. We can listen in to just about every phone call in > > > Afghanistan," explains the former NSC staffer. "Where the rubber > > > hits the pavement is with the analysts. They are a bunch of 24-year- > > > old recent grads from Middlebury or Dartmouth who have never been to > > > Pakistan or Afghanistan, don't speak any of the relevant languages, > > > and seem more knowledgeable about the bar scene in Georgetown. They > > > just don't compare to the Soviet specialists we used to have. I'm > > > not surprised they missed it." > > > > > > With the benefit of hindsight, Murad's confession today sounds > > > almost prophetic, and as U.S investigators backtrack, piecing > > > together bits of the puzzle left behind by the hijackers, the > > > specter of Bojinka looms large. As in the case of the September 11 > > > attacks, authorities in Manila following Suite 603's money trail > > > found that the deeper they dug, the closer they came to Osama bin > > > Laden. The critical clue was in Ramzi Yousef's notebook computer. A > > > list of cell phone numbers on its hard drive led authorities to > > > stake out another apartment in Manila, this one on Singalong Street. > > > There they apprehended a third conspirator in Yousef's terrorist > > > cell, a stocky Afghan by the name of Wali Khan Amin Shah. > > > > > > Like Yousef, Shah carried many passports under various aliases -- > > > Norwegian, Saudi, Afghan and four Pakistani, all filled with travel > > > visas and entry stamps from Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Shah > > > also had mangled hands, and was missing two fingers. Both his legs > > > were heavily scarred with shrapnel, and he had a large surgical scar > > > on his stomach. > > > > > > Shah turned out to be Bojinka's unlikely finance officer. To launder > > > incoming funds, Shah used bank accounts belonging to his live-in > > > Filipino girlfriend and a number of other Manila women, one of whom > > > was an employee at a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet, and others who > > > were described as bar hostesses. Most of the transfers were > > > surprisingly small -- $500 or $1,000 handed over at a Wendy's or a > > > karaoke bar late at night. Under "tactical interrogation" at Camp > > > Crame, Shah admitted that most of the funds were channeled to Adam > > > Sali, an alias used by Ramzi Yousef, through a Philippine bank > > > account belonging to Omar Abu Omar, a Syrian-born man working at a > > > local Islamic organization known as the International Relations and > > > Information Center -- run by one Mohammed Jalal Khalifa, Osama bin > > > Laden's brother-in-law. > > > > > > Shah's and Murad's confessions led to Yousef's arrest in Pakistan, > > > and the three suspects were extradited to New York to stand trial. > > > All three were sentenced to life in prison at a maximum-security > > > facility in Colorado, and Bojinka was filed in the "win" column, > > > even as Mohamed Atta and fellow September 11 hijackers were hatching > > > plans to enroll in flight schools around the country. > > > > > > That no one seemed to notice the connection, says Cannistraro, is > > > the great failure. > > > > > > In 1998, on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the first World > > > Trade Center bombing, Dale Watson, the FBI's top expert on > > > international terror, reported to a Senate Judiciary subcommittee > > > that "although we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into a > > > false sense of security . . . I believe it is important to note that > > > in the five years since the Trade Center bombing, no significant act > > > of foreign-directed terrorism has occurred on American soil." > > > > > > Three years later, September 11, 2001, the suicide attacks coincided > > > almost to the day, with another fifth anniversary: the 1996 > > > conviction, in a Manhattan court, of Bojinka's original plotters. > > > > > > Matthew Brzezinski is the author of Casino Moscow. He will be > > > fielding questions and comments about this article at 1 p.m. > > > Wednesday on www.washingtonpost.com/liveonline. > > > > > > > > > © 2001 The Washington Post Company > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > considering that Bojinka material was --- In cia- > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Jim Rarey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/14/politics/14terror.html? > > > th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print > > > > > > > > They still will not admit they knew the full Bojinka plan > > > including the intended targets. Sandy Berger risked going to prison > > > to destroy the evidence that President Clinton, others and himself > > > had knowledge of the plan well before 9/11. JR > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ------------- > > > > > > > > September 14, 2005 > > > > F.A.A. Alerted on Qaeda in '98, 9/11 Panel Said > > > > By ERIC LICHTBLAU > > > > WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 - American aviation officials were warned as > > > early as 1998 that Al Qaeda could "seek to hijack a commercial jet > > > and slam it into a U.S. landmark," according to previously secret > > > portions of a report prepared last year by the Sept. 11 commission. > > > The officials also realized months before the Sept. 11 attacks that > > > two of the three airports used in the hijackings had suffered > > > repeated security lapses. > > > > > > > > Federal Aviation Administration officials were also warned in 2001 > > > in a report prepared for the agency that airport screeners' ability > > > to detect possible weapons had "declined significantly" in recent > > > years, but little was done to remedy the problem, the Sept. 11 > > > commission found. > > > > > > > > The White House and many members of the commission, which has > > > completed its official work, have been battling for more than a year > > > over the release of the commission's report on aviation failures, > > > which was completed in August 2004. > > > > > > > > A heavily redacted version was released by the Bush administration > > > in January, but commission members complained that the deleted > > > material contained information critical to the public's > > > understanding of what went wrong on Sept. 11. In response, the > > > administration prepared a new public version of the report, which > > > was posted Tuesday on the National Archives Web site. > > > > > > > > While the new version still blacks out numerous references to > > > particular shortcomings in aviation security, it restores dozens of > > > other portions of the report that the administration had considered > > > too sensitive for public release. > > > > > > > > The newly disclosed material follows the basic outline of what was > > > already known about aviation failings, namely that the F.A.A. had > > > ample reason to suspect that Al Qaeda might try to hijack a plane > > > yet did little to deter it. But it also adds significant details > > > about the nature and specificity of aviation warnings over the > > > years, security lapses by the government and the airlines, and turf > > > battles between federal agencies. > > > > > > > > Some of the details were in confidential bulletins circulated by > > > the agency to airports and airlines, and some were in its internal > > > reports. > > > > > > > > "While we still believe that the entire document could be made > > > available to the public without damaging national security, we > > > welcome this step forward," the former leaders of the commission, > > > Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, said in a joint statement. "The > > > additional detail provided in this version of the monograph will > > > make a further contribution to the public record of the facts and > > > circumstances of the 9/11 attacks established by the final report of > > > the 9/11 commission." > > > > > > > > Bush administration officials said they had worked at the > > > commission's request to restore much of the material that had been > > > blacked out in the original report. "Out of an abundance of caution, > > > there are a variety of reasons why the U.S. government would not > > > want to disclose certain security measures and not make them > > > available in the public domain for terrorists to exploit," said Russ > > > Knocke, spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security. > > > > > > > > Commission officials said they were perplexed by the > > > administration's original attempts to black out material they said > > > struck them as trivial or mundane. > > > > > > > > One previously deleted section showed, for instance, that flights > > > carrying the author Salman Rushdie were subjected to heightened > > > security in the summer of 2001 because of a fatwa of violence > > > against him, while a previously deleted footnote showed that "sewing > > > scissors" would be allowed in the hands of a woman with sewing > > > equipment, but prohibited "in the possession of a man who possessed > > > no other sewing equipment." > > > > > > > > Other deletions, however, highlighted more serious security > > > concerns. A footnote that was originally deleted from the report > > > showed that a quarter of the security screeners used in 2001 by > > > Argenbright Security for United Airlines flights at Dulles Airport > > > had not completed required criminal background checks, the > > > commission report said. Another previously deleted footnote, related > > > to the lack of security for cockpit doors, criticized American > > > Airlines for security lapses. > > > > > > > > Much of the material now restored in the public version of the > > > commission's report centered on the warnings the F.A.A. received > > > about the threat of hijackings, including 52 intelligence documents > > > in the months before the Sept. 11 attacks that mentioned Al Qaeda or > > > Osama bin Laden. > > > > > > > > A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate, a report prepared by > > > intelligence officials, "highlighted the growing domestic threat of > > > terrorist attack, including a risk to civil aviation," the > > > commission found in a blacked-out portion of the report. > > > > > > > > And in 1998 and 1999, the commission report said, the F.A.A.'s > > > intelligence unit produced reports about the hijacking threat posed > > > by Al Qaeda, "including the possibility that the terrorist group > > > might try to hijack a commercial jet and slam it into a U.S. > > > landmark." > > > > > > > > The unit considered this prospect "unlikely" and a "last resort," > > > with a greater threat of a hijacking overseas, the commission found. > > > > > > > > Still, in 2000, the commission said, the F.A.A. warned carriers > > > and airports that while political conditions in the 1990's had made > > > a terrorist seizure of an airliner less likely, "we believe that the > > > situation has changed." > > > > > > > > "We assess that the prospect for terrorist hijacking has increased > > > and that U.S. airliners could be targeted in an attempt to obtain > > > the release of indicted or convicted terrorists imprisoned in the > > > United States." > > > > > > > > It concluded, however, that such a hijacking was more likely > > > outside the United States. > > > > > > > > By September 2001 the F.A.A. was receiving some 200 pieces a day > > > of intelligence from other agencies about possible threats, and it > > > had opened more than 1,200 files to track possible threats, the > > > commission found. > > > > > > > > The commission found that F.A.A. officials were repeatedly warned > > > about security lapses before Sept. 11 and, despite their increased > > > concerns about a hijacking, allowed screening performance to decline > > > significantly. > > > > > > > > While box cutters like those used by the hijackers were not > > > necessarily a banned item before Sept. 11, some security experts > > > have said that tougher screening and security could have detected > > > the threat the hijackers posed. But screening measures at two of the > > > three airports used by the hijackers - Logan in Boston and Dulles > > > near Washington - were known to be inadequate, the commission found. > > > Reviews at Newark airport also found some security violations, but > > > it was the only one of the three airports used on Sept. 11 that met > > > or exceeded national norms. > > > > > > > > Richard Ben-Veniste, a former member of the Sept. 11 commission, > > > said the release of the material more than a year after it was > > > completed underscored the over-classification of federal > > > material. "It's outrageous that it has taken the administration a > > > year since this monograph was submitted for it to be released," he > > > said. "There's no reason it could not have been released earlier." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > a.. Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Fair play? Video games influencing politics. 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